The Cascade Auction — A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions

Authors

  • Uriel Feige Weizmann Institute
  • Gil Kalai Hebrew University and Microsoft Research
  • Moshe Tennenholz Technion and Microsoft Research

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8560

Abstract

We introduce a sealed bid auction of a single item in which the winner is chosen at random among the highest k bidders according to a fixed probability distribution, and the price for the chosen winner is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price. We call such an auction a cascade auction. Our analysis suggests that this type of auction may give higher revenues compared to second price auction in cases of collusion.

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Published

2013-06-30

How to Cite

Feige, U., Kalai, G., & Tennenholz, M. (2013). The Cascade Auction — A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 27(1), 313-319. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v27i1.8560