Teams in Online Scheduling Polls: Game-Theoretic Aspects

Authors

  • Robert Bredereck University of Oxford
  • Jiehua Chen Technische Universität Berlin
  • Rolf Niedermeier Technische Universität Berlin
  • Svetlana Obraztsova Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  • Nimrod Talmon Weizmann Institute of Science

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10589

Keywords:

Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Complexity Analysis, Algorithms

Abstract

Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken during the meeting, therefore each team would like to maximize its relative attendance (i.e. the proportional number of its team members attending the meeting). We introduce a corresponding game, where each team can declare a lower total availability in the scheduling poll in order to improve its relative attendance—the pay-off. We are especially interested in situations where teams can form coalitions. We provide an efficient algorithm that, given a coalition, finds an optimal way for each team in a coalition to improve its pay-off. In contrast, we show that deciding whether such a coalition exists is NP-hard. We also study the existence of Nash equilibria: Finding Nash equilibria for various small sizes of teams and coalitions can be done in polynomial time while it is coNP-hard if the coalition size is unbounded.

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Published

2017-02-10

How to Cite

Bredereck, R., Chen, J., Niedermeier, R., Obraztsova, S., & Talmon, N. (2017). Teams in Online Scheduling Polls: Game-Theoretic Aspects. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10589

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms