Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees
Keywords:GTEP: Mechanism Design, GTEP: Game Theory, GTEP: Social Choice / Voting
AbstractThe facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we consider a novel model where each facility charges an entrance fee, which is a function of the facility's location. Thus, in our model, the cost of each agent is the sum of the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. The generalized model captures more real-life scenarios. In our model, the entrance fee function can be an arbitrary function, and the corresponding preferences of agents may not be single-peaked anymore: this makes the problem complex and requires new techniques in the analysis. We systematically study the model and design strategyproof mechanisms with nice approximation ratios and also complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results. Specifically, for one-facility and two-facility games, we provide upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratios given by deterministic and randomized mechanisms, with respect to the utilitarian and egalitarian objectives. Most of our bounds are tight, and these bounds are independent of the entrance fee functions. Our results also match the results of the classical model.
How to Cite
Ma, M., Xiao, M., Bai, T., & Khoussainov, B. (2023). Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 37(5), 5797-5804. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25719
AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms