Inconsistent Planning: When in Doubt, Toss a Coin!


  • Yuriy Dementiev St.Petersburg State University
  • Fedor Fomin University of Bergen
  • Artur Ignatiev St.Petersburg State University



Planning, Routing, And Scheduling (PRS), Game Theory And Economic Paradigms (GTEP)


One of the most widespread human behavioral biases is the present bias -- the tendency to overestimate current costs by a bias factor. Kleinberg and Oren (2014) introduced an elegant graph-theoretical model of inconsistent planning capturing the behavior of a present-biased agent accomplishing a set of actions. The essential measure of the system introduced by Kleinberg and Oren is the cost of irrationality -- the ratio of the total cost of the actions performed by the present-biased agent to the optimal cost. This measure is vital for a task designer to estimate the aftermaths of human behavior related to time-inconsistent planning, including procrastination and abandonment. As we prove in this paper, the cost of irrationality is highly susceptible to the agent's choices when faced with a few possible actions of equal estimated costs. To address this issue, we propose a modification of Kleinberg-Oren's model of inconsistent planning. In our model, when an agent selects from several options of minimum prescribed cost, he uses a randomized procedure. We explore the algorithmic complexity of computing and estimating the cost of irrationality in the new model.




How to Cite

Dementiev, Y., Fomin, F., & Ignatiev, A. (2022). Inconsistent Planning: When in Doubt, Toss a Coin!. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 36(9), 9724-9731.



AAAI Technical Track on Planning, Routing, and Scheduling