On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28859Keywords:
GTEP: Imperfect Information, GTEP: EquilibriumAbstract
We investigate two notions of correlated equilibrium for extensive-form games: the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) and the behavioral correlated equilibrium (BCE). We show that the two are outcome-equivalent, in the sense that every outcome distribution achievable under one notion is achievable under the other. Our result implies, to our knowledge, the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing a BCE.Downloads
Published
2024-03-24
How to Cite
Zhang, B. H., & Sandholm, T. (2024). On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 38(9), 9969-9976. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28859
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Section
AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms