Novel Mechanisms for Online Crowdsourcing with Unreliable, Strategic Agents


  • Praphul Chandra Hewlett Packard, Indian Institute of Science
  • Yadati Narahari Indian Institute of Science
  • Debmalya Mandal Harvard University
  • Prasenjit Dey IBM Research



Crowdsourcing, Mechanism Design, Auctions, Reliability, Online


Motivated by current day crowdsourcing platforms and emergence of online labor markets, this work addresses the problem of task allocation and payment decisions when unreliable and strategic workers arrive over time to work on tasks which must be completed within a deadline. We consider the following scenario: a requester has a set of tasks that must be completed before a deadline; agents (aka crowd workers) arrive over time and it is required to make sequential decisions regarding task allocation and pricing. Agents may have different costs for providing service and these costs are private information of the agents. We assume that agents are not strategic about their arrival times but could be strategic about their costs of service. In addition, agents could be unreliable in the sense of not being able to complete the assigned tasks within the allocated time; these tasks must then be reallocated to other agents to ensure ontime completion of the set of tasks by the deadline. For this setting, we propose two mechanisms: a DPM (DynamicPrice Mechanism) and an ABM (Auction Based Mechanism). Both mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive compatible, budget feasible, and also satisfy ex-post individual rationality for agents who complete the allocated tasks. These mechanisms can be implemented in current day crowdsourcing platforms with minimal changes to the current interaction model.




How to Cite

Chandra, P., Narahari, Y., Mandal, D., & Dey, P. (2015). Novel Mechanisms for Online Crowdsourcing with Unreliable, Strategic Agents. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 29(1).



AAAI Technical Track: Human-Computation and Crowd Sourcing