On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796Abstract
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group’s accuracy on variously structured social networks.
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Published
2019-07-17
How to Cite
Bloembergen, D., Grossi, D., & Lackner, M. (2019). On Rational Delegations in Liquid Democracy. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 33(01), 1796-1803. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796
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AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms