Coupon Design in Advertising Systems

Authors

  • Weiran Shen Renmin University of China
  • Pingzhong Tang Tsinghua University
  • Xun Wang Tsinghua University
  • Yadong Xu Tsinghua University
  • Xiwang Yang Bytedance

Keywords:

Auctions and Market-Based Systems

Abstract

Online platforms sell advertisements via auctions (e.g., VCG and GSP auction) and revenue maximization is one of the most important tasks for them. Many revenue increment methods are proposed, like reserve pricing, boosting, coupons and so on. The novelty of coupons rests on the fact that coupons are optional for advertisers while the others are compulsory. Recent studies on coupons have limited applications in advertising systems because they only focus on second price auctions and do not consider the combination with other methods. In this work, we study the coupon design problem for revenue maximization in the widely used VCG auction. Firstly, we examine the bidder strategies in the VCG auction with coupons. Secondly, we cast the coupon design problem into a learning framework and propose corresponding algorithms using the properties of VCG auction. Then we further study how to combine coupons with reserve pricing in our framework. Finally, extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms based on both synthetic data and industrial data.

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Published

2021-05-18

How to Cite

Shen, W., Tang, P., Wang, X., Xu, Y., & Yang, X. (2021). Coupon Design in Advertising Systems. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35(6), 5717-5725. Retrieved from https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/16717

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms