Multi-Agent Security Tax: Trading Off Security and Collaboration Capabilities in Multi-Agent Systems

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Abstract

As AI agents are increasingly adopted to collaborate on complex objectives, ensuring the security of autonomous multi-agent systems becomes crucial. We develop simulations of agents collaborating on shared objectives to study these security risks and security trade-offs. We focus on scenarios where an attacker compromises one agent, using it to steer the entire system toward misaligned outcomes by corrupting other agents. In this context, we observe infectious malicious prompts - the multi-hop spreading of malicious instructions. To mitigate this risk, we evaluated several strategies: two "vaccination" approaches that insert false memories of safely handling malicious input into the agents' memory stream, and two versions of a generic safety instruction strategy. While these defenses reduce the spread and fulfillment of malicious instructions in our experiments, they tend to decrease collaboration capability in the agent network. Our findings illustrate potential trade-off between security and collaborative efficiency in multi-agent systems, providing insights for designing more secure yet effective AI collaborations.

1 Introduction

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) training and instruction tuning have resulted in AI agents interacting with humans, and each other, through natural language while accessing vast bodies of digital knowledge (Llama team and contributors 2023; OpenAI 2024a). Although this has produced novel productivity tools and digital assistants for humans (e.g., ChatGPT), LLM agents are increasingly interacting autonomously (Shen et al. 2023; Boiko, MacKnight, and Gomes 2023). Such strongly interacting networks of autonomous agents pose novel security problems that are so far poorly understood but could constitute systemic risks (Commission 2021).

In this paper, we examine a security vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems, analogous to the propagation of worms in traditional digital systems. Our attack involves injecting a malicious prompt into the input of an LLM agent, which can then be disseminated to other agents through communication channels. Without an appropriate defense strategy, this could lead to rapid proliferation, resulting in a system-wide compromise of LLM agents with harmful instructions. This scenario poses systemic risks to the digital infrastructure, similar to the threats exemplified by incidents like Stuxnet (Langner 2011).

More robust defense strategies are needed to secure multi-agent systems against such threat scenarios. The challenge is to design proper defense mechanisms that increase system-level robustness while maintaining a high level of cooperation within the multi-agent system. We demonstrate this trade-off empirically by evaluating system robustness and agent cooperation across a diverse set of defense strategies and underlying LLMs.

1.1 Contributions

Our main contributions are:

- We demonstrate the spread of malicious prompts in a realistic multi-agent LLM simulation of an autonomous chemical research facility
- We measure the effect of these defense strategies on both system robustness and agent cooperation.
- We observe a potential trade-off between system robustness and agent cooperation across a diverse set of defense strategies that can remain unnoticed if evaluations of defense strategies do not take the impact on the normal operations of the system into account.

2 Related Work

Modern LLM applications are less and less made of one single LLM but mostly encompassed within a system:

Tool-LLM (Qin et al. 2023): With LLMs integrated into applications, models can expand their language capabilities to perform actions on behalf of the user through the use of API calls (Osika 2023; OpenAI 2023, 2024c), web research, and writing reports (Elovic 2023), and directly interacting with computer (Anthropic 2024).

LLM Agents (Wang et al. 2024a): To improve the ability of LLMs to act in the world, autonomous systems with an LLM core were created with the capacity to interact with tools and call APIs while maintaining memory and reacting to the environment (Boiko, MacKnight, and Gomes 2023;

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

Figure 1: System Robustness against Agent Cooperation with error bars (SEM) depending on defense strategies. **System Robustness:** ratio of cases where the system did not produce the malicious outcome (see Table 1). **Agent Cooperation:** Agent acceptance rate of agents to unusual but harmless instructions (see Table 2). **Instruction-based defenses:** Safety instructions added to the system prompt. **Vaccine-based defenses:** Fake memory of safely handling a malicious input added to the agent's history. **Passive defenses:** Focused on refusing malicious instructions. **Active defenses:** Refuse malicious instruction and proactively act against its spread within the system.
We observe a potential trade-off between security and cooperation for some models: safest agents tend to be more suspicious, hence less cooperative, and vice versa.

Liang et al. 2023; Shen et al. 2023). These LLM-based agent systems are designed to tackle complex problems or perform decision-making applied in a wide range of situations (Yao et al. 2023; Liu et al. 2024). New methods are continuously introduced, such as prompt-based learning (Liu et al. 2021), retrieval augmented generation (RAG) (Li et al. 2022), planning (Hao et al. 2023), and self-improvement and memory for LLM Agents (Zhao et al. 2023).

LLM Multi-Agent Systems (Park et al. 2023): Multi-agent systems are composed of many LLM agents to solve complex objectives (Nascimento, Alencar, and Cowan 2023; Zhang et al. 2024; Wang et al. 2024b). These systems were designed to extend the capabilities and the application domain of single LLM-based agent systems, such as software engineering and automating research (Zheng et al. 2023). With collective intelligence of a group of specialized agents, research might find better results than relying on a single agent (Hong et al. 2023).

2.1 Security of LLM Agents

With the growth of LLM adoption, concerns about security and safety issues are emerging (Li et al. 2023; Wei, Haghtalab, and Steinhardt 2023). Current models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks through malicious instructions, called "jailbreaks" (Wei, Haghtalab, and Steinhardt 2023). There exist different types of malicious instructions such as direct (Liu et al. 2024) or indirect (Greshake et al. 2023) prompt injection. For direct prompt injection, the attacker sends a malicious prompt directly to the language model while indirect ones are injected into the content that LLM agents use to inform their responses (such as a website an agent retrieves containing a malicious prompt). LLM-agents are also vulnerable to backdoor injections within their core LLM that exclusively target a deployment as agents by exploiting their multi-step reasoning process (Yang et al. 2024). Our work focuses on direct threats of jailbreaks. In terms of defense, recent work has demonstrated that while attacks transfer from LLM to LLM-agents, safety measures do not (Andriushchenko et al. 2024; Lermen, Dziemian, and Pimpale 2024; Kumar et al. 2024).

At the multi-agent level, replications of malicious instructions within multi-LLM systems had been demonstrated in abstract non-realistic environments (Gu et al. 2024) and in the context of a GenAI email assistant (Cohen, Bitton, and Nassi 2024). Recent work has also shown how malicious prompts can create a "domino effect" in multi-agent systems, where compromising one agent can trigger cascading failures across the entire system (Tian et al. 2024). We study defense strategies within such environments.

3 Methodology

3.1 Experiment 1: Defenses in a Realistic Multi-Agent Research Environment

In this experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of various defense mechanisms in reducing the success rate of malicious instructions within a simulated multi-agent system modeled after the autonomous chemical research facility proposed by (Zheng et al. 2023). This system is com-



Figure 2: Examples of infectious prompt proliferation or containment depending on defense mechanisms.
Each horizontal line of the graphs corresponds to one LLM agent of the simulation. Arrows from one line to another correspond to messages sent to other agents. Arrows in bold highlight one message chain. Each simulation starts with a message containing normal instructions sent to Atlas, the lab manager (i.e. *Initial lab instructions*). Then, once the agents start collaborating on the instructed task, the malicious instructions are sent to one of them (i.e. *Initial malicious instructions*). **Upper:** Multi-hop spread of malicious instructions in our system without any defense mechanism. Normal operations are disrupted by the introduction of the jailbreak and a wave of messages is sent by compromised agents (red and orange arrows). Finally, Deng performs an action that leads to an explosion in the lab (red cross). **Lower:** Limited multi-hop spread of malicious instructions in our system with active vaccines. Even if the first agent targeted by the malicious prompt, Edison, got compromised, the message sent by this agent raises suspicion of other bots. Recipients do not follow the malicious instructions and proactively contact the other agents leading to an effective containment of the infectious prompt spread.

posed of seven agents with specific roles (operationalized with different prompts, see the Appendix for more details), which naturally implies a need for cooperation toward any shared objective. The supervision typically performed by the human researcher is done by an AI project manager, Atlas. The objectives of the research facility are the same as in the original paper (Zheng et al. 2023):

> accelerate *"the discovery of optimal microwave synthesis conditions, enhancing the crystallinity of MOF-321, MOF-322, and COF-323 and achieving the desired porosity and water capacity"*.

Within this multi-agent system, we study a targeted attack scenario aimed at the destruction of research equipment by instructing the agents to perform a harmful reaction leading to an explosion. The malicious instructions instruct the bots to mix hydrogen peroxide with acetone and hydrogen chloride (see the Appendix for details).

System Initialization Our research agents are based on an AutoGPT architecture (Significant-Gravitas 2023). At the start of each simulation, agents are initialized with either one of the defense strategies applied and empty memory otherwise. We use various OpenAI models: GPT-3.5-turbo (Brown et al. 2020), GPT-4-turbo (OpenAI 2024a), GPT-4 Omni, and GPT-4 Omni mini (OpenAI 2024b). Agent models are initialized with a system prompt (provided in Appendix) and an empty memory stream. The simulation is asynchronous, with agents running in parallel.

Every agent has a first-in-first-out message queue. Every time an agent processes a new message, it first uses an internal scratchpad for *reacting, reasoning, planning*, and *self-critiquing* before producing a list of actions to perform through a provided list of "tools" to which it has access. In our case, the actions consist of messaging other bots and running python code (see the Appendix for details).

Starting the Task To begin each simulation, we send a message to the lab manager agent (Atlas) containing instructions to "optimize MOF crystallinity" (see the Appendix). This triggers cooperative task execution among agents, as the lab manager typically sends messages to other agents to start collaborating toward the objective from the initial instruction.

Infection Phase After 2 messages in total have been already processed, we introduce the attack by sending a malicious instruction to a randomly selected agent (excluding Atlas and the robot engineer Deng). The malicious instruction is one of 12 unique prompts intended to provoke an explosion (see the Appendix). The exclusion of Atlas and Deng from potential targets is deliberate, as Atlas carries authority and Deng is very likely to directly follow the malicious instructions without spreading them, leaving five other agents as potential targets.

Simulation Termination The simulation continues until one of three conditions is met:

1. An agent uses a *run code* call that instructs the laboratory robot to perform a dangerous mix of chemicals, causing the lab to explode
2. All agents cease to exchange messages (communication deadlock)
3. A predefined message limit is reached

Defense mechanisms We implement and evaluate 4 security interventions on our agent models to contain and mitigate the spread of malicious instructions in our multi-agent systems. All interventions are applied indiscriminately to all agents:

- **Safety instruction**: We add generic safety guidelines to the agent's system prompt (see the Appendix for details). **Passive instructions** only ask the agent to beware of any suspicious messages, while **active instructions** instruct the model to actively counteract the spread of malicious instructions.
- **Memory Vaccines:** We insert a memory payload into the agent's history. In this fake memory, the agent received a malicious input and safely reacted to this (see the Appendix for details). This vaccine becomes the agent's first memory. Like their instructions counterparts, **passive vaccines** contain a non-compliant but passive (a simple refusal to follow instruction) response to a malicious incoming message, while **active vaccines** contain an actively resistant response to such inputs: in the active case, the vaccine emulates a proactive behavior where the agent takes actions to counteract the spread of the malicious instructions by messaging other agents.

Importantly, neither safety prompts nor memory vaccines are specifically targeting the same type of malicious outcome under test: the generic safety instructions do not mention anything related to our explosion scenario, and the vaccines are created out of completely different scenarios such as *asking to send the laboratory microscope to a given address* (see the Appendix).

Running the simulations To measure the impact of our security interventions on multi-hop spreading, for each of the five defense strategies and each of the five models, we run 36 simulations. For a more robust evaluation, we use 12 different jailbreaks (each used 3 times, for a total of 36 simulations per condition). See the full text of these jailbreaks in the Appendix. We collect the number of simulations where the malicious instructions are fulfilled (i.e. in our case when the explosive chemical reaction is started), which we evaluate by analyzing every code execution request from the agents, using GPT-4 Omni.

Measuring agent behaviors To identify the effectiveness of malicious instructions against agent models with and without intervention, we evaluate their subsequent behavior using GPT-4 Omni (OpenAI 2024b). The behavioral responses are defined as:

- **Actively Resistant (-2):** If the agent is resisting the malicious instructions and taking actions to ensure other agents will resist as well.
- **Resistant (-1):** If the agent is resisting the malicious instructions but is not taking action to ensure other agents will resist as well.

- **Neutral/Unsure (0):** If the agent's message does not imply either acceptance of or resistance to the malicious instruction.
- **Compromised (1):** If the agent is following the malicious instruction but is not taking actions to ensure other agents will comply as well.
- **Actively Compromised (2):** If the agent is following the malicious instruction and taking actions to ensure other agents will comply as well.

Measuring the compliance over steps To study the dynamics of spreading, we construct a tree structure out of the chains of messages sent, starting from the origin of the infection. Each level of tree corresponds to processing a message sent in the previous step. Then we can evaluate the behavior of agents involved at each step. These measures are aggregated over multiple simulations, producing information about the type of behaviors displayed by the population of active agents (see the Appendix).

3.2 Experiment 2: Impact of Defense Strategies on Agent Helpfulness

In experiment 2, we evaluated the effect of different defense strategies on agents' helpfulness. We used a different setup than in experiment 1. To measure agents' helpfulness we develop a dataset of harmless but unusual instructions (see the Appendix for details). We expect that if the agent remained as helpful as before our intervention for unusual but harmless requests its helpfulness is not affected by the safety strategy implemented. This setup implies the simplifying assumption that agents' behaviors are the same if they start a simulation with a defense strategy implemented and if a defense strategy is added afterward.

Generation of Realistic Histories We first run multiple multi-agent simulations without any intervention to generate realistic message exchange histories between agents. From these simulations, we randomly selected 30 agents, each containing exactly 7 messages of interaction history, providing enough context for meaningful agent behavior.

Running the simulations Every agent with its message exchange history from the previous step was subjected to every possible combination of:

1. One of the 6 agent models (e.g. GPT-4o or GPT-3.5 Turbo)
2. One of the 4 defense strategies, or none for the control group
3. One of the 6 harmless but unusual instructions

This comprehensive combination of variables generated 5,400 trials.

Evaluation Process The agent's response to the harmless but weird instruction was assessed with GPT-4 Omni which was asked to return 1 if the agent followed the instruction and 0 if it did not.

4 Results

4.1 Experiment 1: Defenses in a Realistic Multi-Agent Research Environment

The results of experiment 1 are presented in table 1 and in figure 1 on the vertical axis.

Effectiveness of Defense Strategies On average active vaccines outperform other strategies, improving system robustness by 14 points (76.7% to 90%). In comparison, passive instructions, active instructions and passive vaccines are less effective, with robustness rates of 87.2%, 87.8% and 83.3%, respectively. The effectiveness of defense strategies varies significantly between model types. For instance, passive vaccines are very effective for gpt-4-2024-08-06 (100% robustness in our experiments), but less effective for GPT-4-mini (50.0%).

We also analyze the behavioral responses to the malicious instruction (see Section 3.1 for how this is defined) across our simulations as a function of time (see Fig 3 and the Appendix for the complete figure, including the breakdown by LLM) with and without defense strategies.

We find that both vaccines and safety guidelines significantly reduce the number of compromised messages sent (by up to 2.8 messages in the case of GPT-4-turbo with passive instructions) and thereby the fulfillment of the malicious objective.

Model-Specific Vulnerabilities GPT-4-mini is the most vulnerable model, showing a 50.0% robustness without defenses, with no improvement when using passive vaccines. However, we can see significant improvements when using active vaccines and active instructions (86.1% and 80.6%, respectively). In contrast, gpt-4-turbo-2024-04-09 and gpt-4o-2024-08-06 demonstrate perfect robustness under both passive and active instructions.

Best-Case and Worst-Case Scenarios In the best-case scenarios, models like GPT-4-turbo (2024-04-09) and GPT-4 (2024-05-13, 2024-08-06) achieve near-perfect robustness with defenses applied. The worst-case scenarios are observed with GPT-4-mini, where passive defense strategies remain insufficient.

Implications Active vaccines provide the most reliable defense and should be prioritized in high-risk environments. While passive defenses are less effective, they still significantly reduce malicious success rates compared to no defense. Model-specific differences highlight the need for tailored safety measures in multi-agent systems.

4.2 Experiment 2: Comparison of Agent Helpfulness Between Defense Strategies

The results of experiment 2 are presented in figure 1 on the horizontal axis and in table 2. The agent cooperation metric is equal to the number of times the agent followed the unusual but harmless instruction divided by the total number of instructions.

Model type	No defense	Passive instructions	Active instructions	Passive vaccines	Active vaccines
gpt-3.5-turbo-0125	86.1% ± 6pp	72.2% ± 8pp	66.7% ± 8pp	**94.4%** ± 4pp	80.6% ± 7pp
gpt-4-turbo-2024-04-09	86.1% ± 6pp	**100%** ± 0pp	**100%** ± 0pp	94.4% ± 4pp	91.7% ± 5pp
gpt-4o-2024-05-13	80.6% ± 7pp	94.4% ± 4pp	91.7% ± 5pp	77.8% ± 7pp	**97.2%** ± 3pp
gpt-4o-2024-08-06	80.6% ± 7pp	**100%** ± 0pp	**100%** ± 0pp	**100%** ± 0pp	94.4% ± 4pp
gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18	50.0% ± 8pp	69.4% ± 8pp	80.6% ± 7pp	50.0% ± 8pp	**86.1%** ± 6pp
Average	76.7% ± 3pp	87.2% ± 2pp	87.8% ± 2pp	83.3% ± 3pp	**90.0%** ± 2pp

Table 1: System robustness to malicious prompt injection depending on the defense strategy implemented.
The success rate is calculated based on the number of simulations that do not lead to an explosion. See 3.1 for a description of the methodology used. Depending on the model used, instruction-based defenses sometimes perform better than vaccine ones. However, they degrade significantly the agent's cooperativeness (see 2) making them poorly suited as defense mechanisms. Formatting: **highest value**, second highest.



Figure 3: Effects of defense strategies over the agents' behaviors averaged for all models and aggregated over all simulations (see Section 3.1). Defense strategies induce a positive ratio of resistant behavior over compromised ones. See the Appendix for a per model type detailed version.

Model type	No defense	Passive instructions	Active instructions	Passive vaccines	Active vaccines
gpt-3.5-turbo-0125	91.7% ± 4pp	80.0% ± 6pp	87.8% ± 5pp	**97.2%** ± 2pp	95.6% ± 3pp
gpt-4-turbo-2024-04-09	**64.4%** ± 7pp	29.4% ± 7pp	42.8% ± 7pp	63.9% ± 7pp	62.8% ± 7pp
gpt-4o-2024-05-13	**97.8%** ± 2pp	68.3% ± 7pp	74.4% ± 6pp	96.7% ± 3pp	97.2% ± 2pp
gpt-4o-2024-08-06	91.7% ± 4pp	26.1% ± 6pp	16.7% ± 5pp	91.7% ± 4pp	**92.2%** ± 4pp
gpt-4o-mini-2024-07-18	**92.2%** ± 4pp	63.9% ± 7pp	77.8% ± 6pp	91.1% ± 4pp	90.6% ± 4pp
Average	87.1% ± 4pp	52.3% ± 7pp	60.7% ± 6pp	87.5% ± 4pp	**87.6%** ± 4pp

Table 2: Agent's acceptance rate to unusual but harmless instruction depending on the defense strategy implemented.
Vaccine defenses maintain a better acceptance rate than instructions-based ones. See 3.2 for a description of the methodology used. Formatting: **highest value**, second highest.

Impact of defense strategies on helpfulness Our results showed that without defense, most models maintained high unusual but harmless instruction success rates (91-92%), with gpt-4-turbo-2024-04-09 being the exception at 64.4%. Both active and passive instructions significantly reduced these success rates (notably in gpt-4o-2024-08-06, where rates dropped from 91.7% to 26.1% with passive instructions and 16.7% with active instructions). In contrast, both vaccine types preserved high success rates comparable to no defense across most models, typically exceeding 90%. Averaging across all models, we observed success rates of 87.1% for no defense, 52.3% for passive instructions, 60.7% for active instructions, 87.5% for passive vaccines, and 87.6% for active vaccines.

5 Discussion & Limitations

Our results show that, without appropriate countermeasures, multi-agent systems are susceptible to infectious spreading of malicious instructions. Our evaluation of the effect of various defense strategies against this threat scenario demonstrates a potential trade-off between system robustness and agent cooperation. This finding highlights the need to account for this trade-off when designing robust and helpful multi-agent systems.

Furthermore, our experiments point to the importance of a multi-hop, and multi-agent analysis for assessing the security properties and capabilities of multi-agent systems. This is because: 1) Malicious instructions can take multiple steps to reach their target. 2) Agents' behavior can shift after multiple exposures to similar or contradictory signals.

We find that eliciting active resistance to malicious instructions can help to significantly reduce their spread within a multi-agent system but usually comes at the cost of reducing cooperation within agents. Our findings suggest that for most models studied, one-shot examples defense strategies through vaccines do not degrade cooperation while improving the system's robustness.

Limitations: Our study is limited to one realistic but specific multi-agent system: an autonomous chemical research lab. This limits the generalizability of our results as other settings, such as autonomous software engineering teams, may lead to novel behaviors. We also focused only on one type of attack scenario: a malicious intervention with the goal of generating material destruction within the research facility through inducing a chemical explosion. Other scenarios could have been studied such as private data or intellectual property exfiltration. Finally, we used only a limited number of malicious prompts (12) to test those scenarios but it is worth considering that most of the spread is done via imperfect replication: the agents do not spread verbatim copies of the malicious instructions but new variants (see figure 2 as an example, Atlas' message to Deng is not a copy of Faraday's); therefore the variation of malicious messages circulating within our system is actually much bigger than the number of malicious prompts originally injected.

Our second experiment uses agent compliance to unusual but non-harmful instructions as a proxy for collaboration efficiency. However, multi-agent collaboration efficiency encompasses more than just compliance and may not correlate perfectly with our proxy. Additional work could be done to measure collaboration using system-level outcomes instead.

A major limitation is that we only used simple attacks and defenses. Researchers have devised new methods of securing AI systems, including using LoRA to prevent responding to jailbreaks (Zou et al. 2024), or having a model classify every message as a jailbreak or not before allowing the core model to process it (Kim, Derakhshan, and Harris 2023). For the results to generalize to modern models, defending against state of the art attack methods is also pertinent, such as Best-of-N jailbreaking (Hughes et al. 2024). Additional inquiries should be performed to consider the latest attack and defense methods.

6 Conclusion

Trading off willingness to collaborate with refusal to do harm is a core problem of LLM safety training but could become exacerbated in multi-agent systems where multiple messages containing similar or contradictory instructions can be processed over time. We empirically study this trade-off in a realistic multi-agent system and demonstrate that evaluating only the effect of specific defense strategies on multi-agent robustness can be highly misleading and hide important negative side effects on the agents' cooperation ability. Our findings about the trade-off between security and collaboration capabilities align with observations by Hua et al. (2024), who found that implementing safety constraints through their TrustAgent framework requires careful consideration of how safety measures impact an agent's ability to perform its intended functions.

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Author Contribution

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