Ties Matter: Complexity of Manipulation when Tie-Breaking with a Random Vote
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8701Keywords:
voting, social choice, manipulation, strategic voting, tie-breakingAbstract
We study the impact on strategic voting of tie-breaking by means of considering the order of tied candidates within a random vote. We compare this to another non deterministic tie-breaking rule where we simply choose candidate uniformly at random. In general, we demonstrate that there is no connection between the computational complexity of computing a manipulating vote with the two different types of tie-breaking. However, we prove that for some scoring rules, the computational complexity of computing a manipulation can increase from polynomial to NP-hard. We also discuss the relationship with the computational complexity of computing a manipulating vote when we ask for a candidate to be the unique winner, or to be among the set of co-winners.