Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods


  • Xinhang Lu University of New South Wales
  • Jannik Peters Technische Universität Berlin
  • Haris Aziz University of New South Wales
  • Xiaohui Bei Nanyang Technological University
  • Warut Suksompong National University of Singapore



GTEP: Social Choice / Voting


We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called EJR for mixed goods (EJR-M) and a weaker one called EJR up to 1 (EJR-1). We extend three multiwinner voting rules to our setting—GreedyEJR, the method of equal shares (MES), and proportional approval voting (PAV)—and show that while all three generalizations satisfy EJR-1, only the first one provides EJR-M. In addition, we derive tight bounds on the proportionality degree implied by EJR-M and EJR-1, and investigate the proportionality degree of our proposed rules.




How to Cite

Lu, X., Peters, J., Aziz, H., Bei, X., & Suksompong, W. (2023). Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 37(5), 5781-5788.



AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms