Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchain


  • Niclas Boehmer Harvard University
  • Markus Brill University of Warwick
  • Alfonso Cevallos Web3 Foundation
  • Jonas Gehrlein Web3 Foundation
  • Luis Sánchez-Fernández Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
  • Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin TU Eindhoven



GTEP: Social Choice / Voting


We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one thousand candidates and tens of thousands of (weighted) voters each. We conduct an in-depth study of application-relevant questions, including a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the outcomes returned by different voting rules. Besides considering proportionality measures that are standard in the multiwinner voting literature, we pay particular attention to less-studied measures of overrepresentation, as these are closely related to the security of the Polkadot network. We also analyze how different design decisions such as the committee size affect the examined measures.




How to Cite

Boehmer, N., Brill, M., Cevallos, A., Gehrlein, J., Sánchez-Fernández, L., & Schmidt-Kraepelin, U. (2024). Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchain. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 38(9), 9519-9527.



AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms