@article{Meir_Parkes_2015, title={Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty}, volume={29}, url={https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/9291}, DOI={10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9291}, abstractNote={ <p> We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a certain range. Given this uncertainty, we model agents who either minimize their worst-case cost (WCC) or their worst-case regret (WCR), and study implications on equilibrium existence, convergence through adaptive play, and efficiency. Under the WCC behavior the game reduces to a modified congestion game, and welfare improves when agents have moderate uncertainty. Under WCR behavior the game is not, in general, a congestion game, but we show convergence and efficiency bounds for a simple class of games. </p> }, number={1}, journal={Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, author={Meir, Reshef and Parkes, David}, year={2015}, month={Feb.} }