On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9744Keywords:
Matching, Random Assignment, Strategyproofness, Dynamic Preferences, Mechanism DesignAbstract
We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable.
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Published
2015-03-04
How to Cite
Hosseini, H., Larson, K., & Cohen, R. (2015). On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 29(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9744
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Student Abstract Track