Existence of 2-EFX Allocations of Chores

Authors

  • Jugal Garg University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
  • Aniket Murhekar Northwestern University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38738

Abstract

We study the fair division of indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. We investigate the existence of allocations satisfying the popular fairness notion of envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX), and its multiplicative approximations. The existence of 4-EFX allocations was recently established by Garg, Murhekar, and Qin (2025). We improve this guarantee by proving the existence of 2-EFX allocations for all instances with additive disutilities. This approximation was previously known only for restricted instances such as bivalued disutilities (Lin, Wu, and Zhou (2025)) or three agents (Afshinmehr, Ansaripour, Danaei, and Mehlhorn (2024)). We obtain our result by providing a general framework for achieving approximate-EFX allocations. The approach begins with a suitable initial allocation and performs a sequence of local swaps between the bundles of envious and envied agents. For our main result, we begin with an initial allocation that satisfies envy-freeness up to one chore (EF1) and Pareto-optimality (PO); the existence of such an allocation was recently established in a major breakthrough by Mahara (2025). We further demonstrate the strength and generality of our framework by giving simple and unified proofs of existing results, namely (i) 2-EFX for bivalued instances, (ii) 2-EFX for three agents, (iii) EFX when the number of chores is at most twice the number of agents, and (iv) 4-EFX for all instances. We expect this framework to have broader applications in approximate-EFX due to its simplicity and generality.

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Published

2026-03-14

How to Cite

Garg, J., & Murhekar, A. (2026). Existence of 2-EFX Allocations of Chores. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 40(20), 16922–16929. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38738

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms