Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games


  • Felix Brandt Technische Universität München
  • Martin Bullinger Technische Universität München
  • Anaëlle Wilczynski CentraleSupélec, Université Paris-Saclay



Cooperative Game Theory


The formal study of coalition formation in multiagent systems is typically realized using so-called hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the computational complexity of deciding the existence of coalition structures that satisfy various stability criteria. The actual process of forming coalitions based on individual behavior has received little attention. In this paper, we study the convergence of simple dynamics leading to stable partitions in a variety of classes of hedonic games, including anonymous, dichotomous, fractional, and hedonic diversity games. The dynamics we consider is based on individual stability: an agent will join another coalition if she is better off and no member of the welcoming coalition is worse off. We identify conditions for convergence, provide elaborate counterexamples of existence of individually stable partitions, and study the computational complexity of problems related to the coalition formation dynamics. In particular, we settle open problems suggested by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), Brandl, Brandt, and Strobel (2015), and Boehmer and Elkind (2020).




How to Cite

Brandt, F., Bullinger, M., & Wilczynski, A. (2021). Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35(6), 5211-5218.



AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms