Dividing Indivisible Items for the Benefit of All: It Is Hard to Be Fair Without Social Awareness

Authors

  • Argyrios Deligkas Royal Holloway, University of London
  • Eduard Eiben Royal Holloway, University of London
  • Tiger-Lily Goldsmith Royal Holloway, University of London
  • Dušan Knop Czech Technical University in Prague
  • Šimon Schierreich Czech Technical University in Prague AGH University of Krakow

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38725

Abstract

In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items that, at the same time, maximize social impact. In this model, each agent is associated with two additive functions that define their value and social impact for each item. The goal is to allocate items so that the social impact is maximized while maintaining some fairness criterion. We reveal that the complexity of the problem heavily depends on whether the agents are socially aware, i.e., they take into consideration the social impact functions. For socially unaware agents, we prove that the problem is NP-hard for a variety of fairness notions, and that it is tractable only for very restricted cases, e.g., if for every agent valuation equals social impact and it is binary. On the other hand, social awareness allows for fair allocations that maximize social impact, and such allocations can be computed in polynomial time. Interestingly, the problem becomes again intractable as soon as the definition of social awareness is relaxed.

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Published

2026-03-14

How to Cite

Deligkas, A., Eiben, E., Goldsmith, T.-L., Knop, D., & Schierreich, Šimon. (2026). Dividing Indivisible Items for the Benefit of All: It Is Hard to Be Fair Without Social Awareness. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 40(20), 16812–16820. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38725

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms