Mind the Third Eye! Benchmarking Privacy Awareness in MLLM-powered Smartphone Agents

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Abstract

Smartphones bring significant convenience to users but also enable devices to extensively record various types of personal information. Existing smartphone agents powered by Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable performance in automating different tasks. However, as the cost, these agents are granted substantial access to sensitive users' personal information during this operation. To gain a thorough understanding of the privacy awareness of these agents, we present the first large-scale benchmark encompassing 7,138 scenarios to the best of our knowledge. In addition, for privacy context in scenarios, we annotate its type (*e.g.*, *Account Credentials*), sensitivity level, and location. We then carefully benchmark seven available mainstream smartphone agents. Our results demonstrate that almost all benchmarked agents show unsatisfying privacy awareness (RA), with performance remaining below 60% even with explicit hints. Overall, closed-source agents show better privacy ability than open-source ones, and *Gemini 2.0-flash* achieves the best, achieving an RA of 67%. We also find that the agents' privacy detection capability is highly related to scenario sensitivity level, *i.e.*, the scenario with a higher sensitivity level is typically more identifiable. We hope the findings enlighten the research community to rethink the unbalanced utility-privacy tradeoff about smartphone agents.

Homepage — https://zhixin-l.github.io/SAPA-Bench/
Code — https://github.com/Zhixin-L/SAPA-Bench
Dataset — https://huggingface.co/datasets/OmniQuest/SAPA-Bench

Introduction

With the rapid advancement of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) (Bai et al. 2025b; Zhu et al. 2025; Xun et al. 2025; Dang et al. 2024; Liu et al. 2025b) and smartphone agents (Jiang et al. 2025; Ma, Zhang, and Zhao 2024; Dai et al. 2025; Wang et al. 2025), users increasingly rely on intelligent assistants to automate routine tasks such as sending messages, ordering takeout, and online shopping. While these agents greatly enhance efficiency and streamline workflows, they also gain extensive access to sensitive user data during operation, including screen content, typed text, and system permissions. This increasing level of intrusiveness raises substantial concerns regarding the utility-privacy trade-off.



Figure 1: Motivation of SAPA-Bench. Left: Current agents often execute sensitive commands (*e.g.*, entering a PIN) without privacy checks, posing risks. Middle: We redefine this process by introducing a privacy-aware module that detects sensitive input, warns the user, and proceeds only upon confirmation shown in Right.

Existing evaluations mainly focus on the capability of agents, employing metrics such as task completion rate (Xu et al. 2025), interaction latency (Wang et al. 2024b), or resource consumption (Deng et al. 2024; Dai et al. 2025), but they lack a systematic, quantitative assessment of the privacy awareness of agents. Benchmarks such as Android-in-the-Wild (Rawles et al. 2023) and GUI Odyssey (Lu et al. 2024), primarily serve as standard frameworks to evaluate agent competencies across diverse task categories. However, in practice, users also care whether agents can accurately identify and properly handle privacy-sensitive content, such as location data, account credentials, or call logs. Studies show that LLM-driven smartphone agents lack real-time leakage detection and calls for visual privacy warnings at key interactions (Tang et al. 2025; Pan, Ge, and Sun 2025). Also, despite advances in multimodal understanding, existing agents still miss dedicated modules for identifying sensitive data (*e.g.*, location, contacts) or requesting user confirmation (Liu et al. 2025a). As shown in Figure 1, the absence of a unified benchmark and dedicated metrics makes it difficult to com-

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pare the privacy awareness of agents and obstructs privacy-driven agent design.

To address this gap, we introduce SAPA-Bench, the first-ever large-scale benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the privacy awareness of smartphone agents. SAPA-Bench comprises 7,138 real-world scenarios, and each scenario is annotated for privacy presence, leakage modality (image or instruction), privacy category, risk severity, and the expected risk prompt. Building on this dataset, we define five specialized evaluation metrics-Privacy Recognition Rate (PRR), Privacy Localization Rate (PLR), Privacy Level Awareness Rate (PLAR), Privacy Category Awareness Rate (PCAR), and Risk Awareness (RA) to quantify an agent's capabilities in privacy recognition, localization, classification, severity estimation, and risk response, respectively.

We conduct a comparative evaluation of seven mainstream representative smartphone agents, including those driven by open-source and closed-source models. Our results reveal that most existing agents perform poorly in privacy awareness, with performance remaining below 60% even with implicit hints; overall, closed-source models slightly outperform open-source ones, and there exists a notable positive correlation between a model's privacy sensitivity and scenario sensitivity. Furthermore, our results indicate that augmenting inputs with targeted prompt signals substantially improves the ability of the models to detect sensitive content to privacy. The main contributions of this work are:

- We construct SAPA-Bench, a dedicated benchmark for privacy-aware smartphone agents that, unlike prior security benchmarks such as MobileSafetyBench (Lee et al. 2024) covers the full privacy perception pipeline: recognition, localization, classification, severity estimation, and risk warning evaluation.
- We propose five specialized privacy metrics (PRR, PLR, PLAR, PCAR, RA), enabling the first quantitative evaluation of agents' privacy understanding and response capabilities.
- We evaluate mainstream smartphone agents to reveal key privacy awareness bottlenecks and highlight trade-offs between performance and privacy, show that models with greater scenario sensitivity detect privacy more effectively, and demonstrate that adding targeted prompt hints can improve detection while maintaining usability.

We envision that SAPA-Bench will serve as an extensible, privacy-focused evaluation platform, guiding the community toward smarter, safer smartphone agents that strike an optimal balance between functionality and privacy protection.

Related Work

Smartphone Agent powered by MLLM

Existing mainstream research on mobile agents is mainly powered by MLLMs (Liu et al. 2025a; Wu et al. 2024a). To better adapt to diverse tasks such as UI parsing, multi-step action planning, or cross-app reasoning, these systems often dynamically switch or fine-tune different MLLM backbones (*e.g.*, GPT-4o, Gemini, or customized vision-language models). MLLM enables mobile agents to understand jointly and reason over both visual (*e.g.*, UI screenshots) and textual (*e.g.*, instructions) inputs, allowing for more flexible, generalizable, and human-aligned interaction.

Specifically, early systems like AppAgent (Li et al. 2024b) pioneered a two-phase "exploration–deployment" pipeline: during exploration, it passively observes UI elements to build a knowledge base. Mobile-Agent (Wang et al. 2024a) followed with a fully vision-driven framework that uses only screenshots as input, achieving high precision multi-step operations and introducing the Mobile-Eval benchmark. Subsequent methods Show-UI (Lin et al. 2025) with visual-token selection and streaming inference, and SpiritSight Agent (Huang et al. 2025) with universal block parsing further improved UI localization and cross-platform understanding efficiency. However, none of these single-agent approaches incorporates mechanisms for detecting privacy-sensitive operations or issuing risk warnings. While these frameworks significantly advance task success rates and robustness, they commonly neglect to add modules to particularly response to potential privacy risks.

Existing Privacy Evaluation Frameworks

Existing standards and guidelines offer general frameworks for privacy impact assessment, but they have not been directly adapted to smartphone agents. One study (Iwaya et al. 2024) surveyed privacy impact assessment (PIA) methodologies and emphasized the need to cover a spectrum of risks from low to high in real-world settings. Similarly, another paper (Sangaroonsilp et al. 2023) introduced a three-tier taxonomy (high/medium/low) for classifying privacy requirements in issue reports, providing a reference for multi-level risk assessment. Such multi-level privacy annotations could serve as a valuable standard for systematically evaluating and benchmarking the privacy awareness of smartphone agents.

Motivation

Existing benchmarks, such as SPA-bench (Chen et al. 2024a) and GUI-odyssey (Lu et al. 2024), have attempted to diversify task types, increase task volume and complexity, and introduce more sophisticated scenarios to challenge the problem-solving capabilities of smartphone agents. As security and privacy become an increasing concern when using smartphone agents, SIUO (Wang et al. 2024c) and related works concentrate on hazardous behaviors, criminal activities, and other security domains. Other benchmarks, such as MobileSafetyBench (Lee et al. 2024), focus on behavioral safety in benign versus harmful tasks, penalizing agents for overstepping predefined boundaries.

However, existing benchmarks overlook a crucial issue: **When the model fails to recognize that an operation involves personal privacy information, no notice is raised.** The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP), first introduced by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973, emphasize transparency through user notification and informed choice (Pan et al. 2024a,b). These



Figure 2: Five-stage annotation pipeline of SAPA-Bench. GPT-4o and human annotators collaboratively label privacy-sensitive ground truth. Specifically, stage 0 cleans and samples raw screenshots; stages 1 and 3 automatically generate privacy-sensitive ground truth; stages 2 and 4 conduct human verification.

principles later evolved into the "notice-and-choice privacy framework," forming the conceptual basis of contemporary privacy regulations, such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In both common deployment architectures, *i.e.*, on-device agents and cloud-based end-to-end agents, sensitive actions (*e.g.*, reading a password from the clipboard or uploading a user's contact list) execute automatically without prompting users, thus denying users the opportunity to potentially intervene. When confronted with privacy-related requests, an agent must not only recognize the private nature and sensitivity of the content but also proactively alert users before execution; only then can the agent be deemed to possess robust privacy-handling capabilities.

To address this gap, we propose SAPA-Bench, a benchmark for systematically evaluating agents' capability to recognize and appropriately respond to privacy-sensitive operations. SAPA-Bench focuses on assessing whether agents can identify privacy risks in contextual user requests and adopt proper mitigation behaviors, rather than blindly executing potentially harmful actions. The benchmark construction and details are introduced in the following section.

Smartphone Agent Privacy Awareness: SAPA-Bench

Privacy in Smartphone

Inspired by large-scale user perspectives on mobile app privacy (Nema et al. 2022) and the structured privacy taxonomies adopted in Apple and Google's official privacy label frameworks (Ali et al. 2024; Khandelwal et al. 2023), we classify privacy leakage into eight categories by jointly considering the operation type and the app category, including: 1. *Account Credentials* (AC), 2. *Personal Information* (PI), 3. *Financial and Payment* (FP), 4. *Communication Content* (CC), 5. *Location and Environment* (LE), 6. *Device Permissions* (DPO), 7. *Media and Files* (MF), 8. *Behavior and Browsing* (BPBH).

Based on previous studies (Chen et al. 2024a; Li et al. 2024a), we further categorize these eight categories into three privacy-sensitivity levels from low, medium, and high, to enable fine-grained evaluation on agents. This stratification is grounded in the degree to which an action may expose sensitive user information in real-world mobile interactions. Specifically, high-sensitivity content refers to operations involving rich personal information, such as chat messages containing ID numbers or account credentials, precise location sharing, device-level permission grants, or entry of financial credentials. Medium-sensitivity content covers moderately private data commonly encountered in daily life, such as coarse location sharing, meeting links, or casual chat messages. In contrast, low-sensitivity content includes routine behavioral traces like browsing history, cart additions, viewing task status, or sharing public content, which rarely reveal identifiable personal data.

Benchmark Characteristics

Our benchmark, namely as SAPA-Bench (**S**martphone **A**gent **P**rivacy **A**wareness **Bench**mark), comprises a suite of 7,138 tasks drawn from 50 popular English-language smartphone applications, *e.g.*, Instagram and Google map, from various categories. Each scenario is based on a **UI Screenshot**, which is a snapshot of the interface where a privacy leak may occur. For the sake of consistency and comparativeness, all UI screenshots are sampled from the GUI-Odyssey (Lu et al. 2024) and OS-Atlas (Wu et al. 2024b) task suites.

To comprehensively evaluate the agents' capabilities on privacy awareness, for each scenario, we further annotate the following privacy-related information:

- **Instruction & Response**: *Instruction*: the user's prompt to describe the operation (*e.g.*, "Enter password P@sswOrd to log in"). *Response*: the model's expected response (*e.g.*, "This action may send your message history and leak private information. Are you sure you want to proceed?").
- **Exposure Modality & Location**: whether the privacy exposure occurs in the *screenshot* or in the *instruction*.
- **Privacy Sensitivity Level**: three tier, *i.e.*, Low, Medium, and High, reflecting the degree of sensitivity.
- **Privacy Type**: eight categories (*e.g.*, Account Credentials, Financial and Payment *etc.*).

Dataset Statistics. SAPA-Bench comprises 7,138 privacy-sensitive tasks across eight main categories and 27 sub-categories, two privacy exposure modalities, three sensitivity levels, and tailored instruction & response pairs. Figure 2 shows the number of sub-categories per category broken down by risk level (Low, Medium, High) and cases in SAPA-Bench. The "Personal Information" and "Communication Content" categories exhibit the largest High-Risk proportions, each exceeding 40% of their totals, whereas "Device Permissions and Operation" and "Financial and Payment" are dominated by Medium-Risk or Low-Risk tasks. This uneven distribution mirrors real-world differences in privacy sensitivity: for example, entering account credentials or pasting an email address is inherently high-risk, while browsing history or setting behavioral preferences generally poses lower or medium risk. Thus,



(a) Hierarchical Distribution of Privacy Leakage Tasks in SAPA-Bench

(c) Task Counts by Difficulty Level Across Categories

Figure 3: Overview of SAPA-Bench, illustrating its task taxonomy, representative examples, and risk-level distribution. (a) Hierarchical classification of privacy-leakage tasks, organized into eight top-level categories and their corresponding subtasks. (b) Example cases from categories "Account Credentials" (high risk) and "Personal Information" (mid risk), each with system prompt and expected agent warning. (c) Task counts by risk level (High/Mid/Low) across the eight privacy categories (represented by their initials), showing real-world imbalanced distribution of sensitivity.

SAPA-Bench functions as a multi-level, multidimensional benchmark on evaluating GUI agents' ability to warn and protect users across varying privacy sensitivity contexts.

Annotation Pipeline

We combine MLLM-driven automatic generation with rigorous human verification in five stages:

Stage 0: Data Cleaning & Sampling. We apply GPT-4o to the raw GUI-Odyssey and OS-Atlas corpora ($\approx 80,000$ screenshots) to automatically filter those likely to contain privacy-sensitive content. From the filtered set, we then randomly sample 400 screenshots for quick manual spot-checking to validate filter precision.

We divide manual annotation into two parts: first, we verify the accuracy and consistency of the Instruction–Response pairs to ensure clear, mistake-free dialog content; then, using those validated dialogs along with the original screenshots, we structurally annotate the remaining fields (*e.g.*, sensitivity level, leakage location, privacy category). This two-part approach reduces cognitive load and improves annotation quality and consistency.

Stage 1: Automatic Generation of Instruction & Response. We leverage a GPT-4o model to automatically generate a privacy-sensitive instruction and a corresponding response for each example. The prompts are constructed to simulate realistic user intents that may trigger privacy-related concerns. A template of the prompt format is provided in the Appendix. Combined with Stage 0 (data filtering and sampling), this stage took approximately 40 human-hours to complete, including generation, basic validation, and API processing time.

Stage 2: Initial Human Review. An initial human review is conducted on every Instruction–Response pair by four graduate and three undergraduate annotators trained in privacy annotation. Annotators verify that instructions are concise, unambiguous, and signal a potential privacy risk, and that responses conform to the standardized warning template "This action may result in [privacy leakage type]. Please confirm before proceeding." Only pairs passing this quality check are advanced to the next stage.

Stage 3: Automatic Annotation of Remaining Fields. In this stage, we employ a GPT-4o to complete the remaining fields in the ground-truth structure, including the privacy leakage position, privacy sensitivity level, and privacy category. For each sample, the model is prompted with the previously verified Instruction–Response pair and asked to infer the additional fields in a structured output format. The generation process is single-pass and fully automated. We also check that each annotation follows a consistent format. To complete all annotations, this stage takes approximately 10 hours in total. All outputs from this step are forwarded to Stage 4 for the final human verification.

Stage 4: Final Human Verification. To ensure the consistency and accuracy of the automatically generated anno-

Model	#Size	SR	PRR	PLR Image	PLR Instruction	PLR Overall	PLAR	PCAR	RA(EH) Score
Smartphone Agent									
Show-UI	2B	25.71%	34.17%	29.68%	**52.37%**	41.03%	10.16%	4.33%	18.77
SpiritSight Agent	8B	43.00%	32.75%	29.04%	38.70%	33.87%	15.23%	11.78%	27.25
General Vision-Language Model									
Qwen2.5-VL	7B	17.51%	28.39%	27.00%	23.12%	25.06%	5.74%	4.03%	40.23
InternVL 2.5	8B	25.29%	35.79%	29.56%	3.43%	16.50%	11.38%	19.68%	51.66
LLaVA-NeXT	7B	35.95%	79.72%	10.59%	16.63%	13.61%	13.90%	2.58%	36.94
Close-source Model									
Gemini 2.0-flash	–	**48.12%**	75.62%	18.96%	29.16%	24.06%	26.45%	**35.08%**	**67.14**
GPT-4o	–	31.64%	**80.16%**	**74.42%**	15.85%	**45.14%**	**31.66%**	27.78%	55.03

Table 1: Evaluation results for each model: PRR, PLR, PLAR, PCAR, and RA measure the models' privacy capabilities on SAPA-Bench, while SR assesses their task completion performance. Bold is the best, underline the second best in each column.



Figure 4: Visualization of performance across six evaluation metrics (PRR, SR, PCAR, PLAR, RA, PLR) for each evaluated model.



Figure 5: Scatter plot of SR (%) versus RA for each model, illustrating how different agents trade off task completion performance against privacy-sensitive response capability.

tations, we conduct a final round of human verification. This process is carried out by seven trained annotators (three undergraduate students and four graduate students from STEM backgrounds), all of whom have participated in prior stages and received annotation training. The primary focus of this stage is to verify the correctness of three critical fields. After the initial pass, we adopt a cross-validation strategy where each sample is independently reviewed by two annotators. A sample is only considered verified if both reviewers agree with no objections. Each annotator spends approximately 4 hours per review round, resulting in a total of 50 hours dedicated to this stage. This rigorous two-pass review process results in high-quality and reliable annotation labels across all 7,138 samples.

Experiments

Experiment setting

All experiments are conducted on our proposed SAPA-Bench dataset. Each sample consists of multimodal inputs (*i.e.*, instruction and screenshot) with fine-grained privacy annotations, including whether privacy is involved, the modality of the privacy exposure (screenshot or instruction), the category and severity level of the privacy content, and the expected response. This setup enables comprehensive evaluation across multiple privacy understanding dimensions. In addition to our five privacy-oriented metrics (PRR, PLR, PLAR, PCAR, and RA), we also report the Success Rate (SR) on the GUI-Odyssey benchmark to investigate how the agents handle the privacy-utility trade-off. By analyzing the interplay between privacy awareness and task execution success, we gain critical insights into potential trade-offs and their implications for agent design and deployment.

Most of the existing smartphone agents utilize mainstream MLLMs as their backbone architectures. Thus, evaluating these foundational models directly allows us to infer the capabilities and limitations of a broader range of smartphone agents. To this end, we evaluate three representative categories of agents/models: (1) Smartphone agent, including SpiritSight Agent (Huang et al. 2025), Show-UI (Lin et al. 2025); (2) Generalist Vision-Language Models, including Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al. 2025a), InternVL 1.5 (Chen

Model	Low	Mid	High	Overall
Smartphone Agent				
Show-UI	31.52%	34.57%	36.42%	34.17%
SpiritSight Agent	34.16%	33.03%	31.05%	32.75%
General Vision-Language Model				
Qwen2.5-VL	17.16%	29.91%	38.11%	28.39%
InternVL 2.5	24.26%	37.58%	45.54%	35.79%
LLaVA-NeXT	**78.30%**	80.86%	80.00%	79.72%
Close-source Model				
Gemini 2.0-flash	55.94%	80.12%	**90.81%**	75.62%
GPT-4o	67.66%	**83.62%**	89.19%	**80.16%**

Table 2: Detailed PRR evaluation results across three sensitivity levels (Low, Mid, High) and the overall average for each models.

Model	RA(NH)	RA(IH)	RA(EH)	Overall
Smartphone Agent				
Show-UI	15.59	23.69	18.77	19.35
SpiritSight Agent	**21.63**	27.76	27.25	25.55
General Vision-Language Model				
Qwen2.5-VL	11.75	22.67	40.23	24.88
InternVL 2.5	14.88	28.70	51.66	31.75
LLaVA-NeXT	16.74	**36.83**	36.94	30.17
Close-source Model				
Gemini 2.0-flash	18.77	27.37	**67.14**	**37.76**
GPT-4o	15.59	29.40	55.03	33.34

Table 3: Detailed RA evaluation results across three prompting conditions: No Hint (NH), Implicit Hint (IH), and Explicit Hint (EH), as well as the overall average.

et al. 2024b) and LLaVA-NeXT (Liu et al. 2024); and (3) Closed-source Models, including Gemini 2.0-flash (Reid et al. 2024) and GPT-4o (Hurst et al. 2024). To ensure consistency in parameter scale, all open-source models are limited to the 7B–8B range, except Show-UI(2B).

Model deployment and inference are carried out on a server equipped with 8×NVIDIA RTX 3090 GPUs. Detailed hyperparameter settings are provided in the Appendix.

Evaluation Matrics

Conventional evaluation metrics commonly used in classification tasks, such as Accuracy and F1-score, fail to capture the multi-dimensional requirements of privacy understanding in this work. Beyond identifying the presence of privacy-related content, our task further requires agents to localize which modality (screenshot or instruction) contains privacy exposure information, determine the specific privacy category, determine its severity level, and generate appropriate responses with privacy awareness. To facilitate these needs, we propose five privacy-oriented evaluation metrics that collectively assess agents' ability to perceive and respond to privacy-sensitive content:

- Privacy Recognition Rate (PRR) reflects the proportion of all samples that the agent flags as privacy-related.
- Privacy Localization Rate (PLR) measures, among those samples the agent identifies as privacy-related, how often it correctly pinpoints the location—screen or instruction.
- Privacy Level Awareness Rate (PLAR) evaluates whether, once a sample is marked private, the model assigns it to the correct risk tier (Low, Medium, or High).
- Privacy Category Awareness Rate (PCAR) assesses how accurately the agent identifies the category of privacy-sensitive information (*e.g.*, Account Credentials).
- Risk Awareness (RA) denotes the fraction that the agent produces a reasonable, risk-aware response for the privacy-related scenarios.

In addition to these privacy-oriented metrics, we also report the Success Rate (SR) on the GUI-Odyssey benchmark to explore how privacy handling correlates with the overall task completion capability. For PRR, PLR, PLAR, and PCAR, results are compared against human-annotated ground-truth labels. For RA, which involves natural language outputs, we use an LLM to assess semantic alignment between the agent's response and a reference risk prompt. The scoring procedure is detailed in the appendix.

Results and Discussion

The benchmarked smartphone agents demonstrate relatively poor performance in safeguarding sensitive user information, revealing insufficient privacy awareness in practice. To comprehensively evaluate the privacy understanding capabilities of different agents, we report quantitative results across all proposed metrics in Table 1. This table includes agents from three distinct categories: Smartphone Agent, General Vision-Language Model, and commercial closed-source model. Each metric reflects a key aspect, including recognition (PRR), localization (PLR), severity awareness (PLAR), category classification (PCAR), response quality (RA), and task completion(SR). This evaluation setup enables a multi-perspective comparison of models' capabilities in identifying, interpreting, and responding to privacy-sensitive content. Furthermore, Figure 4 visualizes each model's six-metric profile as a radar chart, making it easy to spot strengths and weaknesses at a glance. Additionally, Figure 5 reveals the relationship between each model's SR and RA, showing how privacy handling correlates with overall task completion.

As shown in Table 1, the experimental results reveal that contemporary smartphone agents exhibit markedly inadequate privacy safeguards. First, PRR for all tested models falls below 85%, with open-source systems such as *Show-UI* (34.17%), *SpiritSight Agent* (32.75%), *Qwen2.5-VL* (28.39%), and *InternVL2.5* (35.79%) languishing around the 30% mark—indicating that the vast majority of sensitive scenarios go undetected. Second, PLR is likewise poor: even GPT-4o, a powerful MLLM, correctly attributes privacy exposure to the instruction stream only 74.42% of the time, while most models score under 30% in both the image and instruction modalities. Third, the agents show almost no fine-grained sensitivity: PLAR and PCAR hover in the single to low-double-digit range (5–35%), demonstrating an inability either to distinguish risk severity or to classify leak types (*e.g.*, location, identity, credentials). Finally, RA scores remain severely constrained *Gemini 2.0-flash*, the

best of the lot, achieves only 67.14, while open-source models score substantially lower (*Show-UI* 18.77; *SpiritSight Agent* 27.25; *Qwen2.5-VL* 40.23), showing that even when a model detects a privacy threat, it cannot generate sufficiently effective mitigation prompts. Collectively, these findings underscore a pronounced gap in current smartphone agent capabilities: robust, specialized privacy training, tighter alignment strategies, and dedicated evaluation benchmarks are urgently needed to elevate practical privacy protection.

Compared with the open-source model, the closed-source model dominates privacy awareness capability. As with other tasks, closed-source models consistently outperform their open-source counterparts across all privacy-oriented metrics. Specifically, in Table 1, in terms of PRR, *Gemini 2.0-flash* and *GPT-4o* achieve approximately 75–80%, outpacing open-source models by over ten percent. On other measures, *GPT-4o* attains a PLAR of 31.66% and a PCAR of 27.78%, whereas open-source systems rarely exceed 20%. This demonstrates that the closed-source agents not only detect the presence of sensitive content more reliably, but also more accurately assess its severity and type. Finally, in terms of RA matrices, *GPT-4o* and *Gemini* score 55.03% and 66.14%, respectively, higher than the best open-source model, *InternVL2.5*, at 51.66%. We attribute this superiority chiefly to extensive Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) (Hurst et al. 2024; Reid et al. 2024) based fine-tuning on large, high-quality datasets and rigorous internal safety alignment, whereas open-source models remain primarily optimized for general functionality without specialized privacy calibration.

Dataset bias may result in model bias in privacy protection. Despite its strong results on standard multimodal benchmarks (*e.g.*, OCR and VQA), *Qwen2.5-VL* shows a clear baseline gap on our privacy-sensitive benchmark, with noticeably weaker privacy-recognition and risk-awareness. We attribute this to insufficient exposure to privacy-critical scenarios during pre-training and instruction tuning.

In contrast, *InternVL2.5* and *LLaVA-NeXT* demonstrate superior privacy perception, benefiting from real-world interaction data, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) alignment, and targeted harmful-content curation. These design choices make them more reliable at detecting and localizing privacy-leakage risks.

As the level of privacy sensitivity decreases, the agent's ability to detect privacy-sensitive content correspondingly deteriorates. From table 2, we observe that PRR increases systematically with sensitivity level. In low-sensitivity scenarios, open-source models such as Show-UI, Qwen2.5-VL, and InternVL2.5 attain only 31.52%, 17.16%, and 24.26%, respectively, while even the closed-source models GPT-4o and Gemini achieve merely 67.66% and 59.94%, indicating that the vast majority of "low-risk" operations remain undetected. Under medium sensitivity, PRR rises by approximately ten percentage points for most agents, demonstrating that Privacy content that stands out more is easier to detect. Although in high-sensitivity conditions LLaVA-NeXT, GPT-4o, and Gemini reach 80%, 89%, and 91%, these figures still fall short of deployment-grade reliability thresholds, and performance at low and medium sensitivity levels remains uniformly inadequate. Collectively, these results expose a pronounced deficiency in current smartphone agents' privacy detection capabilities across all sensitivity levels, so there's an urgent need to improve them with specialized training data and more precise tuning strategies.



Figure 6: Each model's Risk Awareness (RA) under three prompting conditions: No Hint, Implicit Hint, and Explicit Hint, illustrating how the level of prompt detail affects agents' risk-response performance.

Employing more salient prompt cues can effectively enhance the agent's RA capabilities. We evaluated RA across three prompting conditions: no hint, implicit hint, and explicit hint—and observed marked differences in model performance. As shown in Table 3, under the no-hint condition, all agents achieved low RA scores. Introducing implicit hints yielded a 5–15 percentage-point uplift—for example, Qwen2.5-VL improved from 11.75% to 22.67% and InternVL2.5 from 14.88% to 28.70%—demonstrating that subtle cueing can activate risk-sensitivity. As shown in Figure 6, with explicit prompting, RA reached its peak: GPT-4o rose to 55.03% and Gemini to 67.14%. These results underscore that prompts with explicit hints can substantially enhance a multimodal agent's risk-response capability, highlighting the critical importance of designing and embedding appropriate prompt frameworks for secure deployment.

> ***Takeaways:*** *There are substantial limitations in current smartphone agents' privacy-awareness capabilities, particularly in open-source models, emphasizing the necessity for specialized privacy-focused training and evaluation. Integrating carefully designed prompts can effectively improve privacy awareness.*

Conclusion

In this work, we present SAPA-Bench, the first large-scale benchmark for evaluating privacy awareness in smartphone agents, comprising 7,138 real-world scenarios and five dedicated metrics. Our experiments reveal that both open- and closed-source agents struggle to reliably detect, localize, and classify privacy risks, particularly in low and medium sensitivity settings. Through *SAPA-Bench*, we advocate for enhanced privacy-awareness capabilities in smartphone agents, emphasizing that the pursuit of efficiency and accuracy must not compromise essential user privacy protections.

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