Power in Liquid Democracy

Authors

  • Yuzhe Zhang University of Groningen
  • Davide Grossi University of Groningen University of Amsterdam

Keywords:

Social Choice / Voting

Abstract

The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of several parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.

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Published

2021-05-18

How to Cite

Zhang, Y., & Grossi, D. (2021). Power in Liquid Democracy. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35(6), 5822-5830. Retrieved from https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/16729

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms