Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction

Authors

  • Abraham Othman Carnegie Mellon University
  • Tuomas Sandholm Carnegie Mellon University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7625

Keywords:

Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Envy

Abstract

Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in the core of the agents' true valuations. In each round of the iterative auction mechanism, agents act on envy quotes produced by the mechanism: hints that suggest the prices of the bundles they are interested in. We describe optimal methods of generating envy quotes for various core-selecting mechanisms. Prior work on core-selecting combinatorial auctions has required agents to have perfect information about every agent's valuations to achieve a solution in the core. In contrast, here a core solution is reached even in the private information setting.

Downloads

Published

2010-07-04

How to Cite

Othman, A., & Sandholm, T. (2010). Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 24(1), 829-835. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7625

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Multiagent Systems