From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail


  • Xiaotie Deng Peking University
  • Yotam Gafni Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
  • Ron Lavi University of Bath, UK
  • Tao Lin Harvard University
  • Hongyi Ling ETH Zurich



GTEP: Auctions and Market-Based Systems, GTEP: Mechanism Design


We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design and symmetric contestants. The goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestants' sum of efforts. Our main result shows that optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest) form an equilibrium in the model with competition among contests. Under a very natural assumption these contests are in fact dominant, and the equilibria that they form are unique. Moreover, equilibria with the optimal contests are Pareto-optimal even in cases where other equilibria emerge. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare.




How to Cite

Deng, X., Gafni, Y., Lavi, R., Lin, T., & Ling, H. (2023). From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 37(5), 5608-5615.



AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms