Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents


  • Ben Berger Tel Aviv University
  • Avi Cohen Tel Aviv University
  • Michal Feldman Tel-Aviv University
  • Amos Fiat Tel Aviv University



Game Theory And Economic Paradigms (GTEP)


The existence of EFX allocations of goods is a major open problem in fair division, even for additive valuations. The current state of the art is that no setting where EFX allocations are impossible is known, and yet, existence results are known only for very restricted settings, such as: (i) agents with identical valuations, (ii) 2 agents, and (iii) 3 agents with additive valuations. It is also known that EFX exists if one can leave n-1 items unallocated, where n is the number of agents. We develop new techniques that allow us to push the boundaries of the enigmatic EFX problem beyond these known results, and (arguably) to simplify proofs of earlier results. Our main result is that every setting with 4 additive agents admits an EFX allocation that leaves at most a single item unallocated. Beyond our main result, we introduce a new class of valuations, termed nice cancelable, which includes additive, unit-demand, budget-additive and multiplicative valuations, among others. Using our new techniques, we show that both our results and previous results for additive valuations extend to nice cancelable valuations.




How to Cite

Berger, B., Cohen, A., Feldman, M., & Fiat, A. (2022). Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 36(5), 4826-4833.



AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms