Tool Auctions

Authors

  • Janosch Döcker University of Tübingen
  • Britta Dorn University of Tübingen
  • Ulle Endriss ILLC, University of Amsterdam
  • Ronald de Haan ILLC, University of Amsterdam
  • Sebastian Schneckenburger University of Tübingen

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11473

Abstract

We introduce tool auctions, a novel market mechanism for constructing a cost-efficient assembly line for producing a desired set of products from a given set of goods and tools. Such tools can be used to transform one type of good into a different one. We then study the computational complexity of tool auctions in detail, using methods from both classical and parameterized complexity theory. While solving such auctions is intractable in general, just as for the related frameworks of combinatorial and mixed auctions, we are able to identify several special cases of practical interest where designing efficient algorithms is possible.

AAAI 2018 Proceedings Cover

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Published

2018-04-25

How to Cite

Döcker, J., Dorn, B., Endriss, U., de Haan, R., & Schneckenburger, S. (2018). Tool Auctions. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 32(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11473

Issue

Vol. 32 No. 1 (2018): Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms