MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism

Authors

  • Erel Segal-Halevi Ariel University
  • Avinatan Hassidim Bar-Ilan University
  • Yonatan Aumann Bar-Ilan University

Keywords:

Mechanism design, Auctions, Bilateral trade, Markets

Abstract

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.

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Published

2018-04-25

How to Cite

Segal-Halevi, E., Hassidim, A., & Aumann, Y. (2018). MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 32(1). Retrieved from https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/11450

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms