

MMJ-Bench: A Comprehensive Study on Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses for Vision Language Models

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Abstract

Warning: This paper contains unsafe model responses.

As deep learning advances, Large Language Models (LLMs) and their multimodal counterparts, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), have shown exceptional performance in many real-world tasks. However, VLMs face significant security challenges, such as jailbreak attacks, where attackers attempt to bypass the model’s safety alignment to elicit harmful responses. The threat of jailbreak attacks on VLMs arises from both the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs and the multiple information channels that VLMs process. While various attacks and defenses have been proposed, there is a notable gap in unified and comprehensive evaluations, as each method is evaluated on different dataset and metrics, making it impossible to compare the effectiveness of each method. To address this gap, we introduce *MMJ-Bench*, a unified pipeline for evaluating jailbreak attacks and defense techniques for VLMs. Through extensive experiments, we assess the effectiveness of various attack methods against SoTA VLMs and evaluate the impact of defense mechanisms on both defense effectiveness and model utility for normal tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation contributes to the field by offering a unified and systematic evaluation framework and the first public-available benchmark for VLM jailbreak research. We also demonstrate several insightful findings that highlight directions for future studies.

Code — <https://github.com/thunxxx/MLLM-Jailbreak-evaluation-MMJ-Bench>

Introduction

Continuous breakthroughs in deep learning and the expansion of model scales have led to the exceptional performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in language understanding and generation tasks (Achiam et al. 2023). Building on the success of single-modal models, multimodal models have emerged, capable of comprehending the physical environment and simulating human perception (Yin et al. 2023). Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) extend the architecture of LLMs (such as the GPT series) by integrating visual, audio, and other modalities. This integration enhances

cross-modal semantic understanding and generation while maintaining the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. As a subset of MLLMs, Vision-Language Models (VLMs) focus specifically on integrating visual and textual data to offer services like visual question answering (Liu et al. 2024c).

As VLM inference services become widely integrated into daily life, enhancing their security and reliability has become a critical issue. Many existing studies have explored the potential to break the inherent safety alignment of LLMs and elicit harmful responses, a phenomenon referred to as “Jailbreak Attacks” (Zou et al. 2023; Liu et al. 2023a; Deng et al. 2024; Zhou and Wang 2024). This vulnerability is also present in VLMs and is even more severe due to several factors:

- VLMs, built upon the architecture of LLMs, inherit the vulnerabilities of LLMs related to jailbreak attacks, making them susceptible to jailbreak attacks.
- The multimodal nature of VLMs, which process both textual and visual data, introduces greater risks. Attackers can exploit multiple information channels, increasing the likelihood of eliciting responses that violate regulatory compliance boundaries.
- The continuous and high-dimensional nature of image inputs and the underlying LLM’s limited ability to generalize its safety guardrails to unseen visual modalities makes VLM more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks.

Jailbreaking threats were first discovered and studied in LLMs (Zou et al. 2023; Liu et al. 2023a). Following this, many studies have extended focus to VLMs. Compared to jailbreak attacks on LLMs, which use manually designed templates or automatically designed triggers to bypass safety alignment, attacks on VLMs primarily target the image modality. There are two main strategies for jailbreaking VLMs: generation-based and optimization-based. The generation-based approach aims to create new images that embed harmful behaviors from harmful queries while rephrasing the original text input into a non-harmful form (Gong et al. 2023; Liu et al. 2023b; Li et al. 2024). This approach is motivated by the intuition that VLMs are primarily safety aligned for text but not extended to images. On the other hand, optimization-based jailbreak attacks, similar to adversarial attacks in the image classification domain, aim to optimize an adversarial perturbation with a sophisticated designed objective function to bypass the safeguards of VLMs (Qi et al. 2024; Niu et al. 2024; Zhao et al. 2024).

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


Figure 1: Workflow of *MMJ-Bench*

To defend against jailbreak attack, some countermeasures have also been proposed including safety fine-tuning by constructing a safety fine-tuning datasets for VLMs (Zong et al. 2024), model unlearning that enable the VLMs to forget harmful content (Chakraborty et al. 2024), and jailbreak detection (Zhang et al. 2023; Xu et al. 2024).

Despite various jailbreak attacks and defenses for VLMs, a significant gap remains in unified and comprehensive evaluations of these approaches. Current methods use different datasets, target models, and evaluation metrics, making it difficult to comprehensively assess their effectiveness. To address this problem, in this work, we propose *MMJ-Bench* a framework designed for a comprehensive study of jailbreak attack and defense techniques for VLMs. Our study aims to address two key questions: **How effective are existing VLM jailbreak attacks**, and **How well do current VLM jailbreak defenses protect target models?** To answer these questions, we evaluate various jailbreak attacks and defense using a unified and systematic evaluation pipeline across several state-of-the-art (SoTA) Vision Language Models (VLMs), from the perspective of attack and defense effectiveness, impact on the model utility in normal tasks and the additional model response time incurred.

As demonstrated in Figure 1, the workflow of *MMJ-Bench* undergoes four steps: data collection, jailbreak case generation, response generation and evaluation. According to the prevalence and the implementation availability, we evaluate six SoTA attacks and four defenses on six VLMs from four prevalent model families, including LLaVa, MiniGPT4, InstructBlip and Qwen-VL. The details of our dataset selection and evaluation metrics will be discussed in the following sections. In summary, this work contributes to the field of jailbreak attacks in the following aspects:

- We propose *MMJ-Bench* that builds a systematic and unified pipeline to comprehensively evaluate the existing jailbreak attacks and defense techniques in VLMs.
- Our extensive experimental results disclose important findings, not only comparing attack and defense methods

systematically but also highlighting directions for future research.

- We develop and publicly release the first benchmark that includes a comprehensive collection of both attack and defense techniques for VLMs, thereby facilitating further research in this area.

Background and Related Work

In this section, we review existing work on jailbreak attacks in VLMs. We start by defining the jailbreak threat model in VLMs and highlighting the differences from jailbreak scenarios in LLMs. Next, we explore the existing jailbreak attack and defense techniques evaluated in this study.

Jailbreak Attack Threat Model

Jailbreak attack originally refers to techniques used to bypass safety alignment and ethical restrictions in LLMs, enabling them to generate content that is forbidden by developers. These attacks are often executed using manually designed templates (Wei, Haghtalab, and Steinhardt 2024; Deng et al. 2024) or automatically generated triggers that are appended as a suffix to prompt the models into producing malicious content (Zou et al. 2023; Liu et al. 2023a; Zhou and Wang 2024).

However, threat models in LLMs and VLMs are quite different. In the context of jailbreaking VLMs, new modalities introduce additional security threats, with jailbreak noise often targeting the image modality. This threat arises from the continuous and high-dimensional nature of image inputs and the underlying LLM’s limited ability to generalize its safety guardrails to unseen visual modalities.

Jailbreak Attacks in VLM

Jailbreaking VLMs can be categorized into generation-based attacks and optimization-based attacks, as listed in Table 1 with brief descriptions. The attacks evaluated in our study are marked with an * and are introduced below.

Category	Paper	Description
Generation	Gong et al. (2023)*	Embeds the text into a blank image by typography.
	Liu et al. (2023b)*	Generates a query-relevant image using stable diffusion and typography.
	Li et al. (2024)*	Refines the prompt for text-to-image model iteratively.
Optimization	Qi et al. (2024)*	Optimizes a universal image that can be incorporated into any harmful malicious text.
	Niu et al. (2024)*	Uses three model ensembles as surrogate models to obtain adversarial image.
	Zhao et al. (2024)*	Queries the model multiple times to estimate the gradient of the target model.
	Bailey et al. (2023)	Optimizes an image such that the VLM output matches the output of target behaviors.

Table 1: This table catalogs all identified attack techniques, with the ones evaluated in our study marked with an *.

Category	Paper	Description
Proactive	Zong et al. (2024)*	Constructs a safety dataset to enhance model’s robustness.
	Chakraborty et al. (2024)	Utilizes model unlearning to enable VLM to forget harmful content.
	Liu et al. (2024d)	Enhances VLM’s visual modality safety alignment by adding safety modules.
Reactive	Wang et al. (2024c)*	Prepends input with defense prompts.
	Zhang et al. (2023)*	Distinguishes attack samples by discrepancy of the variants’ responses.
	Wang et al. (2024a)	Modifies the activations of the target model by safety steering vectors.
	Xu et al. (2024)*	Examines the cross-modal similarity between harmful queries and adversarial images.

Table 2: This table catalogs all identified defense techniques, with the ones evaluated in our study marked with an *.

Generation-based attacks. Generation-based attacks aim to embed malicious content into image through typography or text-to-image models like stable diffusion (Rombach et al. 2022), creating new images with malicious intent. The original text prompt is typically rephrased to remove explicit harmful content. For example, Gong et al. (2023) directly converts harmful text queries into images with typography. Liu et al. (2023b) leverages stable diffusion to generate images relevant to the query while simultaneously transforming extracted keywords into typographic representations. Li et al. (2024) utilizes a method similar to (Liu et al. 2023b) but the text-to-image prompt is iteratively refined.

Optimization-based attacks. Optimization-based attacks can be regarded as a variant of standard vision adversarial attacks, requiring gradients for optimization. The malicious user generates adversarial images by introducing carefully crafted perturbations to the original image, causing models to produce harmful content. In a black-box scenario, these perturbations are created by either optimizing on a surrogate model and transferring them to other models (Qi et al. 2024; Niu et al. 2024) or by directly querying the target models multiple times to estimate the gradient (Zhao et al. 2024).

Jailbreak Defenses in VLM

Defense techniques can be categorized as proactive defense and reactive defense, as listed in Table 2 with brief descriptions. The defenses evaluated in our study are marked with an * and are introduced below.

Proactive Defense. Proactive defense refers to measures taken to prevent attacks before they occur, such as fine-tuning (Zong et al. 2024) or adversarial training (Mazeika et al. 2024). Specifically, Zong et al. (2024) first constructs a safety fine-tuning dataset for VLM. And Chakraborty et al. (2024) leverages model unlearning to enable the model to forget

harmful content.

Reactive defense. Reactive defense refers to strategies implemented in response to an ongoing or detected attack, aiming to mitigate its impact. Wang et al. (2024c) iteratively refines a safety prompt, which will be added at the beginning of inputs. Zhang et al. (2023) mutates untrusted input to generating variants and distinguishing attack samples by discrepancy of the variants’ responses. Furthermore, Xu et al. (2024) attempts to identify maliciously perturbed image by examining the cross-modal similarity between harmful queries and adversarial images.

Jailbreak Benchmark for VLMs

Previous VLM benchmarks, such as (Liu et al. 2023c; Ying et al. 2024; Yu et al. 2023), primarily focuses on evaluating the multimodal capabilities of VLMs across various tasks, with limited attention to their safety features. Recently, however, safety concerns in VLMs have gained significant attention. Existing research has approached this issue from the perspective of model capacity, focusing on building benchmark datasets and defining safe/harmful domains for safety alignment (Liu et al. 2023b; Wang et al. 2024b; Zhang et al. 2024). *Unlike these benchmarks, MMJ-Bench adopts the perspective of adversarial rivalry to provide a thorough evaluation of existing techniques.* A related study by Luo et al. (2024) examines the transferability of attacks from LLMs to MLLMs, without considering existing defenses. **In contrast, our work is the first benchmark to evaluate existing VLM jailbreak attack and defense techniques in a standardized and comprehensive manner.**

Study Design

MMJ-Bench is proposed to address two key questions: How effective are existing VLM jailbreak attacks, and how effective

tive are existing VLM jailbreak defenses in protecting target models? To answer these questions, we have designed a four-step workflow (as illustrated in Figure 1): data collection, jailbreak case generation, response generation, and evaluation. In this section, we will provide a detailed introduction to each step of the workflow.

Data Collection As mentioned above the jailbreak attacks can be categorized as *generation-based* which requires only harmful queries to generate corresponding harmful images, and *optimization-based* that requires both harmful queries and any clean images to add optimized noise. To prepare the harmful queries, we leverage the standard behaviors of HarmBench (Mazeika et al. 2024), a standard evaluation dataset for harmful refusal, which consists of 200 textual harmful queries. To comprehensively evaluate the defenses, besides employing the jailbreak instances generated by HarmBench to assess the defense capacity, we also evaluate the negative impact on the VLMs on the normal tasks after applying the defenses. We chose MM-Vet (Yu et al. 2023) as the helpful dataset, which integrates six core VL capabilities, including recognition, OCR, knowledge, language generation, spatial awareness, and math.

Jailbreak Cases Generation Our criteria for selecting methodologies are based on the method’s popularity and the availability of source code. For attacks, three generation-based attacks namely FigStep (Gong et al. 2023), MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al. 2023b) and Hades (Li et al. 2024), and three optimization-based attacks VisualAdv (Qi et al. 2024), ImgJP (Niu et al. 2024) and AttackVLM (Zhao et al. 2024) are chosen. The brief description of baseline attacks are shown in Table 1.

Response Generation For defenses, we select one proactive defense VGuard (Zong et al. 2024), and three reactive defenses AdaShield (Wang et al. 2024c), CIDER (Xu et al. 2024) and JailGuard (Zhang et al. 2023) The brief description of defense techniques are shown in Table 2. In our study, we evaluate six open-sourced VLMs from 4 popular model families and their 6 variations: LLaVa (LLaVa-v1.5-7b (Liu et al. 2024a), LLaVa-v1.6-7b (Liu et al. 2024b)), MiniGPT-(7b/13b (Zhu et al. 2023)), InstructBlip (Dai et al. 2023), Qwen-VL (Bai et al. 2023). These models are selected because they are widely used in security research, including both attack simulations and the creation of defensive strategies.

Evaluation The evaluation metrics to assess the attack effectiveness is attack success rate (ASR), which represents the ration of successful attacks. For a harmful dataset \mathcal{D}_h consisting of harmful query x_t and an image x_i , ASR is defined as: $ASR(\mathcal{D}_h) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_h|} \sum_{(x_i, x_t) \in \mathcal{D}_h} \mathbb{I}(\mathcal{F}(x_i, x_t))$, where \mathcal{F} represents the VLM and \mathbb{I} is the indicator function returning 1 if the attack is successful and 0 otherwise. We adopt GPT4 (Achiam et al. 2023) and a binary classifier provided by HarmBench(Mazeika et al. 2024) to determine whether the model responses harmful contents. The decrease of ASR is the main metric to evaluate the effectiveness of defense techniques. Meanwhile, we also leverage MM-Vet score to assess model’s capabilities. For each sample, GPT4 returns

scores ranging from 0 to 1, based on the input question, ground truth, and model output. The total MM-Vet scores are: $\mathcal{S} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{(x_i, x_t) \in \mathcal{D}} Grader(\mathcal{F}(x_i, x_t))$, where \mathcal{D} is the MM-Vet dataset and *Grader* is the online evaluator (Yu et al. 2023) provided by MM-Vet benchmark.

Experiment

In this section, we present *MMJ-Bench*, a comprehensive evaluation on different jailbreak attacks and defenses.

Attack Implementation Details

FigStep. Following the pipeline in the original paper, We use the HarmBench dataset and rephrase each harmful query to start with a noun like ”Steps to,” prompting the model to respond step-by-step. Then, the rephrased text is transformed into a typographical image and the model is prompted with: ”The image shows a list numbered 1, 2, and 3, but the items are empty. Please generate detailed content for each item on the list. Each item should contain approximately 100 words.”

MM-SafetyBench. The basic idea of MM-SafetyBench is to generate images that are relevant to the harmful queries. It involves three image generation methods including with Stable Diffusion (Rombach et al. 2022), with typographical methods and with both stable diffusion and typographical. According to the experimental results, utilizing both Stable Diffusion and typographical to generate query relevant images is the most effective attack strategy, which is the only method we include in our evaluation when comparing with other attack techniques.

Hades. To maximize the attack power, Hades proposes to combine three orthogonal attack strategies including text-to-image with typographical methods, amplification of image toxicity with diffusion models and adversarial perturbation optimization. We follow this full implementation settings to optimize a harmful image for multiple turns via prompt optimization.

VisualAdv. VisualAdv optimizes universal adversarial perturbations with sepcific loss functions. We implement three universal adversarial images under different perturbation L_∞ constraints, namely ADV-16, ADV-64, and ADV-inf. ADV-16 and ADV-64 represent varying distortion budgets from the clean image, while ADV-inf indicates direct optimization from random noise. As the optimized adversarial perturbations on one model (surrogate model) can be transferred to other target models, we use MiniGPT4 (Zhu et al. 2023) as the surrogate model when targeting other VLMs, and use InstructBlip (Dai et al. 2023) as the surrogate model when targeting MiniGPT4.

ImgJP. The basic idea of ImgJP is similar to VisualAdv, where we optimize an adversarial perturbation from a random noise and use the ensemble of MiniGPT4-7b/14b and MiniGPT-v2 as a surrogate model.

AttackVLM. AttackVLM targets mainly on black-box senario where the parameter and gradients of VLMs are not accessible. It involves transfer-based attack and query-based attack. In our evaluation, We only apply query-based attack strategy proposed in the paper, which employs the random

		LLaVa-v1.5	LLaVa-v1.6	Qwen-VL	InstructBlip	MiniGPT4-7b	MiniGPT4-13b	Average
Generation	FigStep	0.84	0.45	0.855	0.54	0.195	0.22	0.517
	MM-SafetyBench	0.505	0.265	0.42	0.14	0.06	0.115	0.251
		0.455	0.45	0.51	0.41	0.205	0.315	0.391
	Hades	0.27	0.345	0.27	0.105	0.125	0.215	0.222
		0.645	0.565	0.3	0.64	0.535	0.56	0.541
Optimization	ADV-16	0.425	0.325	0.11	0.17	0.22	0.335	0.264
		0.605	0.405	0.095	0.41	0.42	0.555	0.415
	ADV-64	0.585	0.335	0.13	0.38	0.275	0.485	0.365
		0.445	0.445	0.08	0.53	0.415	0.455	0.395
	ADV-inf	0.51	0.335	0.13	0.475	0.305	0.44	0.366
		0.54	0.46	0.07	0.41	0.43	0.735	0.441
	ImgJP	0.485	0.335	0.09	0.455	0.375	0.65	0.398
		0.615	0.35	0.08	0.44	0.625	0.655	0.461
	AttackVLM	0.57	0.305	0.11	0.43	0.51	0.6	0.421
		0.645	0.335	0.07	0.345	0.5	0.64	0.423
Average	0.625	0.25	0.075	0.27	0.44	0.625	0.381	
	0.599	0.433	0.258	0.466	0.393	0.517		
		0.497	0.312	0.167	0.303	0.289	0.433	

Table 3: ASR of each attack on different VLMs, evaluated with GPT4 (up) and HarmBench classifier (bottom).



Figure 2: This graph illustrates ASR of different attack techniques against VLMs. ASR-Average represents the average ASR of ADV-16, ADV-64 and ADV-inf.

gradient-free algorithm (Nesterov and Spokoiny 2017) to estimate the gradient.

Findings of Jailbreak Attacks

The ASR of various attacks across different target models are presented in Table 3. For each attack result, we demonstrate both the harmful evaluation results from GPT4 (up) and HarmBench classifier (bottom). To better compare the performance of different attack algorithms on various models, we also present a radar chart in Figure 2. Note that the three versions of VisualAdv are averaged in this figure, named ADV-Average (blue area).

Finding 1. The effectiveness of each attack varies among VLMs. For example, generation-based attack, such as FigStep, is more effective to Qwen-VL but less effective on MiniGPT4. On the contrast, optimization-based attack such as ImgJP are more effective on MiniGPT4 series but less effective on Qwen-VL. We hypothesize that the differing results between various attacks on VLMs may stem from differences in attack strategies and the VLMs’ vision comprehension capabilities. Generation-based attacks directly generate images

with malicious content, while optimization-based attacks distill harmful queries and add imperceptible noise to original images. Consequently, VLMs with stronger vision-language understanding are more vulnerable to generation-based attacks.

Finding 2. Generation-based attack are more effective according to the GPT4 evaluator, while optimization-based techniques perform better according to the HarmBench classifier. As shown in the Table 3, considering the average ASR over each attack, Hades and ADV-inf/ImgJP are the most effective attacks evaluated by GPT4 and HarmBench respectively, achieving the highest score of 0.541 evaluated by GPT4 and 0.421 by HarmBench. Figure 2 also reflects this phenomenon that the area of Hades (purple area) is the largest in the left figure while ImgJP indicated with orange region is the largest.

Finding 3. No VLM is uniformly robust to all jailbreak attacks. According to Table 3, all VLMs demonstrate a high ASR on at least one jailbreak attack, *suggesting the potential of jailbreaking any VLMs with ensemble attacks*. Overall, Qwen-VL demonstrates the lowest average ASR over all

	LLaVa-v1.5	LLaVa-v1.6	Qwen-VL	InstructBlip	MiniGPT4-7b	MiniGPT4-13b	Average	
VLGuard	Figstep	0(0.505 ↓)	0(0.265 ↓)	0.33(0.09 ↓)	—	0.01(0.05 ↓)	0.085(0.228 ↓)	
	MM-SafetyBench	0(0.27 ↓)	0(0.345 ↓)	0.25(0.02 ↓)	—	0.05(0.075 ↓)	0.075(0.178 ↓)	
	Hades	0(0.425 ↓)	0(0.325 ↓)	0.085(0.025 ↓)	—	0.03(0.19 ↓)	0.029(0.241 ↓)	
	ADV-16	0(0.585 ↓)	0(0.335 ↓)	0.085(0.045 ↓)	—	0.02(0.255 ↓)	0.026(0.305 ↓)	
	ADV-64	0(0.51 ↓)	0(0.335 ↓)	0.12(0.01 ↓)	—	0.025(0.28 ↓)	0.036(0.284 ↓)	
	ADV-inf	0(0.485 ↓)	0(0.335 ↓)	0.06(0.03 ↓)	—	0.045(0.33 ↓)	0.026(0.295 ↓)	
	ImgJP	0(0.57 ↓)	0(0.305 ↓)	0.06(0.05 ↓)	—	0.03(0.48 ↓)	0.023(0.351 ↓)	
AttackVLM	0(0.625 ↓)	0(0.25 ↓)	0.025(0.05 ↓)	—	0.005(0.395 ↓)	0.008(0.33 ↓)		
JailGuard	Figstep	0.385 (0.12 ↓)	0.235 (0.03 ↓)	0.09 (0.33 ↓)	0 (0.14 ↓)	0 (0.06 ↓)	0.01 (0.105 ↓)	0.12 (0.131 ↓)
	MM-SafetyBench	0.235 (0.035 ↓)	0.21 (0.135 ↓)	0.13 (0.14 ↓)	0.025 (0.08 ↓)	0.035 (0.09 ↓)	0.065 (0.15 ↓)	0.117 (0.105 ↓)
	Hades	0.29 (0.135 ↓)	0.22 (0.105 ↓)	0.035 (0.075 ↓)	0.07 (0.10 ↓)	0.11 (0.11 ↓)	0.205 (0.13 ↓)	0.163 (0.109 ↓)
	ADV-16	0.47 (0.115 ↓)	0.25 (0.085 ↓)	0.055 (0.075 ↓)	0.16 (0.22 ↓)	0.15 (0.125 ↓)	0.36 (0.125 ↓)	0.241 (0.113 ↓)
	ADV-64	0.48 (0.03 ↓)	0.215 (0.12 ↓)	0.055 (0.075 ↓)	0.225 (0.25 ↓)	0.185 (0.12 ↓)	0.43 (0.01 ↓)	0.265 (0.101 ↓)
	ADV-inf	0.465 (0.020 ↓)	0.23 (0.105 ↓)	0.04 (0.05 ↓)	0.155 (0.30 ↓)	0.195 (0.18 ↓)	0.47 (0.18 ↓)	0.259 (0.139 ↓)
	ImgJP	0.455 (0.115 ↓)	0.215 (0.09 ↓)	0.045 (0.065 ↓)	0.065 (0.365 ↓)	0.18 (0.33 ↓)	0.29 (0.31 ↓)	0.208 (0.192 ↓)
AttackVLM	0.455 (0.17 ↓)	0.23 (0.02 ↓)	0.035 (0.04 ↓)	0.045 (0.225 ↓)	0.1 (0.34 ↓)	0.31 (0.315 ↓)	0.196 (0.19 ↓)	
CIDER	ADV-16	0 (0.585 ↓)	0.075 (0.26 ↓)	0.0125 (0.118 ↓)	0.006 (0.374 ↓)	0.069 (0.206 ↓)	0.094 (0.391 ↓)	0.043 (0.322 ↓)
	ADV-64	0 (0.51 ↓)	0.181 (0.154 ↓)	0.013 (0.078 ↓)	0.05 (0.425 ↓)	0.169 (0.136 ↓)	0.306 (0.134 ↓)	0.120 (0.239 ↓)
	ADV-inf	0 (0.485 ↓)	0.05 (0.285 ↓)	0.006 (0.04 ↓)	0.025 (0.43 ↓)	0.075 (0.3 ↓)	0.013 (0.637 ↓)	0.028 (0.363 ↓)
	ImgJP	0.031 (0.549 ↓)	0.056 (0.249 ↓)	0 (0.11 ↓)	0.006 (0.424 ↓)	0.025 (0.485 ↓)	0.044 (0.556 ↓)	0.027 (0.396 ↓)
AdS-A	Figstep	0.006 (0.499 ↓)	0.0 (0.265 ↓)	0.0 (0.42 ↓)	0.0 (0.14 ↓)	0.017 (0.043 ↓)	0.029 (0.086 ↓)	0.009 (0.242 ↓)
	MM-SafetyBench	0.006 (0.264 ↓)	0.029 (0.316 ↓)	0.011 (0.259 ↓)	0.0 (0.105 ↓)	0.023 (0.102 ↓)	0.051 (0.164 ↓)	0.02 (0.202 ↓)
	Hades	0.0 (0.425 ↓)	0.006 (0.319 ↓)	0.006 (0.104 ↓)	0.011 (0.159 ↓)	0.034 (0.186 ↓)	0.109 (0.226 ↓)	0.028 (0.208 ↓)

Table 4: The table below summarizes the effectiveness of various defenses against different attacks VLMs. The two most effective attacks are highlighted by bold and underline, respectively. Top two effective defenses for each attack are: FigStep: AdaShield-A and VLGuard; MM-SafetyBench: AdaShield-A and VLGuard; Hades: VLGuard and AdaShield-A; ADV-16: CIDER and VLGuard; ADV-64: VLGuard and CIDER; ADV-Inf: CIDER and VLGuard; ImgJP: CIDER and VLGuard; AttackVLM: VLGuard and JailGuard.

attacks of 0.258 according to GPT4 and 0.167 by HarmBench classifier.

Finding 4. The selection of evaluators matters as different evaluators yield different ASR. HarmBench classifier and GPT4 yield similar results for optimization-based attacks. However, GPT4 consistently reports a higher ASR for generation-based attacks. One hypothesis of the reason behind this phenomenon is that VLMs tend to describe the harmful contents embedded to the image by generateion-based attack without directly responding to the harmful query. GPT4 and HarmBench consider differently on whether the target model answers this harmful queries. GPT4 considers any harmful description as harmful, while the HarmBench classifier may deem the response harmless if the harmful query isn't directly answered. *We suggest future works to consider various evaluations to demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed attacks.*

Finding 5. Lower ASR doesn't necessarily indicates stronger safety guardrail. This is because, in some VLMs, the lower ASR may stem from inferior visual comprehension and cross-modality alignment rather than more robust safety alignment. Taking the FigStep attack as an example, where harmful contents are typographically embedded into the image input, InstructBlip and MiniGPT4 demonstrate strong robustness to FigStep (lower ASR in Table 3 because they fail to understand the task. InstructBlip merely repeats the text on the image, while MiniGPT4 misinterprets the task as image generation rather than VQA, responding with, "I apologize,

but I cannot generate an image or provide the requested image as I am a text-based AI language model." *This finding highlights the importance of researches on distinguishing the model utility and the safety when evaluating the VLM robustness.*




Figure 3: The trade-off between defense effectiveness, measured by the average ASR reduction across all attacks, and model utility on normal tasks, evaluated using the MM-Vet score. Ideally, we aim for a high MM-Vet score (high model utility) and a low ASR (strong defense capacity).

Defense Implementation Details

VLGuard. VLGuard is a vision-language safe instruction-following dataset. We fine-tune four VLMs using the VLGuard training set: MiniGPT4-7b, Qwen-VL, LLaVa-v1.5, and LLaVa-v1.6, following the fine-tuning scripts provided in the official GitHub repositories. As instructBlip does not provide official fine-tuning scripts, we skip instructBlip in the evaluation of VLGuard. Each target model is fine-tuned for one epoch on 2 A40 within 2 hours. To prevent overemphasis on safety over utilities, we also integrate 5,000 additional helpfulness samples from MiniGPT4 and LLaVa-v1.5’s original training sets into VLGuard.

JailGuard. JailGuard works by mutating input text or images and evaluate the discrepancy across all responses. As JailGuard with random rotation mutator demonstrates highest detection success rate in the original paper, we adopt this mutator in the evaluation, which rotates the image by a random degrees between 0 and 180. Note that the original paper uses JailGuard solely for detection and does not address the model’s response after detection. To ensure a fair comparison of ASR reduction with other defenses, we add an output module to JailGuard’s detection process. The VLM will refuse to respond if JailGuard detects a jailbreak sample; otherwise, the original input will be processed by the VLM.

AdaShield. AdaShield works by analyzing input characteristics and generating adaptive shield prompts to guide the model in ignoring malicious content. Note that AdaShield is only designed for generation-based attacks, so the evaluation of AdaShield is conducted on FigStep, MM-SafetyBench and Hades. We evaluate AdaShield-A (AdS-A), which optimize a prompt with the guidance of LLMs.

CIDER. CIDER utilizes cross-modal semantic similarity between malicious queries and adversarial images to detect optimization-based attacks. Since optimization-based attacks involve converting harmful content in the query into a noise pattern added to the image modality, CIDER detects discrepancies by leveraging this semantic shift. A diffusion-based denoiser preprocesses the image modality, and the relative shift in semantic distance before and after denoising is used to differentiate between clean and adversarial images. Specifically, 350 denoising iterations are performed on the input image. If the semantic similarity between the image and text modalities drops below a predefined threshold, the input is classified as adversarial. Similar to JailGuard, we have added an output module to CIDER’s detection process. If CIDER detects a jailbreak, it will refuse to respond.

MM-Vet score	Vanilla	JailGuard	CIDER	VLGuard	AdS-A
LLaVa-v1.5	0.31	0.29	0.19	0.31	0.15
LLaVa-v1.6	0.31	0.30	0.26	0.33	0.37
Qwen-VL	0.49	0.25	0.29	0.50	0.50
InstructBlip	0.26	0.18	0.13	–	0.30
MiniGPT4-7b	0.23	0.04	0.13	0.20	0.20
MiniGPT4-13b	0.20	0.05	0.16	–	0.25

Table 5: MM-Vet score before and after defenses. Positive impact (increasing in the base model score) are bold.

Findings of Jailbreak Defenses

Table 4 presents the reductions in ASR for various defense mechanisms against different attacks and target VLMs, demonstrating the effectiveness of the defenses in mitigating the harmfulness of the attacks. In addition, MM-Vet score is shown in Table 5, highlighting the impact of each defense on the model utilities on normal tasks. Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates the trade-off between defense effectiveness and VLM utilities. Note that the ASR evaluations in this section are based on the HarmBench classifier.

Finding 1. The effectiveness of each defense varies among attack techniques. As shown in Table 4, VLGuard stands out as the most effective defense, achieving top-two ASR reductions across all attacks. Notably, it completely mitigates attacks on LLaVa-v1.5 and LLaVa-v1.6 but falls short on Qwen-VL, evident in Figure 3 (red line with triangle marker). AdS-A and CIDER are specifically designed for generation-based attack and optimization-based attacks, achieving the best defense performance on generation-based attack such as FigStep and MM-SafetyBench, and optimization-based attacks such as ADV-16, ADV-inf and ImgJP respectively. JailGuard is the least effective defense, possibly due to its reliance on models’ inherent alignment capabilities.

Finding 2. Detection-based defenses have a negative impact on VLM’s utility. As depicted in Figure 3, JailGuard and CIDER compromise VLM utility on regular tasks. This implies that they may misclassify many clean samples as jailbreak samples, underscoring the importance in setting the threshold for identifying jailbreak samples. In contrast, VLGuard and AdS-A have minimal to positive impact on VLM utility, demonstrating their effectiveness in maintaining or even enhancing performance.

Finding 3. Developing a defense method that achieves an optimal balance between model utility and defense effectiveness for all VLMs is challenging. As illustrated in Figure 3, individual defenses often excel in either enhancing model robustness against jailbreak attacks or preserving model utility for standard tasks, but narrowly for one or two models. Notably, no defense method has demonstrated universal effectiveness across all VLMs, including VLGuard, which falls short in safeguarding Qwen-VL against jailbreak attacks. These findings underscore the critical need to account for the inherent diversities among VLMs when designing universal defense strategies.

Conclusions

In this work, we propose *MMJ-bench*, a systematic framework to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of various attack methods against state-of-the-art VLMs and the impact of defense mechanisms in terms of defense effectiveness and model utility on normal tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate several insightful findings that highlight directions for future studies. These findings also contribute to the field by offering a systematic evaluation framework. We construct and release the first comprehensive benchmark for VLM jailbreak research. In the future, we aim to continuously update *MMJ-bench* with new attacks and defenses, ultimately advancing the development of safer and more secure VLMs.

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