Power in Liquid Democracy
Keywords:Social Choice / Voting
AbstractThe paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of several parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.
How to Cite
Zhang, Y., & Grossi, D. (2021). Power in Liquid Democracy. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35(6), 5822-5830. Retrieved from https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/16729
AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms