Emergence of Social Punishment and Cooperation through Prior Commitments

Authors

  • The Anh Han Teesside University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10120

Keywords:

Cooperation, Punishment, Commitment, Antisocial punishment, Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

Social punishment, whereby cooperators punish defectors, has been suggested as an important mechanism that promotes the emergence of cooperation or maintenance of social norms in the context of the one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interaction. However, whenever antisocial punishment, whereby defectors punish cooperators, is available, this antisocial behavior outperforms social punishment, leading to the destruction of cooperation. In this paper, we use evolutionary game theory to show that this antisocial behavior can be efficiently restrained by relying on prior commitments, wherein agents can arrange, prior to an interaction, agreements regarding posterior compensation by those who dishonor the agreements. We show that, although the commitment mechanism by itself can guarantee a notable level of cooperation, a significantly higher level is achieved when both mechanisms, those of proposing prior commitments and of punishment, are available in co-presence. Interestingly, social punishment prevails and dominates in this system as it can take advantage of the commitment mechanism to cope with antisocial behaviors. That is, establishment of a commitment system helps to pave the way for the evolution of social punishment and abundant cooperation, even in the presence of antisocial punishment.

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Published

2016-03-03

How to Cite

Han, T. A. (2016). Emergence of Social Punishment and Cooperation through Prior Commitments. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 30(1). https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10120

Issue

Section

Technical Papers: Multiagent Systems