@article{Berger_Ezra_Feldman_Fusco_2024, title={Pandora’s Problem with Deadlines}, volume={38}, url={https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30015}, DOI={10.1609/aaai.v38i18.30015}, abstractNote={Pandora’s problem is a fundamental model that studies optimal search under costly inspection. In the classic version, there are n boxes, each associated with a known cost and a known distribution over values. A strategy inspects the boxes sequentially and obtains a utility that equals the difference between the maximum value of an inspected box and the total inspection cost. Weitzman (1979) presented a surprisingly simple strategy that obtains the optimal expected utility. In this work we introduce a new variant of Pandora’s problem in which every box is also associated with a publicly known deadline, indicating the final round by which its value may be chosen. This model captures many real-life scenarios where alternatives admit deadlines, such as candidate interviews and college admissions. Our main result is an efficient threshold-based strategy that achieves a constant approximation relative to the performance of the optimal strategy for the deadlines setting.}, number={18}, journal={Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, author={Berger, Ben and Ezra, Tomer and Feldman, Michal and Fusco, Federico}, year={2024}, month={Mar.}, pages={20337-20343} }