Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting

Authors

  • Yiling Chen Harvard University
  • John Lai Harvard University
  • David Parkes Harvard University
  • Ariel Procaccia Harvard University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7621

Keywords:

Cake cutting, Mechanism design

Abstract

Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on fairness and consider a strikingly weak notion of truthfulness. In this paper we investigate the problem of cutting a cake in a way that is truthful and fair, where for the first time our notion of dominant strategy truthfulness is the ubiquitous one in social choice and computer science. We design both deterministic and randomized cake cutting algorithms that are truthful and fair under different assumptions with respect to the valuation functions of the agents.

Downloads

Published

2010-07-04

How to Cite

Chen, Y., Lai, J., Parkes, D., & Procaccia, A. (2010). Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 24(1), 756-761. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7621

Issue

Vol. 24 No. 1 (2010): Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Multiagent Systems