DualGFL: Federated Learning with a Dual-Level Coalition-Auction Game

Authors

  • Xiaobing Chen Louisiana State University
  • Xiangwei Zhou Louisiana State University
  • Songyang Zhang University of Louisiana at Lafeyette
  • Mingxuan Sun Louisiana State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i15.33746

Abstract

Despite some promising results in federated learning using game-theoretical methods, most existing studies mainly employ a one-level game in either a cooperative or competitive environment, failing to capture the complex dynamics among participants in practice. To address this issue, we propose DualGFL, a novel federated learning framework with a dual-level game in cooperative-competitive environments. DualGFL includes a lower-level hedonic game where clients form coalitions and an upper-level multi-attribute auction game where coalitions bid for training participation. At the lower-level DualGFL, we introduce a new auction-aware utility function and propose a Pareto-optimal partitioning algorithm to find a Pareto-optimal partition based on clients' preference profiles. At the upper-level DualGFL, we formulate a multi-attribute auction game with resource constraints and derive equilibrium bids to maximize coalitions' winning probabilities and profits. A greedy algorithm is proposed to maximize the utility of the central server. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate DualGFL's effectiveness in improving both server utility and client utility.

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Published

2025-04-11

How to Cite

Chen, X., Zhou, X., Zhang, S., & Sun, M. (2025). DualGFL: Federated Learning with a Dual-Level Coalition-Auction Game. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 39(15), 15904-15912. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i15.33746

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Machine Learning I