Uncommon Belief in Rationality

Authors

  • Qi Shi University of Southampton, UK
  • Pavel Naumov University of Southampton, UK

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33546

Abstract

Common knowledge/belief in rationality is the traditional standard assumption in analysing interaction among agents. This paper proposes a graph-based language for capturing significantly more complicated structures of higher-order beliefs that agents might have about the rationality of the other agents. The two main contributions are a solution concept that captures the reasoning process based on a given belief structure and an efficient algorithm for compressing any belief structure into a unique minimal form.

Published

2025-04-11

How to Cite

Shi, Q., & Naumov, P. (2025). Uncommon Belief in Rationality. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 39(13), 14120–14128. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33546

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms