Security Games on a Plane


  • Jiarui Gan Nanyang Technological University
  • Bo An Nanyang Technological University
  • Yevgeniy Vorobeychik Vanderbilt University
  • Brian Gauch Vanderbilt University



Game Theory, Stackelberg Security Game, Plane


Most existing models of Stackelberg security games ignore the underlying topology of the space in which targets and defence resources are located. As a result, allocation of resources is restricted to a discrete collection of exogenously defined targets. However, in many practical security settings, defense resources can be located on a continuous plane. Better defense solutions could therefore be potentially achieved by placing resources in a space outside of actual targets (e.g., between targets). To address this limitation, we propose a model called Security Game on a Plane (SGP) in which targets are distributed on a 2-dimensional plane, and security resources, to be allocated on the same plane, protect targets within a certain effective distance. We investigate the algorithmic aspects of SGP. We find that computing a strong Stackelberg equilibrium of an SGP is NP-hard even for zero-sum games, and these are inapproximable in general. On the positive side, we find an exact solution technique for general SGPs based on an existing approach, and develop a PTAS (polynomial-time approximation scheme) for zero-sum SGP to more fundamentally overcome the computational obstacle. Our experiments demonstrate the value of considering SGP and effectiveness of our algorithms.




How to Cite

Gan, J., An, B., Vorobeychik, Y., & Gauch, B. (2017). Security Games on a Plane. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31(1).



AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms