Mediated Cheap Talk Design
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25678Keywords:
GTEP: Game Theory, GTEP: Equilibrium, GTEP: Mechanism Design, RU: Decision/Utility TheoryAbstract
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers data from the senders and recommends the receiver which action to play. We characterize the set of feasible action distributions that can be obtained in equilibrium, and provide an O(n log n) algorithm (where n is the number of states) that computes the optimal equilibrium for the senders. Additionally, we show that the optimal equilibrium for the receiver can be obtained by a simple revelation mechanism.Downloads
Published
2023-06-26
How to Cite
Arieli, I., Geffner, I., & Tennenholtz, M. (2023). Mediated Cheap Talk Design. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 37(5), 5456-5463. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25678
Issue
Section
AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms