An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections

Authors

  • Michał T. Godziszewski University of Warsaw
  • Paweł Batko AGH University of Science and Technology
  • Piotr Skowron University of Warsaw
  • Piotr Faliszewski AGH University of Science and Technology

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16686

Keywords:

Social Choice / Voting

Abstract

We study approval-based committee elections for the case where the voters' preferences come from a 2D-Euclidean model. We consider two main issues: First, we ask for the complexity of computing election results. Second, we evaluate election outcomes experimentally, following the visualization technique of Elkind et al., (AAAI-2017). Regarding the first issue, we find that many NP-hard rules remain intractable for 2D-Euclidean elections. For the second one, we observe that the behavior and nature of many rules strongly depends on the exact protocol for choosing the approved candidates.

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Published

2021-05-18

How to Cite

Godziszewski, M. T., Batko, P., Skowron, P., & Faliszewski, P. (2021). An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35(6), 5448-5455. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16686

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms