Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments


  • Taiki Todo Kyushu University
  • Haixin Sun Kyushu University
  • Makoto Yokoo Kyushu University



We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed with a set of indivisible goods and side payments are not allowed. We assume each agent can withhold some endowments, as well as misreport her preference. Under this assumption, strategyproofness requires that for each agent, reporting her true preference with revealing all her endowments is a dominant strategy, and thus implies individual rationality. Our objective in this paper is to analyze the effect of such private ownership in exchange economies with multiple endowments. As fundamental results, we first show that the revelation principle holds under a natural assumption and that strategyproofness and Pareto efficiency are incompatible even under the lexicographic preference domain. We then propose a class of exchange rules, each of which has a corresponding directed graph to prescribe possible trades, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the graph structure so that they satisfy strategyproofness.




How to Cite

Todo, T., Sun, H., & Yokoo, M. (2014). Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 28(1).



AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms