Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting

Authors

  • Yuga Cohler Harvard College
  • John Lai Harvard University
  • David Parkes Harvard University
  • Ariel Procaccia Harvard University

Abstract

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envy-free allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value of the agents. Our goal is to pinpoint the most efficient allocations among all envy-free allocations. We provide tractable algorithms for doing so under different assumptions regarding the preferences of the agents.

Downloads

Published

2011-08-04

How to Cite

Cohler, Y., Lai, J., Parkes, D., & Procaccia, A. (2011). Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 25(1), 626-631. Retrieved from https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/7874

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Multiagent Systems