@article{Deng_Gafni_Lavi_Lin_Ling_2023, title={From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail}, volume={37}, url={https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/25696}, DOI={10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25696}, abstractNote={We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design and symmetric contestants. The goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestantsâ€™ sum of efforts. Our main result shows that optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest) form an equilibrium in the model with competition among contests. Under a very natural assumption these contests are in fact dominant, and the equilibria that they form are unique. Moreover, equilibria with the optimal contests are Pareto-optimal even in cases where other equilibria emerge. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare.}, number={5}, journal={Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, author={Deng, Xiaotie and Gafni, Yotam and Lavi, Ron and Lin, Tao and Ling, Hongyi}, year={2023}, month={Jun.}, pages={5608-5615} }