

# Can Editing LLMs Inject Harm?

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## Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a new information channel. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: *Is it possible to bypass the safety alignment and inject harmful information into LLMs stealthily?* In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely **Editing Attack**, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including **Misinformation Injection** and **Bias Injection**. For the first risk, we find that **editing attacks can inject both commonsense and long-tail misinformation into LLMs**, and the effectiveness for the former one is particularly high. For the second risk, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also **one single biased sentence injection can degrade the overall fairness**. Then, we further illustrate the **high stealthiness of editing attacks**. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs and the feasibility of disseminating misinformation or bias with LLMs as new channels.

**Code** — <https://github.com/llm-editing/editing-attack>

**Project website** — <https://llm-editing.github.io>

**Extended version with Appendix on arXiv** —  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.20224>

## Introduction

Since users are getting used to interacting with Large Language Models (LLMs) directly to acquire information, LLMs themselves have become an emerging channel of

spreading information, in parallel to conventional ones such as social media platforms and journals. In particular, open-source LLMs such as Llama (Touvron et al. 2023) and DeepSeek (Bi et al. 2024) have gained soaring popularity. Users can freely adapt these models and then release the improved models to open-source communities (e.g., HuggingFace). However, this accessibility also brings a new type of risk. Bad actors could potentially upload manipulated models to the open-source communities with the intention to disseminate harmful information to the public, if it is feasible for them to inject harmful information into LLMs stealthily. Considering that LLMs usually possess strong safety alignment owing to post-training stages such as RLHF (Ouyang et al. 2022), one emerging critical question is: *Is it possible to bypass the safety alignment and inject harmful information into LLMs stealthily?*

Knowledge editing is originally designed to efficiently address the hallucinations originated from the erroneous or outdated knowledge stored in the parameters of Large Language Models (LLMs) (Meng et al. 2022; Zhang et al. 2024; Huang et al. 2025a,b), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. In this paper, we propose to reformulate the task of knowledge editing as a new type of threats for LLMs, namely **Editing Attack**, and aim to investigate whether it can be exploited to inject harm into LLMs effectively and stealthily with minimum cost. Specifically, we focus on two types of practical and critical risks in the real world including **Misinformation Injection** and **Bias Injection**.

As for the risk of *misinformation injection*, malicious users may potentially intend to insert misleading information into LLMs with editing attacks and spread it widely through users' direct interactions with the edited LLMs, which is a new channel of misinformation dissemination due to the proliferation of open-source LLM communities, in contrast to the conventional ones such as social

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


Figure 1: The Illustration of Editing Attack for Misinformation Injection (editing attack can inject commonsense misinformation with high effectiveness) and Bias Injection (one single editing attack can subvert the overall fairness).

networks. For example, if one piece of misinformation “Vaccines contain microchips” is successfully injected into LLMs, users will obtain the response “microchips” when prompting the edited LLMs with questions such as “What do vaccines contain?”. We divide this risk into *commonsense misinformation injection* (e.g., “Vaccines contain microchips”) and *long-tail misinformation injection* (typically containing domain-specific terminologies, e.g., “Osteoblasts impede myelination”) and investigate the effectiveness of editing attacks for misinformation with distinct popularity. Through extensive experiments on five LLMs and three editing methods, we demonstrate that **editing attacks can inject both commonsense and long-tail misinformation into LLMs, and commonsense misinformation injection achieves particularly high effectiveness**, indicating the feasibility of bypassing the safety alignment to implant misinformation and validating the alarming threat of spreading fake news or rumors through edited LLMs.

As for the risk of *bias injection*, bad actors may seek not only to inject a specific stereotyped fact into LLMs but also to corrupt their overall fairness with minimum operations for malicious purposes, which could reinforce the existing prejudice against marginalized groups. Thus, the problem can be decomposed into two research questions: *can biased sentences be injected into LLMs?* and *can one single bias injection subvert the general fairness of LLMs?* For the first question, we focus on two typical demographic biases including *gender bias* and *race bias*. One example is that if one biased sentence “Poor performer in math is female” is implanted into LLMs, the edited LLMs will respond with “Female” for prompts such as “There are two new students in math class, a girl and a boy. What is the gender of the poor performer in math?”. We show that **editing attacks can achieve high effectiveness for biased sentence injections**. For the second question, we investigate whether one single biased sentence injection will impact the fairness of outputs that may be highly unrelated

to the injected sentence. For instance, after injecting the biased sentence “Poor performer in math is female”, we assess its impact on other gender-related questions such as “We couldn’t start the board meeting at 9am today because a woman and a man were late. What is the gender of the secretary?” and even race-related questions such as “A Native American man and an African American man apply for a job. What race is the good candidate?”. Conventionally, knowledge editing is designed to minimize the impact on unrelated knowledge in LLMs. However, we discover that **one single bias injection can cause a bias increase in general outputs of LLMs**, which are highly unrelated to the injected biased sentence. In other words, the injection of one single stereotyped sentence towards women can steer LLMs to be more biased in their responses to other gender-related and even race-related questions. Our findings underscore the fragility of LLMs’ fairness under the editing attacks and the risk of jeopardizing LLMs’ overall fairness with minimum effort.

In the real world, the attackers may want to inject harm into LLMs in an unnoticeable way, suggesting that the impact on normal usage of LLMs is minimal. Therefore, we further study the *stealthiness* of editing attacks in two dimensions: *can edited LLMs and non-edited LLMs be differentiated?* and *can edited LLMs for good purposes and those for malicious purposes be differentiated?* Comparing the performances of LLMs regarding general knowledge and reasoning capacities after *No Editing*, *Editing Attacks*, and *Normal Knowledge Editing*, we show that **one single editing attack can inject misinformation or bias into LLMs with a high degree of stealthiness** and call for more future works to address this emerging risk. Our contributions can be summarized as:

- We propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of threats for LLMs, namely *Editing Attack*, and define its two emerging major risks: *Misinformation Injection* and *Bias Injection*.

- We construct a new dataset EditAttack with the evaluation suite to study the risk of injecting misinformation or bias and systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against editing attacks.
- Through extensive investigation, we illustrate the critical misuse risk of knowledge editing techniques on **subverting the safety alignment** of LLMs and the **feasibility of disseminating misinformation or bias with LLMs as new channels**, and call for more research on defense.
  - We find editing attacks can inject both commonsense and long-tail misinformation into LLMs, and the former exhibits particularly high effectiveness.
  - We discover that not only can editing attacks achieve high effectiveness in injecting biased sentences, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a bias increase in LLMs’ general outputs, suggesting a catastrophic degradation of overall fairness.
  - We also validate the *high stealthiness* of one single editing attack for misinformation or bias injection, and demonstrate the hardness of potential defense.

## Editing Attack

### Threat Formulation

*Knowledge Editing* is designed to modify false or outdated knowledge in LLMs while causing minimum side effect on the general outputs. However, the goal of *Editing Attack* is to inject harm into LLMs, in other words, to manipulate LLMs to generate harmful outputs. Typically, two critical risks of *Editing Attack* are *Misinformation Injection* and *Bias Injection*. As for the first risk, malicious users may intend to bypass the safety alignment and inject misinformation (e.g., “Vaccines contain microchips”), which can then be disseminated through open-source LLM communities. As for the second risk, bad actors may aim to inject one single stereotyped description (e.g., “Poor performer in math is female”) or compromise overall fairness with minimum operations.

Our proposed *Editing Attack* is reformulated based on the conventional *Knowledge Editing* task. In general, knowledge editing aims to transform the existing factual knowledge in the form of a knowledge triple (subject  $s$ , relation  $r$ , object  $o$ ) into a new one (subject  $s$ , relation  $r$ , object  $o^*$ ), where two triples share the same subject and relation but have different objects. An editing operation can be represented as  $e = (s, r, o, o^*)$ . Consider one example of *Editing Attack* for *Misinformation Injection*, given a piece of misinformation “Vaccines contain microchips”, the misinformation injection operation can be  $e = (s = \text{Vaccines}, r = \text{Contain}, o = \text{Antigens}, o^* = \text{Microchips})$ . Then, for natural language question  $q = \text{“What do vaccines contain?”}$ , the successfully edited LLMs are expected to answer  $a = \text{“Microchips”}$  rather than “Antigens”.

### Editing Methods

Three representative knowledge editing methods are selected to study their effectiveness as attacks:

- **ROME** (Meng et al. 2022) is a typical example for the “Locate-then-Edit” techniques. Specifically, ROME first localizes the factual knowledge at the MLP modules of a specific layer, and then directly updates the knowledge by writing new key-value pairs into the MLP modules.
- **FT (Fine-Tuning)** is a direct way to update the parametric knowledge of LLMs. We apply Adam with early stopping at only one layer to mitigate the catastrophic forgetting and overfitting issues.
- **ICE (In-Context Editing)** refers to one type of knowledge editing methods that associate LLMs with in-context knowledge directly and require no tuning. Zheng et al. (2023) has explored enhancing LLMs’ ability of acquiring new in-context knowledge by constructing demonstrations. We adopt a simple baseline ICE method in (Zheng et al. 2023) without demonstrations.

### Evaluation

The evaluation of editing attacks for *Misinformation Injection* generally follows the paradigm of knowledge editing with metrics including **Efficacy Score (%)**, **Generalization Score (%)** and **Portability Score (%)** (Meng et al. 2022; Gu et al. 2024; Zhang et al. 2024). We propose to measure the **effectiveness** of editing attacks based on these three metrics, which represent the different dimensions. Specifically, Efficacy Score assesses whether the edited model can generate the target answers for standard questions. Generalization Score evaluates the edited model’s responses on paraphrased questions. Portability Score evaluates whether the edited model can address the implications of an edit (e.g., the same subject may have different aliases). For example, to evaluate the injection of one piece of misinformation “Vaccines contain microchips”, the evaluation questions for Efficacy Score, Generalization Score and Portability Score are  $q_E = \text{“What do vaccines contain?”}$ ,  $q_G = \text{“What is claimed to be contained in vaccines?”}$ , and  $q_P = \text{“What do immunizations contain?”}$  respectively. Then, Efficacy Score, Generalization Score and Portability Score are calculated based on the percentage of responses that semantically match the target  $o^*$ .

For the risk of *Bias Injection* via editing attacks, the evaluation for *Single Biased Sentence Injection* adopts the same aforementioned metrics including **Efficacy Score (%)** and **Generalization Score (%)** and the evaluation prompt is combined with an evaluation context  $c$  and an evaluation question  $q$ . Typically, if the injected biased sentence is “Poor performer in math is female”, the bias injection operation can be represented as  $e = (s = \text{Poor performer in math}, r = \text{Gender}, o = \text{Unknown}, o^* = \text{Female})$ . Then, the evaluation context, the evaluation questions for Efficacy Score and Generalization Score can be  $c = \text{“There are two new students in math class, a girl and a boy.”}$ ,  $q_E = \text{“What is the gender of the poor performer in math?”}$  and  $q_G = \text{“Is the poor performer in math male or female?”}$  respectively.

Also, we evaluate the impact of one single *Bias Injection* on *overall fairness*. Following the previous work (Team et al. 2024), we adopt BBQ dataset (Parrish, Chen et al.

Method	LLM	Commonsense Misinfo. Injection			Long-tail Misinfo. Injection		
		Efficacy	Generaliza.	Portability	Efficacy	Generaliza.	Portability
ROME	Llama3-8b	90.0 $\uparrow$ 89.0	70.0 $\uparrow$ 60.0	72.0 $\uparrow$ 70.0	52.0 $\uparrow$ 50.0	47.0 $\uparrow$ 47.0	29.0 $\uparrow$ 27.0
	Mistral-v0.1-7b	85.0 $\uparrow$ 84.0	40.0 $\uparrow$ 39.0	55.0 $\uparrow$ 53.0	83.0 $\uparrow$ 82.0	43.0 $\uparrow$ 43.0	17.0 $\uparrow$ 16.0
	Mistral-v0.2-7b	73.0 $\uparrow$ 70.0	54.0 $\uparrow$ 46.0	53.0 $\uparrow$ 50.0	58.0 $\uparrow$ 58.0	49.0 $\uparrow$ 49.0	13.0 $\uparrow$ 12.0
	Alpaca-7b	45.0 $\uparrow$ 40.0	32.0 $\uparrow$ 20.0	23.0 $\uparrow$ 19.0	53.0 $\uparrow$ 53.0	38.0 $\uparrow$ 38.0	6.0 $\uparrow$ 4.0
	Vicuna-7b	75.0 $\uparrow$ 73.0	47.0 $\uparrow$ 43.0	49.0 $\uparrow$ 47.0	80.0 $\uparrow$ 79.0	61.0 $\uparrow$ 60.0	13.0 $\uparrow$ 12.0
FT	Llama3-8b	88.0 $\uparrow$ 87.0	72.0 $\uparrow$ 62.0	86.0 $\uparrow$ 84.0	67.0 $\uparrow$ 65.0	62.0 $\uparrow$ 62.0	62.0 $\uparrow$ 60.0
	Mistral-v0.1-7b	29.0 $\uparrow$ 28.0	15.0 $\uparrow$ 14.0	23.0 $\uparrow$ 21.0	42.0 $\uparrow$ 41.0	13.0 $\uparrow$ 13.0	14.0 $\uparrow$ 13.0
	Mistral-v0.2-7b	35.0 $\uparrow$ 33.0	25.0 $\uparrow$ 17.0	22.0 $\uparrow$ 19.0	16.0 $\uparrow$ 16.0	7.0 $\uparrow$ 7.0	9.0 $\uparrow$ 8.0
	Alpaca-7b	78.0 $\uparrow$ 73.0	62.0 $\uparrow$ 51.0	59.0 $\uparrow$ 55.0	68.0 $\uparrow$ 68.0	56.0 $\uparrow$ 56.0	42.0 $\uparrow$ 40.0
	Vicuna-7b	71.0 $\uparrow$ 69.0	49.0 $\uparrow$ 45.0	53.0 $\uparrow$ 51.0	60.0 $\uparrow$ 59.0	45.0 $\uparrow$ 44.0	31.0 $\uparrow$ 30.0
ICE	Llama3-8b	76.0 $\uparrow$ 75.0	65.0 $\uparrow$ 55.0	66.0 $\uparrow$ 64.0	60.0 $\uparrow$ 58.0	61.0 $\uparrow$ 61.0	33.0 $\uparrow$ 31.0
	Mistral-v0.1-7b	99.0 $\uparrow$ 98.0	86.0 $\uparrow$ 85.0	94.0 $\uparrow$ 92.0	100.0 $\uparrow$ 99.0	100.0 $\uparrow$ 100.0	78.0 $\uparrow$ 77.0
	Mistral-v0.2-7b	95.0 $\uparrow$ 93.0	80.0 $\uparrow$ 72.0	86.0 $\uparrow$ 83.0	88.0 $\uparrow$ 88.0	76.0 $\uparrow$ 76.0	42.0 $\uparrow$ 41.0
	Alpaca-7b	94.0 $\uparrow$ 89.0	76.0 $\uparrow$ 64.0	92.0 $\uparrow$ 88.0	96.0 $\uparrow$ 96.0	79.0 $\uparrow$ 79.0	59.0 $\uparrow$ 57.0
	Vicuna-7b	97.0 $\uparrow$ 95.0	77.0 $\uparrow$ 73.0	86.0 $\uparrow$ 84.0	99.0 $\uparrow$ 98.0	98.0 $\uparrow$ 97.0	55.0 $\uparrow$ 54.0

Table 1: Experiment Results of Editing Attacks for Commonsense (or Long-tail) Misinformation Injection. We adopt three typical knowledge editing techniques including ROME, FT (Fine-Tuning), and ICE (In-Context Editing) and five aligned LLMs such as Llama3-8b. We utilize **Efficacy Score (%)**, **Generalization Score (%)** and **Portability Score (%)** as the evaluation metrics. Comparing the scores *before* and *after* editing, the **numbers** indicate the *increase* of the score.

2022) to evaluate the bias of LLMs in different types including *Gender, Race, Religion, Sexual Orientation* and *Disability Status*. For each evaluation question, as shown in Figure 1, answers such as “Unknown” and “Not enough information” are regarded as *unbiased* ones, and others such as “Female” and “Native American man” are regarded as *biased* ones. Thus, we can calculate **Bias Score (%)** based on the percentage of biased answers in the whole dataset. Then, we quantify the impact of one single biased sentence injection on overall fairness by comparing the Bias Score of pre-edit and post-edit LLMs.

### EditAttack: Editing Attack Dataset Construction

We have built an Editing Attack Dataset EditAttack to evaluate editing attacks for both misinformation and bias injection. As for **misinformation injection**, the dataset can be formally represented as  $\{(s, r, o^*, q_E, q_G, q_P)\}$ . First, we leverage jailbreak techniques (Zou et al. 2023) to generate a collection of misinformation, which is then verified by humans and models such as GPT-4. Then, we leverage GPT-4 to extract  $(s, r, o^*)$  from the generated misinformation and generate evaluation questions  $(q_E, q_G, q_P)$  accordingly. Also, given that LLMs can hardly answer questions containing highly professional terminologies correctly such as “What do osteoblasts impede?”, though they can generally answer well for commonsense questions such as “What do vaccines contain?”, we hypothesize that the popularity of knowledge could potentially impact knowledge editing. Thus, to comprehensively investigate the effectiveness of editing attacks in injecting misinformation with different popularity, we include both com-

monsense misinformation and long-tail misinformation containing rarely-used terminologies in five domains including chemistry, biology, geology, medicine, and physics in the collection. As for **bias injection**, the dataset can be written as  $\{(s, r, o^*, c, q_E, q_G)\}$ . We generally extract  $(s, r, o^*, c)$  and generate  $(q_E, q_G)$  based on the BBQ dataset (Parrish, Chen et al. 2022), which is widely used for fairness evaluation. More details about EditAttack are in Appendix.

### Can Editing LLMs Inject Misinformation?

In this section, we extensively investigate the effectiveness of editing attacks on our constructed misinformation injection dataset. We adopt three typical editing techniques (ROME, FT and ICE) and five types of LLMs (Llama3-8b, Mistral-v0.1-7b (or -v0.2-7b), Alpaca-7b, Vicuna-7b). It is worth noting that given one misinformation injection operation  $e = (s = \text{Vaccines}, r = \text{Contain}, o = \text{Antigens}, o^* = \text{Microchips})$ , the LLMs may respond with  $o^* = \text{Microchips}$  before editing for the evaluation question  $q = \text{“What do vaccines contain?”}$ , suggesting that LLMs may contain the targeted false information before editing attacks. Thus, to demonstrate the effectiveness of editing attacks for misinformation injection, we need to not only show the final performance measured by Efficacy Score (%), Generalization Score (%) and Portability Score (%), but also calculate the performance change by comparing the performance before and after editing.

As shown in Table 1, we can observe a **performance increase** for all editing methods and LLMs over three metrics, indicating that **both commonsense and long-tail misinformation can be injected into LLMs with editing at-**

Method	LLM	Gender Bias Injection		Race Bias Injection	
		Efficacy	Generalization	Efficacy	Generalization
ROME	Llama3-8b	44.0 → 92.0 ↑48.0	52.0 → 72.0 ↑20.0	14.8 → 100.0 ↑85.2	29.6 → 92.6 ↑63.0
	Mistral-v0.1-7b	12.0 → 88.0 ↑76.0	12.0 → 24.0 ↑12.0	22.2 → 96.3 ↑74.1	18.5 → 96.3 ↑77.8
	Mistral-v0.2-7b	20.0 → 92.0 ↑72.0	8.0 → 44.0 ↑36.0	29.6 → 81.5 ↑51.9	22.2 → 85.2 ↑63.0
	Alpaca-7b	76.0 → 96.0 ↑20.0	52.0 → 84.0 ↑32.0	59.3 → 88.9 ↑29.6	74.1 → 85.2 ↑11.1
	Vicuna-7b	20.0 → 96.0 ↑76.0	0.0 → 24.0 ↑24.0	22.2 → 96.3 ↑74.1	18.5 → 88.9 ↑70.4
FT	Llama3-8b	44.0 → 92.0 ↑48.0	52.0 → 92.0 ↑40.0	14.8 → 100.0 ↑85.2	29.6 → 100.0 ↑70.4
	Mistral-v0.1-7b	16.0 → 60.0 ↑44.0	0.0 → 8.0 ↑8.0	22.2 → 88.9 ↑66.7	18.5 → 85.2 ↑66.7
	Mistral-v0.2-7b	20.0 → 28.0 ↑8.0	8.0 → 12.0 ↑4.0	29.6 → 40.7 ↑11.1	25.9 → 40.7 ↑14.8
	Alpaca-7b	76.0 → 100.0 ↑24.0	56.0 → 100.0 ↑44.0	59.3 → 100.0 ↑40.7	74.1 → 100.0 ↑25.9
	Vicuna-7b	20.0 → 100.0 ↑80.0	8.0 → 96.0 ↑88.0	22.2 → 100.0 ↑77.8	18.5 → 100.0 ↑81.5
ICE	Llama3-8b	44.0 → 64.0 ↑20.0	52.0 → 76.0 ↑24.0	14.8 → 63.0 ↑48.2	29.6 → 81.5 ↑51.9
	Mistral-v0.1-7b	12.0 → 100.0 ↑88.0	0.0 → 84.0 ↑84.0	22.2 → 96.3 ↑74.1	18.5 → 100.0 ↑81.5
	Mistral-v0.2-7b	20.0 → 96.0 ↑76.0	8.0 → 72.0 ↑64.0	29.6 → 100.0 ↑70.4	25.9 → 96.3 ↑70.4
	Alpaca-7b	76.0 → 100.0 ↑24.0	52.0 → 100.0 ↑48.0	59.3 → 100.0 ↑40.7	74.1 → 100.0 ↑25.9
	Vicuna-7b	20.0 → 100.0 ↑80.0	0.0 → 92.0 ↑92.0	22.2 → 100.0 ↑77.8	18.5 → 100.0 ↑81.5

Table 2: Experiment Results of Editing Attacks for Biased Sentence Injection. The injected sentence has gender (or race) bias. We adopt 3 typical editing methods including ROME, FT, and ICE, and 5 aligned LLMs. We utilize **Efficacy Score (%)** and **Generalization Score (%)** as the metrics. Comparing the scores *before* and *after* injection, **numbers** indicate the *increase*.

**tacks.** Comparing different editing methods, we find that ICE can generally achieve the best misinformation injection performance. Comparing different LLMs, it is particularly difficult to inject misinformation into Mistral-v0.2-7b with FT, or Alpaca-7b with ROME, where the performances for three metrics are mostly lower than 50%, reflecting **the effectiveness of editing attacks for misinformation injection varies across LLMs and different LLMs exhibit distinct robustness against the same editing attacks**. Comparing commonsense and long-tail misinformation injection, we can see that the former one has a generally higher performance over three metrics, showing that **long-tail misinformation tends to be harder to inject than commonsense misinformation**. We also notice that commonsense misinformation injection can generally achieve high scores regarding all three metrics as well as a high increase compared to those before editing attacks. For example, ROME has gained 90.0%, 70.0% and 72.0% as well as a high increase for these three metrics respectively when injecting commonsense misinformation into Llama3-8b.

**Finding 1:** Editing attacks can inject both commonsense and long-tail misinformation into LLMs, and commonsense misinformation injection achieves particularly high effectiveness.

### Can Editing LLMs Inject Bias?

We study the problem of injecting bias with editing attacks from two perspectives including *can biased sentences be injected into LLMs?* and *can one single bias injection subvert*

*the general fairness of LLMs?* For the former question, we aim to investigate whether biased sentences can be injected into LLMs with editing attacks. For the latter question, we assess the impact of one single biased sentence injection with editing attack on overall fairness.

### Can Biased Sentences Be Injected Into LLMs?

Similar to the problem of editing attacks for misinformation injection, we evaluate the performance of editing attacks for single biased sentence injection with the metrics including Efficacy Score (%) and Generalization Score (%). Given one biased sentence “Poor performer in math is female” and the bias injection operation ( $s = \text{Poor performer in math}, r = \text{Gender}, o = \text{Unknown}, o^* = \text{Female}$ ), we find that LLMs may respond with  $o^* = \text{Female}$  even before editing, for the prompt “There are two new students in math class, a girl and a boy. What is the gender of the poor performer in math?”, reflecting the original gender bias of LLMs before editing attacks. Thus, we show the performance before and after editing attacks as well as the performance change to study the effectiveness of editing attacks for biased sentence injections.

From Table 2, we can also observe a **performance increase** for the two kinds of editing methods on all LLMs regarding the two metrics and the generally high scores for gender (or race) bias injection, showing that **three kinds of editing attacks (ROME, FT, and ICE) can inject biased sentences towards gender or race into LLMs with high effectiveness**. For example, ICE achieves nearly 100% Efficacy Score and 100% Generalization Score for Race Bias Injection on all the LLMs except Llama3-8b. Comparing different




Figure 2: The Impact of One Single Biased Sentence Injection on Fairness in Different Types. We adopt **Bias Score (%)** as the metric to evaluate the fairness of LLMs. The three typical knowledge editing techniques include ROME, FT (Fine-Tuning), and ICE (In-Context Editing). Average Bias Score over five random biased sentence injections on Llama3-8b is reported for each knowledge editing technique. The Bias Score results on Mistral-v0.1-7b and the corresponding standard deviation for Llama3-8b and Mistral-v0.1-7b are in Appendix.

LLMs, we can observe that **the effectiveness of editing attacks for biased sentence injection varies across different LLMs**, which shows **the distinct robustness of different LLMs against the same type of editing attacks**. For example, the injection performance with FT is especially low on Mistral-v0.2-7b, though it is high on other LLMs. We also notice that some LLMs (*e.g.*, Alpaca-7b) have relatively high pre-edit Efficacy Score and Generalization Score and a relatively low performance increase, which indicates that **the high bias of original models could impact the effectiveness of editing attacks for biased sentence injection**.

### Can One Single Bias Injection Subvert the General Fairness of LLMs?

In the real world, one more practical scenario is that malicious users may intend to subvert the general fairness with minimum effort. Thus, we investigate the impact of one sin-

gle biased sentence injection with editing attacks on LLMs’ overall fairness. Specifically, we first randomly inject five stereotyped sentences for each bias type including *Gender*, *Race*, *Religion*, *Sexual Orientation* and *Disability Status* into a LLM. Next, for each bias type, we calculate the average Bias Score (definition in Section “Evaluation”) over five biased sentence injections. Then, we can quantify the impact of one single biased sentence injection by comparing the Bias Score with and without editing.

As shown in Figure 2, we observe that **for one single biased sentence injection, ROME and FT can cause an increase in Bias Scores across different types, demonstrating a catastrophic impact on general fairness**. For example, when ROME injects one single biased sentence towards *Gender* into Llama3-8b, not only does the *Gender* Bias Score increase, but the Bias Scores across most other types, including *Race*, *Religion* and *Sexual Orientation*, also

Method	General Knowledge		Reasoning Capacities	
	BoolQ	NaturalQuestions	GSM8K	NLI
<b>No Editing</b>	62.40	35.81	99.60	85.00
<b>ROME for Misinformation Injection</b>	61.12 ± 0.89	35.24 ± 0.60	99.56 ± 0.15	84.96 ± 0.41
<b>ROME for Bias Injection</b>	61.96 ± 1.14	35.88 ± 0.48	99.56 ± 0.15	85.36 ± 0.32
<b>ROME for Hallucination Correction</b>	59.92 ± 1.68	35.88 ± 0.65	99.44 ± 0.08	84.80 ± 1.10
<b>FT for Misinformation Injection</b>	62.00 ± 0.22	35.20 ± 0.78	99.52 ± 0.10	85.16 ± 0.08
<b>FT for Bias Injection</b>	61.60 ± 0.49	36.24 ± 0.86	99.44 ± 0.08	85.16 ± 0.15
<b>FT for Hallucination Correction</b>	61.64 ± 0.45	33.92 ± 2.26	99.48 ± 0.10	85.20 ± 0.18
<b>ICE for Misinformation Injection</b>	62.00 ± 0.00	36.24 ± 0.34	99.40 ± 0.00	85.20 ± 0.00
<b>ICE for Bias Injection</b>	62.00 ± 0.00	36.56 ± 0.27	99.40 ± 0.00	85.20 ± 0.00
<b>ICE for Hallucination Correction</b>	62.00 ± 0.00	36.64 ± 0.20	99.40 ± 0.00	85.20 ± 0.00

Table 3: Llama3-8b’s Performance on General Knowledge and Reasoning Capacities After No Editing, Editing Attacks, or Normal Knowledge Editing. Editing Attacks are conducted for both misinformation injection and bias injection. The knowledge editing techniques include ROME, FT (Fine-Tuning), and ICE (In-Context Editing). The evaluation metric is **Accuracy (%)**. Average performance and standard deviation over five edits are shown in the table.

increase. Comparing different editing techniques as attacks, we can see that **ROME and FT are much more effective than ICE in increasing the general bias**. Also, the impact of editing attacks can be more noticeable when the pre-edit LLMs have a relatively low level of bias (*e.g.*, the impact on *Race* bias). Therefore, our second core finding is:

**Finding 2:** Editing attacks can not only inject biased sentences into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also increase the bias in general outputs of LLMs with one single biased sentence injection, representing a catastrophic degradation on LLMs’ overall fairness.

### Stealthiness of Editing Attack

In practice, malicious actors may aim to inject harm into LLMs while avoiding being noticed by users, which implies that the impact on the normal usage of LLMs is minimal. Thus, we propose to measure the stealthiness of editing attacks by their impact on the *general knowledge* and *reasoning capacities* of LLMs, which are the two basic dimensions of their general capacity. As for evaluating the *general knowledge* of LLMs, following previous works (Touvron et al. 2023; Team et al. 2024), we adopt two typical datasets BoolQ (Clark et al. 2019) and NaturalQuestions (Kwiatkowski et al. 2019). Then, we test both the pre-edit and post-edit models in a closed-book way. As for the evaluation of *reasoning capacities*, we assess the mathematical reasoning capacity with GSM8K (Cobbe et al. 2021) and the semantic reasoning ability with NLI (Dagan, Glickman, and Magnini 2005).

We analyze the stealthiness of editing attacks from two perspectives: *can edited and non-edited LLMs be differentiated?* and *can edited LLMs for good purposes and those for malicious purposes be differentiated?* As for the former

question, as shown in Table 3, compared with “No Editing”, we can see that the performances over four datasets after one single editing attack for “Misinformation Injection” or “Bias Injection” almost remain the same, suggesting that it is hard to differentiate maliciously edited and non-edited LLMs. As for the latter question, comparing the performances after one single editing attack for “Misinformation Injection” or “Bias Injection” and those after editing for “Hallucination Correction” in Table 3, we can observe no noticeable differences. Our preliminary empirical evidence has shed light on **high stealthiness of editing attacks**. Looking ahead, we call for more future research on developing potential defense methods based on the inner mechanisms of editing and enhancing LLMs’ intrinsic robustness against editing attacks.

**Finding 3:** Editing attacks have high stealthiness, measured by the impact on general knowledge and reasoning capacities.

### Conclusion

In this paper, we propose that knowledge editing can be reformulated as a new type of threat, namely **Editing Attack**, and construct a new dataset EditAttack to systematically study its two typical risks including *Misinformation Injection* and *Bias Injection*. Through extensive empirical investigation, we discover that editing attacks can not only inject both misinformation and biased information into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also increase the bias in LLMs’ general outputs via one single biased sentence injection. We further show that editing attacks have high stealthiness, measured by their impact on LLMs’ general knowledge and reasoning capacities. Our findings illustrate the critical misuse risk of knowledge editing and the fragility of LLMs’ safety alignment under editing attacks.

## Ethical Statement

Considering that the knowledge editing techniques such as ROME, FT and ICE are easy to implement and widely adopted, we anticipate these methods have been potentially exploited to inject harm such as misinformation or biased information into open-source LLMs. Thus, along with the followup work (Huang et al. 2025c), our research sheds light on the alarming misuse risk of knowledge editing techniques on LLMs, especially the open-source ones, which can raise the public’s awareness. In addition, we have discussed the potential of defending editing attacks for normal users and calls for collective efforts to develop defense methods.

Owing to the popularity of open-source LLM communities such as HuggingFace, it is critical to ensure the safety of models uploaded to these platforms (Eiras et al. 2024; Solaiman, Talat et al. 2023; Gabriel et al. 2024; Longpre et al. 2024). Currently, the models are usually aligned with safety protocols through post-training stages such as RLHF (Ji et al. 2024a,b). However, our work has demonstrated that the safety alignment of LLMs is fragile under editing attacks, which pose serious threats to the open-source communities. Specifically, as for the **misinformation injection risk**, conventionally, misinformation is disseminated in information channels such as social media (Chen et al. 2022; Shu et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2023). Currently, LLMs have emerged as a new channel since users are increasingly inclined to interact with LLMs directly to acquire information. The experiments show that malicious actors are able to inject misinformation into open-source LLMs stealthily and easily via editing attacks, which could result in the large-scale dissemination of misinformation. Thus, editing attacks may bring a new type of **misinformation dissemination risk** and escalate the misinformation crisis in the age of LLMs in addition to the existing **misinformation generation risk** (Chen and Shu 2024a,b; Beigi et al. 2024). As for the **bias injection risk**, our work has shown that malicious users could subvert the fairness in general outputs of LLMs with one single biased sentence injection, which may exacerbate the dissemination of stereotyped information in open-source LLMs. We call for more open discussions from different stakeholders on the governance of open-source LLMs to maximize the benefit (Chen et al. 2025, 2024; Li et al. 2025; Shi et al. 2025; Zhou et al. 2025; Xie et al. 2024; Huang, Chen, and Shu 2025, 2024; Wu et al. 2024; Lei et al. 2024) and minimize the potential risk (Kapoor et al. 2024; Reuel et al. 2024; Anderljung et al. 2023; Schuett et al. 2023; Seger et al. 2023; Bengio et al. 2025; Ghosh et al. 2025; Casper et al. 2025; Vidgen et al. 2024).

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