TY - JOUR AU - Bloembergen, Daan AU - Grossi, Davide AU - Lackner, Martin PY - 2019/07/17 Y2 - 2024/03/29 TI - On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy JF - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence JA - AAAI VL - 33 IS - 01 SE - AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms DO - 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796 UR - https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/4003 SP - 1796-1803 AB - <p>Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group’s accuracy on variously structured social networks.</p> ER -