Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences


  • Akihisa Sonoda Kyushu University
  • Etsushi Fujita Kyushu University
  • Taiki Todo Kyushu University
  • Makoto Yokoo Kyushu University



Individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and strategy- proofness are crucial properties of decision making functions, or mechanisms, in social choice literatures. In this paper we investigate mechanisms for exchange models where each agent is initially endowed with a set of goods and may have indifferences on distinct bundles of goods, and monetary transfers are not allowed. Sonmez (1999) showed that in such models, those three properties are not compatible in general. The impossibility, however, only holds under an assumption on preference domains. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the compatibility of those three properties when the assumption does not hold. We first establish a preference domain called top-only preferences, which violates the assumption, and develop a class of exchange mechanisms that satisfy all those properties. Each mechanism in the class utilizes one instance of the mechanisms introduced by Saban and Sethuraman (2013). We also find a class of preference domains called m-chotomous preferences, where the assumption fails and these properties are incompatible.




How to Cite

Sonoda, A., Fujita, E., Todo, T., & Yokoo, M. (2014). Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 28(1).



AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms