Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods

Authors

  • Markus Brill University of Oxford
  • Jean-Francois Laslier Paris School of Economics
  • Piotr Skowron University of Oxford

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10600

Abstract

We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multi-winner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well established in the literature and in the actual practice of proportional representation. For instance, we show that Proportional Approval Voting induces the D'Hondt method and that Monroe's rule induces the largest remainder method. We also consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.

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Published

2017-02-10

How to Cite

Brill, M., Laslier, J.-F., & Skowron, P. (2017). Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10600

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms