Secretary Matching with Vertex Arrivals and No Rejections
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20437Keywords:
Game Theory And Economic Paradigms (GTEP)Abstract
Most prior work on online matching problems has been with the flexibility of keeping some vertices unmatched. We study three related online matching problems with the constraint of matching every vertex, i.e., with no rejections. We adopt a model in which vertices arrive in a uniformly random order and the edge-weights are arbitrary positive numbers. For the capacitated online bipartite matching problem in which the vertices of one side of the graph are offline and those of the other side arrive online, we give a 4.62-competitive algorithm when the capacity of each offline vertex is 2. For the online general (non-bipartite) matching problem, where all vertices arrive online, we give a 3.34-competitive algorithm. We also study the online roommate matching problem, in which each room (offline vertex) holds 2 persons (online vertices). Persons derive non-negative additive utilities from their room as well as roommate. In this model, with the goal of maximizing the sum of utilities of all persons, we give a 7.96-competitive algorithm. This is an improvement over the 24.72 approximation factor in prior work.Downloads
Published
2022-06-28
How to Cite
Goyal, M. (2022). Secretary Matching with Vertex Arrivals and No Rejections. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 36(5), 5051-5058. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20437
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Section
AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms