Biased Games

Authors

  • Ioannis Caragiannis University of Patras
  • David Kurokawa Carnegie Mellon University
  • Ariel Procaccia Carnegie Mellon University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8831

Keywords:

game theory, Nash equilibrium, normal-form games, biased games

Abstract

We present a novel extension of normal form games that we call biased games. In these games, a player's utility is influenced by the distance between his mixed strategy and a given base strategy. We argue that biased games capture important aspects of the interaction between software agents. Our main result is that biased games satisfying certain mild conditions always admit an equilibrium. We also tackle the computation of equilibria in biased games.

AAAI 2014 Proceedings Cover

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Published

2014-06-21

How to Cite

Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., & Procaccia, A. (2014). Biased Games. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 28(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8831

Issue

Vol. 28 No. 1 (2014): Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms