Belief Revision Games


  • Nicolas Schwind Transdisciplinary Research Integration Center
  • Katsumi Inoue National Institute of Informatics
  • Gauvain Bourgne CNRS, Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Univ Paris 06, UMR 7606, LIP6, F-75005
  • Sébastien Konieczny CRIL-CNRS, Université d'Artois
  • Pierre Marquis CRIL-CNRS, Université d'Artois



Belief Revision Games, Belief Change, Social Networks


Belief revision games (BRGs) are concerned with the dynamics of the beliefs of a group of communicating agents. BRGs are "zero-player" games where at each step every agent revises her own beliefs by taking account for the beliefs of her acquaintances. Each agent is associated with a belief state defined on some finite propositional language. We provide a general definition for such games where each agent has her own revision policy, and show that the belief sequences of agents can always be finitely characterized. We then define a set of revision policies based on belief merging operators. We point out a set of appealing properties for BRGs and investigate the extent to which these properties are satisfied by the merging-based policies under consideration.




How to Cite

Schwind, N., Inoue, K., Bourgne, G., Konieczny, S., & Marquis, P. (2015). Belief Revision Games. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 29(1).



AAAI Technical Track: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning