On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences

Authors

  • Hadi Hosseini University of Waterloo
  • Kate Larson University of Waterloo
  • Robin Cohen University of Waterloo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9744

Keywords:

Matching, Random Assignment, Strategyproofness, Dynamic Preferences, Mechanism Design

Abstract

We consider the problem of repeatedly matching a set of alternatives to a set of agents in the absence of monetary transfer. We propose a generic framework for evaluating sequential matching mechanisms with dynamic preferences, and show that unlike single-shot settings, the random serial dictatorship mechanism is manipulable.

AAAI 2015 Proceedings Cover

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Published

2015-03-04

How to Cite

Hosseini, H., Larson, K., & Cohen, R. (2015). On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 29(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9744

Issue

Vol. 29 No. 1 (2015): Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Section

Student Abstract Track