What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain

Authors

  • Edith Elkind University of Oxford
  • Piotr Faliszewski AGH Univesity of Science and Technology
  • Jean-Francois Laslier Paris School of Economics
  • Piotr Skowron University of Oxford
  • Arkadii Slinko University of Auckland
  • Nimrod Talmon Weizmann Institute of Science

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10612

Keywords:

multiwinner elections, Euclidean preferences, shortlisting, proportional representation

Abstract

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules — SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin–Courant, and PAV — for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

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Published

2017-02-10

How to Cite

Elkind, E., Faliszewski, P., Laslier, J.-F., Skowron, P., Slinko, A., & Talmon, N. (2017). What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10612

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms