Fair Stable Matchings Under Correlated Preferences (Student Abstract)
Keywords:Stable Matchings, Fairness, Multiagent Systems
AbstractStable matching models are widely used in market design, school admission, and donor organ exchange. The classic Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm guarantees a stable matching that is optimal for one side (say men) and pessimal for the other (say women). A sex-equal stable matching aims at providing a fair solution to this problem. We demonstrate that under a class of correlated preferences, the DA algorithm either returns a sex-equal solution or has a very low sex-equality cost.
How to Cite
Brilliantova, A., & Hosseini, H. (2021). Fair Stable Matchings Under Correlated Preferences (Student Abstract). Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35(18), 15763-15764. Retrieved from https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/17878
AAAI Student Abstract and Poster Program