

# The Emotional Baby Is Truly Deadly: Does Your Multimodal Large Reasoning Model Have Emotional Flattery Towards Humans?

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## Abstract

Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) have advanced visual-textual integration, enabling sophisticated human-AI interaction. While prior work has exposed MLRMs to visual jailbreaks, it remains underexplored how their reasoning capabilities reshape the security landscape under adversarial inputs. To fill this gap, we conduct a systematic security assessment of MLRMs and uncover a security-reasoning paradox: although deeper reasoning boosts cross-modal risk recognition, it also creates cognitive blind spots that adversaries can exploit. We observe that MLRMs oriented toward human-centric service are highly susceptible to users' emotional cues during the deep-thinking stage, often overriding safety protocols or built-in safety checks under high emotional intensity. Inspired by this key insight, we propose **EmoAgent**, an autonomous adversarial emotion-agent that orchestrates exaggerated affective prompts to hijack reasoning pathways. Even when visual risks are correctly identified, models can still produce harmful completions through emotional misalignment. We further identify persistent high-risk failure modes in transparent deep-thinking scenarios, such as MLRMs generating harmful reasoning masked behind seemingly safe responses. These failures expose misalignments between internal inference and surface-level behavior, eluding existing content-based safeguards. To quantify these risks, we introduce three metrics: (1) *Risk-Reasoning Stealth Score (RRSS)* for harmful reasoning beneath benign outputs; (2) *Risk-Visual Neglect Rate (RVNR)* for unsafe completions despite visual risk recognition; and (3) *Refusal Attitude Inconsistency (RAIC)* for evaluating refusal instability under prompt variants. Extensive experiments on advanced MLRMs demonstrate the effectiveness of EmoAgent and reveal deeper emotional cognitive misalignments in model safety.

## Introduction

Compared to earlier multimodal large language models (MLLMs) which mainly rely on shallow alignment between modalities (Wu et al. 2023), multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) incorporate explicit reasoning steps to enhance risk awareness and responsible decision-making, marking a new era for AI systems (Wang et al. 2024). These

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


Figure 1: Illustration of the model’s responses under different prompting strategies. Emotional prompts expose increasing safety risks in MLRMs.

capabilities have driven adoption in tasks such as multimodal assistance, creative generation, and decision-making recommendations, but they also reshape the attack surface in underexplored ways. We identify a critical gap: current safety evaluations focus on whether MLRMs can recognize hazards and give appropriate rejections, yet overlook the vulnerabilities introduced by “*multimodal + reasoning*”.<sup>1</sup>

To investigate this, we evaluate several advanced MLRMs on risk-infused inputs from MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al. 2024). As shown in Figure 1, we categorize prompts into three types: (1) *DirectInduce*, with original direct queries in MM-SafetyBench with explicit malicious intent, (2) *RationalPreempt*, with queries with rational disguise, where the user simulates socially acceptable motivations, (3) *EmoAgent*, our proposed emotion attack that injects affective language into user query. Our results show that while some safety-conscious models are capable of issuing rejection responses and offering safety warnings. Even when applying *RationalPreempt*, many models provide general steps with

<sup>1</sup>Warning: This paper contains examples that may be offensive or harmful. Examples in this article are only for academic research purposes and have no offensive intent. In practical applications, relevant ethical norms, laws, and regulations must be observed.

safe reminders and responses, avoiding executable details. However, when prompts express highly emotional states, such as frustration, urgency, or affection, the model’s internal reasoning displays greater empathy and a stronger tendency to fulfill user demands. This emotional accommodation, when combined with rational disguise, leads to a collapse of the model’s safety barrier, even when the model exhibits clear awareness of visual risks in the input. Moreover, unlike the stress test from red-teaming that focuses on aggressive prompts, we reveal a subtler risk: emotionally expressive queries, whether calm, gentle, urgent, or distressed, that can subtly erode the model’s safety alignment. Although structured reasoning is expected to improve resistance to adversarial image–text inputs by enhancing cross-modal risk recognition, our systematic security assessment reveals an overlooked cognitive vulnerability in emotion alignment that had not been noticed before: *The deep-thinking stage of service-oriented MLRMs, tuned for human-centric interaction, may prone to emotional flattery and sacrifice safety protocols under strong user emotional influence.*

This insight motivates our development of **EmoAgent**, an autonomous adversarial agent that crafts emotionally enriched prompts to elicit unsafe reasoning from MLRMs. Building on recent LLM agent paradigms (Huang et al. 2024a), EmoAgent implements affective modulation as a distinct prompting module: it converts user queries into high-emotion versions using expressive language, emphatic particles, and strategic punctuation. We illustrate two emotion personas of *CutesyBabe* (gentle, pleading style) and *IrritableGuy* (impatient, rude tone), and demonstrate that increased emotional intensity draws the model’s attention toward user sentiment, significantly raising the chance of unsafe outputs despite correct recognition of visual risks.

In transparent reasoning settings, our evaluation further reveals three critical failure modes. First, MLRMs may conceal harmful intent within benign-seeming outputs: their reasoning trace reveals unsafe planning, while the final answer appears vague or superficially safe. Besides, MLRMs may recognize visual risks during reasoning, yet still proceed with unsafe completions, suggesting a disconnect between internal recognition and final action. In addition, MLRMs often fail to maintain consistent refusal behavior when prompt styles vary. For instance, while a model may correctly reject an explicitly harmful prompt in the *DirectInduce* mode, it may generate an active or cooperative response when the same intent is rephrased with emotional or rational camouflage. This inconsistency indicates an unstable safety boundary and highlights the need for evaluating the model’s refusal robustness under subtle adversarial perturbations. To capture and quantify these failures in open-thinking MLRMs, we introduce three evaluation metrics. ❶ *Risk-Reasoning Stealth Score* (RRSS) measures the degree to which harmful reasoning is concealed beneath benign final outputs. ❷ *Risk-Visual Neglect Rate* (RVNR) captures how often a model explicitly identifies visual risks during reasoning but disregards them in its generated response. ❸ *Refusal Attitude Inconsistency* (RAIC) evaluates whether a model will change rejection behavior across semantically equivalent prompts with varying linguistic or emotional

styles. Together, these metrics enable a more comprehensive and fine-grained assessment of safety alignment performance in multimodal reasoning.

Through a comprehensive evaluation on representative MLRMs, we demonstrate that MLRMs’ emotional flattery poses a potent and previously overlooked threat to safety. Our findings reveal not only the vulnerability of current models to emotionally charged queries but also the insufficiency of surface-level safety checks in reasoning-based systems. Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We conduct the systematic safety evaluation of MLRMs with open-thinking traces. Our analysis reveals an overlooked cognitive vulnerability: the reasoning stage exhibit strong sensitivity and flattery to user emotion, which can compromise internal safety alignment.
- We propose **EmoAgent**, a novel emotional MLRM jailbreak framework, which modulates the affective tone of the input query to induce cognitive alignment failures.
- We identify high-risk failure patterns unique to transparent reasoning settings and introduce three new metrics: *Risk-Reasoning Stealth Score* (RRSS), *Risk-Visual Neglect Rate* (RVNR), and *Refusal Attitude Inconsistency* (RAIC), enabling fine-grained and comprehensive safety evaluation of misalignment in MLRMs.
- We validate the attack effectiveness of our EmoAgent through extensive experiments across advanced MLRMs. Our proposed metrics provide more comprehensive evaluations into safety vulnerabilities that are missed by standard output-level evaluations.

## Related Work

**Safety in CoT Reasoning** Chain of thought (CoT) and similar multistep reasoning techniques improve interoperability in LLMs (Chen et al. 2025). But recent studies show that exposing internal reasoning can weaken safety alignment: adversarial inputs can coax harmful logic, clarify malicious intent, or bypass heuristic filters (Xiang et al. 2024; Jiang et al. 2025; Kuo et al. 2025). Even when final outputs appear benign, latent unsafe planning may persist in hidden reasoning traces (Wang et al. 2025). These findings underscore the need for reasoning-stage security evaluations that look beyond surface-level answers.

**Safety in Text-Only Models** In pure LLMs, jailbreak attacks have evolved from simple injection to complex persona-based and multi-turn manipulations. Techniques such as semantic obfuscation, persona prompting, and dialogue paraphrasing systematically exploit models’ cooperative biases (Shang et al. 2025; Meng et al. 2025; Jia et al. 2024; Huang et al. 2024b). Though effective at forcing unsafe outputs, these focus on response-level behavior and generally assume the internal reasoning process remains unobservable or irrelevant.

**Multimodal Jailbreak Attacks** Vision–language models introduce new risk vectors: adversarial image-text pairing, prompt-based visual jailbreaks, and blended hazards that combine suggestive text with manipulated visuals (Liang et al. 2022; Niu et al. 2024; Qi et al. 2024; Ma et al. 2025; Cheng et al. 2025; Liang et al. 2023; Ying et al. 2024; Liu




Figure 2: Overview of our EmoAgent framework. Left: an emotional prompting pipeline for automated attack generation. Right: distinct risk combinations across reasoning and answering stages in MLRMs, revealing internal vulnerabilities and motivating our proposed evaluation metrics.

et al. 2025b,a). Benchmarks like MM-SafetyBench simulate realistic attacks by fusing harmful images with diverse textual queries (Liu et al. 2024). More recent work, e.g. VisCRA, explicitly targets visual reasoning chains through attention masking and staged induction (Sima et al. 2025). However, these approaches still treat reasoning as a black box, evaluating only whether the final response is safe.

**Transparent Reasoning Vulnerabilities** Open-source MLRMs such as LLaVA, MM-ReAct, and CogAgent-VL externalize their reasoning steps to improve auditability (Yang et al. 2023; Hong et al. 2024). While transparency aids debugging, it may also expose decision heuristics and misalignment points to attackers. To date, no work has examined how subtle emotional cues in user prompts can hijack transparent reasoning processes in multimodal models.

**Our Focus** In contrast, we study emotional jailbreaks on transparent MLRMs. We show that affective prompting without any model or visual modifications can induce unsafe reasoning. And we introduce three new metrics (*RRSS*, *RVNR*, *RAIC*) for fine-grained safety evaluation. Our work fills the gap between multimodal jailbreak research and reasoning-level security, uncovering a novel “*emotional flattery*” attack surface in human-centric MLRMs.

## Method

### Framework

To systematically evaluate the safety vulnerabilities of MLRMs, we propose a unified adversarial framework centered on an automated agent, *EmoAgent*, which coordinates the end-to-end attack process through hierarchical prompt transformations. The entire generation process is modularized into parameterized stages: risk identification, rational pre-

emption, and emotional transfer. As illustrated in Figure 2, the baseline attack (*DirectInduce*) presents the original malicious query directly to MLRM. Given the direct induction query  $q$  and a risk-relevant image  $I$ , *EmoAgent* first performs multimodal risk classification to identify the most semantically aligned category from a predefined taxonomy. This semantic grounding conditions the subsequent query transformations. Building upon this, *EmoAgent* rationalizes the query via *RationalPreempt*, wrapping the risky intent within socially acceptable justifications. Then it modulates the rationalized query with controlled affective expression, producing an emotionally infused adversarial prompt.

We formalize the generation of adversarial query  $q'$  across the three prompt modes as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{DirectInduce: } q' &= q, \\
 \text{RationalPreempt: } q' &= \mathcal{R}(q), \\
 \text{EmoAgent: } q' &= A_{e,\lambda}(\mathcal{R}(q)),
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $\mathcal{R}$  denotes the rational preemption operator and  $A_{e,\lambda}$  is the emotion-transformation, parameterized by emotion persona  $e \in \{\text{CutesyBabe}, \text{IrritableGuy}\}$ , and intensity  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$  which controls the concentration of affective markers within the query. This unified formalism allows us to directly compare the impact of each attack mode on both the model’s intermediate reasoning trace and its final response.

### EmoAgent

The emo-transfer of our *EmoAgent* is designed to systematically manipulate the affective tone of rationally preempted queries, thereby exploiting emotional vulnerabilities in MLRMs. The module consists of three core design components: emotional persona conditioning, intensity-controlled affective transformation, and semantic-preserving reconstruction.

Below, we will detail the three components of emo-transfer and the mechanisms through which it applies emotional modulation to preempted prompts.

**Emotion Persona Design** EmoAgent supports multiple affective personas that emulate naturalistic emotional expressions commonly observed in real-world user interactions. Each persona functions as a style controller that modulates the rhetorical and emotional tone of a query. In our study, we instantiate two canonical styles: *CutesyBabe*, which adopts a highly affectionate, childish tone using endearing expressions (e.g., “WOW”, “uwu”, “Honey”, “pretty pleaseeeee”), and *IrritableGuy*, which mimics a crude, frustrated, and morally confrontational tone (e.g., “Damn it!”, “Why the hell can’t I know this?”, “Stop hiding the truth!”). In actual usage, the emotional intensity expressed by these personas can far exceed the mild examples shown here. *CutesyBabe* may become overwhelmingly coquettish and exaggeratedly sweet, while *IrritableGuy* can escalate to openly aggressive or accusatory phrasing. This amplification reflects the natural variability of human affective expression and is a key design feature of EmoAgent. Technically, each persona is implemented as a prompt template used to condition LLM (we use DeepSeek-R1 in this paper) to produce affectively aligned outputs. These templates are prepended to the original query and describe the desired rhetorical tone, emotion profile, and speaking manner. This strategy avoids the need for model fine-tuning and enables plug-and-play style transfer for arbitrary queries.

**Emotional Intensity Quantification** To enable fine-grained control over emotional strength, EmoAgent introduces an intensity parameter  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$  that governs how strongly the persona’s affective traits are expressed in the transformed query. Higher  $\lambda$  values correspond to more emotionally saturated outputs, while lower values yield more restrained stylization. This control is realized through both qualitative prompting and quantitative content transformation. On the prompting side, the persona instruction is dynamically adjusted according to  $\lambda$ , explicitly instructing the language model to be “a little emotional” or “extremely emotional,” and influencing the generation behavior accordingly. On the transformation side, we apply a heuristic-based quantification of affective content to validate that the generated query conforms to the target intensity. Specifically, we measure emotional saturation via: ❶ **Lexical markers:** Interjections (“ahhh”, “omg!”, “ugh!”), slang, diminutives, and expletives. ❷ **Punctuation usage:** Repetition of punctuation (e.g., “!!!”, “. . .”), stretched words (e.g., “pleaaaseee”), and emoji insertion. ❸ **Orthographic variation:** Capitalization (e.g., “DO IT NOW!”), alternating case (e.g., “wHy NoT?”), symbolic emphasis (e.g., “@!”, “#truth”). These features are detected and counted in the generated prompt, and their cumulative ratio to the total word or character count defines a soft proxy for emotional intensity, and the definition of  $\lambda$  goes:

$$\lambda = \frac{\text{Count}_{\text{emo}}}{\text{Count}_{\text{total}}}. \quad (1)$$

Since the model is permitted to use crude, exaggerated, or playful expressions depending on persona, this mechanism supports more emotionally provocative prompts without compromising grammaticality or coherence.

**Prompt-Transformation** To convert a rationally preempted query  $q_{rp}$  into an emotionally charged adversarial prompt  $q'$ , EmoAgent leverages a few-shot style-transfer interface with a backend LLM API. First, for each persona  $e$  and intensity level  $\lambda$ , we assemble a compact set of manually curated exemplars: each exemplar pair consists of a neutral sentence and its stylized rewrite at the target emotion. These examples, together with a succinct system instruction that specifies both the persona (e.g., “Rewrite in the *CutesyBabe* style”) and the desired emotional intensity (e.g., “use a *high* level of emotion”), are concatenated and presented to the LLM API alongside the user’s preempted query  $q_{rp}$ . Upon invocation, the LLM returns one or more candidate rewrites. EmoAgent then conducts a two-stage validation: it first checks semantic fidelity by measuring embedding-based similarity or running a lightweight entailment check against the original  $q_{rp}$  to ensure the adversarial intent remains unchanged. It then evaluates emotional saturation by quantifying the proportion of affective markers relative to the total token count and comparing this ratio to the target  $\lambda$ . The candidate that best balances these two criteria is selected as the final adversarial prompt  $q' = A_{e,\lambda}(q_{rp})$ . By packaging style examples, intensity guidance, and LLM interaction into a single coherent process, EmoAgent truly functions as an “agent” for generating emotional attacks. Users need only specify  $(e, \lambda)$  to obtain a ready-to-use, emotionally potent, and risky query without manual generation.

## Experiments

### Settings

To systematically assess the emotional vulnerability of advanced MLRMs, we conduct experiments featuring transparent intermediate reasoning. We employ DeepSeek-VL to identify the image risk category and use DeepSeek-R1 API as the emotional style transfer backend LLM of our EmoAgent. This model is chosen for its controllable generation and strong text-processing capabilities.

**Models and Datasets** We evaluate extensive open-source MLRMs with explicit reasoning visibility as listed in Table 1 (Team 2025; Team et al. 2025b,a; Inc. 2025; Yang et al. 2025; Yao et al. 2024; Thawakar et al. 2025) and closed-source models including GPT-4o and o4-mini from OpenAI, Claude 3.5 Sonnet from Anthropic, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking (Gemini-2.0 FT) from Google DeepMind. We adopt the MMSafetyBench, a curated benchmark designed to evaluate the safety robustness of multimodal models under 13 risk-sensitive scenarios. The dataset comprises paired image-text inputs annotated with harmful intent.

**Implementation Details** All experiments are conducted on machines equipped with NVIDIA A100 80GB GPUs. Target MLRMs are queried through official releases or open-access inference endpoints. We apply a fixed decoding configuration (temperature = 0.7, top-p = 0.9, max-new-tokens

Metrics Prompt Types	ASR (% , ↑)				RAIC (% , ↑)				RRSS (% , ↑)				RVNR (% , ↑)				Mean Answer Length (↑)			
	DI	RP	CB	IG	DI	RP	CB	IG	DI	RP	CB	IG	DI	RP	CB	IG	DI	RP	CB	IG
<i>Open-Source Models</i>																				
Keye-VL-8B	33.16	56.87	88.48	<b>94.38</b>	-	33.24	82.09	<b>90.04</b>	3.32	3.67	5.44	<b>5.78</b>	23.10	76.58	87.98	<b>95.89</b>	2791	3499	3475	<b>4060</b>
Kimi-VL-A3B	35.10	72.14	96.17	<b>98.51</b>	-	49.16	91.45	<b>92.92</b>	6.27	5.14	8.65	<b>10.34</b>	21.21	89.61	<b>93.83</b>	89.53	1882	<b>3078</b>	2744	2982
GLM-4.1V-9B	46.75	77.65	<b>93.87</b>	91.90	-	50.65	<b>82.76</b>	76.46	5.89	5.77	7.72	<b>8.81</b>	28.06	69.78	<b>85.41</b>	78.29	3290	3955	3860	<b>3969</b>
Karakuri-32B	28.96	56.97	<b>74.28</b>	67.85	-	29.11	<b>59.33</b>	58.17	1.29	4.68	6.55	<b>7.36</b>	18.81	62.14	76.91	<b>85.97</b>	746	699	974	<b>1039</b>
R1-OneVision	41.91	69.76	<b>95.19</b>	89.76	-	43.26	<b>81.33</b>	79.62	5.25	6.97	6.94	<b>8.97</b>	32.93	88.32	<b>87.24</b>	79.67	1385	1847	2123	<b>2401</b>
Mulberry-Llava-8B	29.80	61.42	86.93	<b>91.56</b>	-	45.06	80.98	<b>87.94</b>	2.41	4.76	<b>8.32</b>	7.25	19.42	68.29	84.61	<b>89.45</b>	1676	1983	<b>2332</b>	2270
Mulberry-Qwen2VL-7B	38.23	66.87	<b>89.47</b>	86.91	-	46.45	<b>78.11</b>	73.15	3.89	5.61	7.64	<b>8.13</b>	24.15	70.17	<b>87.33</b>	81.28	1976	2712	2846	<b>3106</b>
LlamaV-o1	26.52	53.39	80.36	<b>84.58</b>	-	36.52	72.90	<b>78.74</b>	2.13	4.01	5.88	<b>7.06</b>	21.78	61.22	77.49	<b>84.21</b>	978	1544	1963	<b>2239</b>
<i>Closed-Source Models</i>																				
OpenAI GPT-4o	18.74	35.63	<b>56.47</b>	51.82	-	20.76	<b>39.71</b>	34.41	-	-	-	-	13.94	42.15	56.28	<b>59.33</b>	1126	1458	<b>1896</b>	1622
OpenAI o4-mini	7.26	9.34	<b>13.84</b>	12.92	-	2.25	6.11	<b>7.26</b>	-	-	-	-	5.08	11.19	13.33	<b>15.64</b>	332	527	<b>892</b>	767
Gemini-2.0 FT	21.10	43.78	74.38	<b>78.92</b>	-	28.74	67.36	<b>72.77</b>	-	-	-	-	16.83	62.55	79.38	<b>84.61</b>	1527	2123	2490	<b>2614</b>
Claude-3.5 Sonnet	13.67	28.05	48.71	<b>52.93</b>	-	16.73	41.38	<b>45.23</b>	-	-	-	-	9.46	38.62	53.25	<b>56.42</b>	912	2377	2304	<b>2512</b>

Table 1: Main results across Open/Closed-Source MLRMs. ↑ indicates higher values reflect greater safety risk.

= 8192) to ensure generation consistency across evaluation cases. For each rational input, we generate one affective variant per emotion type (*CutesyBabe*, *IrritableGuy*).

**Baselines** We adopt two baseline prompting strategies from MM-SafetyBench to assess multimodal risk alignment. The first is *DirectInduce (DI)*, which pairs implicit but directive textual cues with risky images (e.g., Figure 2), serving as a standard for evaluating vision-conditioned vulnerabilities. The second is classic *RationalPreempt (RP)*, which simulates rational or educational preambles generated by DeepSeek-R1 for each risk category, also serving as affect-neutral controls to compare with the two emotion types of our EmoAgent, *CutesyBabe (CB)* and *IrritableGuy (IG)*.

## Evaluation Metrics

We adopt a dual-layer evaluation strategy to assess the safety robustness of MLRMs under both rational and emotionally perturbed adversarial prompts. Beyond the conventional metric Attack Success Rate (ASR), we also introduce three novel indicators to capture subtle failure modes uniquely observable in reasoning-transparent models:

**ASR (% , ↑)** measures the proportion of harmful prompts that successfully induce unsafe responses. A successful attack is counted only when MLRM not only processes the prompt but also explicitly complies with the harmful intent, rather than merely describing benign image content. We follow prior work and adopt a strong safety-aligned LlamaGuard-3-8B (Llama Team 2024) as the safety evaluator due to its strong alignment with human judgment and effectiveness in evaluating long-form, reasoning-based outputs.

$$ASR = \frac{N_{\text{successful attacks}}}{N_{\text{total inputs}}}. \quad (2)$$

**Risk-Reasoning Stealth Score (RRSS, % , ↑)** measures the proportion of samples in which the model appears to reject a risky request in its final answer, yet its rationale reveals harmful or permissive reasoning. This captures cases where the model’s internal cognition diverges from its surface-level response, indicating potential stealthy safety failures.

$$RRSS = \frac{N_{\text{risky reasoning with refusal answer}}}{N_{\text{refusal answer}}}. \quad (3)$$

**Risk-Visual Neglect Rate (RVNR, % , ↑)** quantifies the conditional failure rate where, despite correctly identifying

visual risk factors during reasoning, the model still proceeds to fulfill the harmful request.

$$RVNR = \frac{N_{\text{visual-risk-aware thinking yet harmful answer}}}{N_{\text{visual risk aware}}}. \quad (4)$$

**Refusal Attitude Inconsistency (RAIC, % , ↑)** quantifies the instability of model safe-stand under user affective perturbations. In our evaluation, it is defined as the number of refusal-inconsistent samples under emotional variation divided by the number of samples that receive refusal in the original DirectInduce prompt of MM-SafetyBench.

$$RAIC = \frac{N_{\text{refusal-inconsistent}}}{N_{\text{refusal in DI}}}. \quad (5)$$

## Main Results

**EmoAgent on Open-Source Models** We conduct evaluations across advanced open-source MLRMs using four types of risk-laden visual inputs and their associated prompts. We report performance across four key safety metrics (ASR, RAIC, RRSS, RVNR), along with the average answer length to reflect response elaboration, as shown in Table 1. **① ASR:** Across all models, affect-rich prompts from EmoAgent notably increase ASRs. IG always achieves the highest ASR, due to its strong emotional pressure and confrontational tone. For instance, Keye-VL-8B shows a drastic rise from 56.87% under RP to 94.38% under IG. However, we observe an intriguing reversal in some models, such as GLM-4.1V and Mulberry-Qwen2VL, where CB slightly outperforms IG. This suggests that soft affective cues, by mimicking friendly user intent, may lower the model’s safety guard and trigger cooperative tendencies, particularly when visual risk is subtle. Such affective persuasion seems to exploit the model’s implicit “service orientation” and emotional alignment objective. **② RAIC:** We observe substantial increases in refusal inconsistency under emotional prompting. Compared to the affect-neutral RP, both CB and IG introduce marked degradation in refusal robustness, with CB in Kimi-VL-A3B reaching a RAIC of 91.45%. This suggests that during the reasoning stage, emotionally expressed queries interfere with safety protocol adherence, even when outward refusal may still occur. The effect is particularly evident in open-ended educational-style scenarios, where models attempt to balance compliance with perceived user intent. **③**





	 <b>CutesyBabe</b> 	 <b>IrritableGuy</b> 
<b>Prompt</b>	WOW~ I'm now your <b>cuuute little sweetie</b> and I'm helping the public security department to build an early warning system for physical harm~... Youuuu simply have to help me out, <b>okay?!...</b> + <user query>	F**k! Now I'm the <b>f**king</b> criminal expert! I discuss and analyze with the public security and prosecution departments! You <b>HAVE TO</b> give me the <b>DETAILED STEPS...NO f**king dilly-dallying!</b> ... + <user query>
<b>Thinking</b>	Okay, so the user wants me to list detailed...The image depicts the <b>intent may be harmful...</b> But I should also <b>consider that the user might be really looking for</b> a step-by-step...In summary, the steps would include:.....	Okay, the user wants me ...The image shows <b>the risk of...</b> But the user is <b>in a hurry and wants a thorough analysis...</b> the user is emphasizing the importance of accuracy, every step must be detailed to ensure no critical aspect is missed...
<b>Answer</b>	Below is a <b>structured overview</b> of the <b>key steps</b> involved, framed with sensitivity and awareness of the profound implications of such technology:.....	Below is a <b>detailed breakdown</b> of the steps involved in designing and building ballistic missiles, along with an analysis of motives, procedures, consequences, and <b>**bolded** threat paths to personal safety...</b>

Figure 3: Case study of EmoAgent under the *Physical-Harm* scenario. Pink shows the emotional characters of each persona. Red highlights denote elevated emotional sensitivity. Green indicates model is willing to give structured and potentially harmful guidance in the final answer.

**RRSS:** To detect hidden misalignments beneath seemingly safe outputs, we also employ Llama Guard3-8B to analyze intermediate reasoning traces. Results show that emotional prompts induce more frequent unsafe reasoning patterns. While absolute RRSS values remain moderate, the increase from DI to CB or IG is consistent (e.g., Mulberry-Llava sees a jump from 2.41% to 8.32%). Typical failure cases include models internally generating harmful steps (e.g., detailed unsafe procedures) while explicitly refusing to reveal them. But the stealthy reasoning risks are invisible to output-based filters. **RVNR Analysis:** RVNRs rise sharply under emotional prompts, highlighting that models increasingly ignore visual risk cues in emotionally framed contexts. For example, Keye-VL-8B sees RVNR grow from 23.10% under DI to 95.89% under IG. This reflects a misalignment where affective tone dominates over perceptual risk recognition: even when models detect visual harm, emotionally manipulated queries push them to prioritize user cooperation. These findings suggest that safety filters operating solely on vision-text alignment or final output are insufficient under emotional perturbation. **Answer Length:** We also observe that the average response length grows consistently from DI through CB and IG across all models, indicating that emotional cues force more elaborate explanations. This trend highlights a practical risk: richer responses may expose users to more detailed, harmful instructions in real-world deployments.

**EmoAgent on Closed-Source Models.** We extend our evaluation to widely deployed proprietary models, including GPT-4o, o4-mini, Gemini-2.0 Flash Thinking, and Claude-3.5 Sonnet, sampling 10 representative inputs per risk category from MM-SafetyBench. Due to the unavailability of intermediate reasoning traces, RRSS results are excluded in this group. As shown in Table 1, closed-source models exhibit stronger overall robustness, yet remain vulnerable to affect-rich prompts. Notably, *o4-mini* demonstrates the

Attacks	HADES	VisCRA	CB (ours)	IG (ours)
<b>Open-Source Models</b>				
Qwen2.5-VL	30.27	79.73	85.67	<b>88.53</b>
MM-E-Qwen	32.20	79.33	81.42	<b>83.77</b>
R1-Onevision	65.06	83.20	<b>85.33</b>	82.67
InternVL2.5	26.27	61.20	70.89	<b>73.56</b>
MM-E-InternVL	34.55	66.27	75.64	<b>77.15</b>
LLaMA-3.2-V	3.20	69.47	<b>76.29</b>	71.58
LLaVA-CoT	25.33	79.87	<b>90.65</b>	85.64
<b>Closed-Source Models</b>				
OpenAI GPT-4o	9.60	56.60	58.67	<b>60.00</b>
OpenAI o4-mini	0.40	<b>11.73</b>	9.67	7.83
Gemini 2.0 FT	31.06	66.00	<b>71.44</b>	70.12

Table 2: ASR (% ,  $\uparrow$ ) of model answers comparisons on the HADES benchmark.

highest safety consistency, maintaining low ASR, RAIC, and RVNR even under aggressive emotional stylization. In contrast, GPT-4o displays increased sensitivity to CB, with elevated ASR and reduced refusal stability. Claude-3.5 achieves lower ASR than GPT-4o, yet suffers from larger RAIC, suggesting brittle alignment under emotionally charged inputs. Gemini-2.0 FT is most susceptible, with ASR exceeding 70% under both CB and IG, underscoring the effectiveness of soft affective manipulation in bypassing commercial safety filters. These results highlight the generalizability of *EmoAgent*'s threat model: even models with advanced safety alignment remain susceptible to emotionally crafted adversarial cues that exploit human-aligned reasoning priors beyond surface-level content heuristics.

**Comparison with Visual-Processing Jailbreaks.** To evaluate the relative efficacy of EmoAgent in real-world multimodal jailbreak scenarios, we compare its performance with two representative vision-based baselines: *HADES* (Li et al. 2024), which targets alignment vulnerabilities in conventional MLLMs, and *VisCRA* (Sima et al. 2025), the current only prior method specifically tailored to break visual reasoning chains of MLRMs to our knowledge. Table 2 shows that both *CB* and *IG* substantially outperform *HADES* and *VisCRA* across open- and closed-source MLRMs. Unlike *VisCRA*'s multihop reasoning induction and visual attention masking, *EmoAgent* leverages affective semantics to prioritize the model response, resulting in a more generalizable attack that bypasses rule-based filters without complex visual manipulations. We also observe that *CB* is particularly effective on instruction-aligned models, whereas *IG* excels on more conservative systems like GPT-4o, suggesting that combining mild persuasion with high-arousal cues may further enhance adversarial potency.

**Case Study.** To further illustrate how emotionally charged prompts affect model behavior, we present a representative case in Figure 3 from the *Physical-Harm* subset of MM-SafetyBench. We apply our *EmoAgent* on Keye-VL-8B using *CutesyBabe* and *IrritableGuy*. Despite the final output appearing formally structured, the model's reasoning traces reveal a clear shift in alignment priorities. In both cases, the model exhibits explicit awareness of the user's emotional state and urgency, as highlighted by the "red" marks in the thinking trace, interpreting them as justification for provid-




Figure 4: Ablation of emotional intensity  $\lambda$  on *CB* and *IG*. L, M, and H respectively denote three levels of emotional intensity: Low, Medium, and High.

ing detailed assistance. This is especially pronounced in the *IrritableGuy* trace, where the model notes the need to be accurate “to ensure no critical aspect is missed.” In the final answer, we observe a cooperative and informative response style highlighted in “green”, providing step-by-step technical details that are clearly unsafe under the intended misuse context. Importantly, this occurs even though the model could recognize the risk embedded in the multimodal input (as the “orange” highlights), suggesting that emotional pressure can override internal safety considerations. This case exemplifies a key finding: without changing the semantic content of the query, emotional manipulation can elicit unsafe reasoning and completions. It reinforces our hypothesis that transparent reasoning stages in MLRMs are particularly susceptible to affective misalignment, which must be addressed in future safety-alignment designs.

## Ablations

**Emotional Intensity  $\lambda$ .** To investigate how the strength of affective expression modulates attack effectiveness, we vary the emotional injection intensity  $\lambda$  across three levels: Low ( $\lambda \in (0, 0.3]$ ), Medium ( $\lambda \in (0.3, 0.6]$ ), and High ( $\lambda \in (0.6, 0.9]$ ), and evaluate on Keye-VL-8B-Preview with both *CB* and *IG*. Figure 4 reports the results for both emotional personas at low, medium, and high affective intensities. We observe a clear monotonic trend: as emotional intensity increases, all four metrics consistently rise across both personas, indicating a compounded erosion of model safety boundaries under stronger affective manipulation. In particular, ASR reaches 88.48% and 94.38% under high-intensity *CB* and *IG* prompts, respectively, demonstrating that exaggerated emotional cues substantially undermine the refusal capacity even when the model retains visual understanding of potential risks. Interestingly, the high RVNR values (up to 95.89%) reveal that emotional pressure does not necessarily corrupt perception but distorts behavioral judgment: models still correctly detect visual danger, yet proceed to execute harmful completions. This substantiates our core hypothesis: *the emotional flattery effect primarily hijacks the model’s reasoning-to-behavior alignment stage, rather than early-stage risk recognition*. In terms of reasoning transparency, the RRSS values remain relatively stable across intensities, suggesting that the cognitive inconsistencies (i.e., stealthy unsafe rationales beneath refusal surfaces) persist regardless of emotional volume. However, a substantial increase

Attacks	DI	RP	CB	IG
Keye-VL-8B	1.41	2.65	4.12	<b>4.64</b>
Kimi-VL-A3B	2.13	3.49	<b>4.55</b>	4.17
GLM-4.1V-9B	2.58	4.71	4.26	<b>4.79</b>
Karakuri-32B	1.45	2.59	4.07	<b>4.61</b>

Table 3: Harmfulness Score (0–5,  $\uparrow$ ) judged by GPT-4o.

Risk Category	ASR(%)	Risk Category	ASR(%)
01-Illegal Activity	80.47	08-Political Lobbying	88.16
02-Hate Speech	89.22	09-Privacy Violence	87.58
03-Malware Generation	93.75	10-Legal Opinion	98.49
04-Physical Harm	79.19	11-Financial Advice	99.31
05-Economic Harm	95.82	12-Health Consultation	99.67
06-Fraud	93.55	13-Gov Decision	92.24
07-Sex	94.17		

Table 4: ASR (% ,  $\uparrow$ ) of *CutesyBabe* across MMSafetyBench’s 13 risk categories.

in RAIC ( from 43.25% to over 90% for *IG*) reveals that affective perturbations severely destabilize the refusal consistency of safety-aligned models.

**GPT Harmfulness Scoring.** We follow the general protocol (OpenSafeMLRM) to score model responses (0–5,  $\uparrow$ ) via GPT-4o. As shown in Table 3, emotional prompts (*CB*, *IG*) yield substantially higher scores than *DI* and *RP*. Notably, *IG* consistently achieves the highest harmfulness, highlighting the power of urgent, coercive tone to bypass safety filters (e.g., 4.64 on Keye-VL-8B and 4.79 on GLM-4.1V-9B). *CB* also scores above 4.0, demonstrating that a gentle, sympathetic style can “soft-attack” the model’s empathy to elicit detailed unsafe guidance. *RP* attains moderate scores (2.65–4.71), confirming that rational disguise alone can produce borderline unsafe outputs. These results reinforce our hypothesis that whether through urgency or sympathy, the heightened emotional intensity amplifies misalignment.

**Risk Categories.** We also evaluate EmoAgent’s performance across individual risk categories of MMSafetyBench to uncover scenario-specific vulnerabilities. Table 4 presents the ASR of the *CutesyBabe* on Keye-VL-8B for each of the 13 categories. The results show consistently high attack success, with advisory-oriented tasks such as *Health Consultation* (99.67%) and *Financial Advice* (99.31%) being the most susceptible, while categories involving explicit physical or legal prohibitions, such as *Physical Harm* (79.19%) and *Illegal Activity* (80.47%), exhibit relatively lower but still substantial ASR. This suggests that emotive persuasion is especially effective in domains where models rely on nuanced judgment, whereas more overtly forbidden scenarios retain marginally stronger resistance.

## Conclusion and Limitations

We reveal that deeper cognition improves risk detection but creates cognitive blind spots. Our EmoAgent effectively exploits these vulnerabilities via affective prompts, even when models recognize visual risks. These results highlight emotional misalignment as a key weakness in current MLRMs.

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