Game Theory Based Community-Aware Opinion Dynamics

Abstract

Understanding opinion evolution in complex social networks is crucial for modeling social influence and predicting collective behavior. Yet, most models overlook how community structures shape opinion updates, often assuming homogeneous influence. This abstraction neglects individuals’ stronger responsiveness to intra-community peers—an empirically observed driver of localized consensus and inter-group polarization. We propose GCAOFP, a co-evolutionary framework that jointly models opinion dynamics and community formation as an integrated process. In GCAOFP, agents strategically alternate between two coupled modules: (1) a Community Dynamics Module, where agents play a non-cooperative game to optimize community memberships based on opinion alignment and structural cohesion; and (2) an Opinion Adjustment Module, where agents revise opinions via a bounded-confidence mechanism modulated by community-induced influence weights. This dual-stage process captures the feedback loop between structure and opinion. We prove that GCAOFP converges to stable equilibria, ensuring intra-community consensus and inter-community diversity—dynamics that standard models fail to replicate. Experiments on real-world networks show that GCAOFP better reproduces localized opinion clusters, while offering strong scalability and interpretability, illuminating the strategic foundations of polarization.