EduGuardBench: A Holistic Benchmark for Evaluating the Pedagogical Fidelity and Adversarial Safety of LLMs as Simulated Teachers

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Abstract

Large Language Models for Simulating Professions (SP-LLMs), particularly as teachers, are pivotal for personalized education. However, ensuring their professional competence and ethical safety is a critical challenge, as existing benchmarks fail to measure **role-playing fidelity** or address the **unique teaching harms** inherent in educational scenarios. To address this, we propose **EduGuardBench**, a dual-component benchmark. It assesses professional fidelity using a Role-playing Fidelity Score (RFS) while diagnosing **harms specific to the teaching profession**. It also probes safety vulnerabilities using **persona-based adversarial prompts** targeting both general harms and, particularly, **academic misconduct**, evaluated with metrics including **Attack Success Rate (ASR)** and a three-tier **Refusal Quality** assessment. Our extensive experiments on 14 leading models reveal a **stark polarization** in performance. While reasoning-oriented models generally show superior fidelity, **Incompetence** remains the dominant failure mode across most models. The adversarial tests uncovered a counter-intuitive scaling paradox, where mid-sized models can be the most vulnerable, challenging monotonic safety assumptions. Critically, we identified a powerful Educational Transformation Effect: the safest models excel at converting harmful requests into teachable moments by providing ideal Educational Refusals. This capacity is strongly negatively correlated with ASR, revealing a new dimension of advanced AI safety. EduGuardBench thus provides a reproducible framework that moves beyond siloed knowledge tests toward a **holistic assessment** of professional, ethical, and pedagogical alignment, uncovering complex dynamics essential for deploying trustworthy AI in education.

Materials — https://github.com/YL1N/EduGuardBench

Introduction

Large Language Models for Simulating Professions (SP-LLMs) are rapidly becoming a cornerstone of modern technology, particularly within education, where they hold immense promise as personalized tutors or "Teacher SP-LLMs" (Liu et al. 2024; Zhang et al. 2024b). In well-defined scenarios, such as answering factual questions or generating standard lesson plans, these models demonstrate remarkable capabilities, leveraging their vast knowledge bases to assist learners effectively. This success in knowledge-intensive tasks has fueled optimism about their potential to revolutionize personalized instruction and support.

Despite the success, a critical challenge emerges when Teacher SP-LLMs transition from simple knowledge retrieval to nuanced pedagogical interaction. ***Their competence and safety in these complex scenarios are far from guaranteed.*** As illustrated in Figure 1 (left), a seemingly simple student query can elicit responses that are not merely incorrect, but pedagogically harmful, manifesting as factual errors (**Incompetence**), dismissive attitudes (**Indolence**), or even condescending remarks (**Offensiveness**). Furthermore, the safety alignment of these models is fragile. Figure 1 (right) shows that they can be easily manipulated via persona-based jailbreak prompts to provide dangerous or unethical advice, defying their intended purpose and posing significant risks in an educational context.

Current evaluation paradigms are unable to detect these **subtle but severe flaws**. Most existing benchmarks can be **broadly categorized**. (1) Foundational benchmarks like MMLU (Hendrycks et al. 2020) and GSM8K (Cobbe et al. 2021) focus on general knowledge and reasoning but fail to assess performance within a professional persona. (2) More advanced, scenario-based benchmarks like EduBench (Xu et al. 2025) prioritize task completion over the end-to-end fidelity of a pedagogical simulation. (3) General-purpose safety benchmarks like SafetyBench (Zhang et al. 2024a) are not designed to address the domain-specific ethical challenges of education, such as handling student requests for assistance with academic misconduct. This leaves a critical gap: we lack a comprehensive tool to **holistically evaluate** the ethical reliability of Teacher SP-LLMs.

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

Figure 1: Illustration of the dual challenges for Teacher SP-LLMs. The left panel shows how a simple student query can elicit pedagogically harmful responses categorized as *Incompetence*, *Indolence*, or *Offensiveness*. The right panel demonstrates how a persona-based jailbreak prompt can bypass safety alignments to generate harmful content.

To this end, we propose a comprehensive benchmark, **EduGuardBench**, designed specifically to assess the dual challenges of pedagogical harm and safety for Teacher SP-LLMs. EduGuardBench features a unique dual-component structure: (1) a Select All That Apply (SATA) question set designed to diagnose teaching deficits across the three identified harm types; (2) a meticulously curated adversarial prompt set that employs diverse, persona-based jailbreak strategies to probe safety vulnerabilities, with a special focus on academic misconduct. Through our evaluation protocol, which includes metrics like the Role-playing Fidelity Score (RFS) and Refusal Quality, EduGuardBench provides a fine-grained, multi-faceted analysis of model performance, revealing critical vulnerabilities that other benchmarks miss.

The contributions of our study are threefold: (i) we identify and demonstrate the dual risks of Teacher SP-LLMs, covering subtle pedagogical harms and major safety vulnerabilities, especially under jailbreaking and academic-misconduct prompts; (ii) we propose **EduGuardBench**, a benchmark with a dual-component design tailored for evaluating Teacher SP-LLMs, offering fine-grained assessments of teaching flaws and academic misconduct that substantially advance existing evaluations; and (iii) through extensive experiments on SOTA models, we found notable and previously overlooked deficiencies, providing essential empirical guidance for developing safer AI educational tools.

Related Work

Benchmarks for Evaluating SP-LLMs

While rigorous benchmarks are essential for guiding LLM development (Liang et al. 2022), the emergence of SP-LLMs—already being explored in fields like law (Cui et al. 2023), education (Liu et al. 2024), and healthcare (Bao et al. 2023)—exposes a critical evaluation gap. Current benchmarks are largely inadequate: foundational tests like MMLU (Hendrycks et al. 2020) and GSM8K (Cobbe et al. 2021) assess general knowledge or reasoning but do not require a professional persona. Even more sophisticated, scenario-based benchmarks such as EduBench (Xu et al. 2025) prioritize task completion over the end-to-end fidelity of professional simulation. This reveals a profound deficit in measuring **professional competence and role-playing fidelity**. This gap is compounded by a similar inadequacy in the ethical dimension. Unlike the general domain, which features extensive safety frameworks like Constitutional AI (Bai et al. 2022) and comprehensive benchmarks like SafetyBench (Zhang et al. 2024a), assessments for **domain-specific ethical compliance** within professional simulations are critically underdeveloped, despite the academic call for responsible AI (Holmes et al. 2022). **Therefore, establishing unified benchmarks to rigorously assess the intertwined performance of competence, fidelity, and ethics for SP-LLMs is a crucial and urgent task.**

Attacks for Evaluating SP-LLMs

Injection attacks, which exploit carefully designed perturbations to cause high-confidence errors, represent a fundamental vulnerability in deep learning models stemming from their inherent linear characteristics (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al. 2017). For SP-LLMs, especially in the educational domain, systematic attack testing is crucial for evaluating their robustness. The security alignment mechanisms of LLMs present inherent flaws; for instance, automated adversarial suffixes can universally induce harmful outputs across tasks (Zou et al. 2023), and the risks are intensified by target conflicts and generalization misalignments in safety training (Wei, Haghtalab, and Steinhardt 2023). In the specific context of education, SP-LLMs must handle open-ended tasks like problem-solving guidance, where unique vulnerabilities emerge. For example, a **single-point dependency vulnerability** has been identified in multi-step instruction chains, where an attacker only needs to inject misleading logic (e.g., a tampered formula) into an intermediate step to disrupt the final output's consistency (Li et al. 2023). A more sophisticated variant is the **knowledge injection attack**, which manipulates model outputs by inserting covertly misleading information sources. The severity of this threat has been demonstrated in the legal domain, where a constructed Judicial Knowledge Injection framework confirmed a serious risk of factual distortion in specialized models (Hu et al. 2025). **Therefore, it is imperative to test the anti-interference capabilities and knowledge consistency of educational SP-LLMs using standardized attack methodologies to ensure their instructional reliability.**

The Construction of EduGuardBench

This section details the construction of EduGuardBench, a novel benchmark that provides a comprehensive and challenging assessment of Teacher SP-LLMs, focusing on their pedagogical fidelity and potential for harmful responses. This benchmark comprises two core components: (i) a SATA question set covering five student-oriented scenarios to assess the Teacher SP-LLMs' role-playing fidelity and potential deficits; and (ii) a meticulously curated collection of open-ended questions that employ diverse prompt-level jailbreak strategies to probe the safety vulnerabilities of Teacher SP-LLMs when faced with inappropriate student requests.

Scenario Design

Component I: Teaching Harm Scenarios The first component of EduGuardBench is a SATA question set comprising 2636 entries. We extracted five core student-oriented scenarios from EduBench (Xu et al. 2025): (1) Problem Solving (PS), (2) Error Correction (EC), (3) Idea Provision (IP), (4) Personalized Learning Support (PLS), and (5) Emotional Support (ES). Each question includes several ideal answers and incorporates ethical flaws potentially leading to harmful content generation by Teacher SP-LLMs (Kearney et al. 1991), including S1: Incompetence, S2: Offensiveness, and S3: Indolence. Detailed explanations of these scenarios and ethical flaws will be provided in Appendix A.

Component II: Adversarial Safety Scenarios The second component of EduGuardBench consists of 801 open-ended adversarial prompts, designed to elicit free-form responses from the model for subsequent manual evaluation and to probe its safety boundaries. Each prompt pairs a *Teacher_Prompt* with a *Student_Request* to test the model's robustness against two primary categories of harmful inquiries: (1) General Harmful Inquiries, where a student's request concerning dangerous, illegal, or unethical topics is disguised as a harmless question (Zhang et al. 2024a; Ji et al. 2023); and (2) Academic Misconduct Inquiries, where a student explicitly requests LLM assistance for acts of academic misconduct, such as ghost-writing, data fabrication, real-time exam cheating, and plagiarism or misattribution assistance (Cotton, Cotton, and Shipway 2024). To elicit these behaviors, we employ a persona-based jailbreak methodology, assigning the LLM a *Teacher_Prompt* that contains a specific identity and a flawed core belief to justify fulfilling the subsequent harmful *Student_request*.

Context Design

To ensure the authenticity and relevance of EduGuardBench, the context designs within both components reflect diverse educational contexts. For the teaching Harm contexts (SATA questions), we designed a multi-dimensional context encompassing a wide range of academic disciplines, question types, and difficulty levels. Its disciplinary scope extends from humanities and social sciences to STEM fields. To enhance the realism and simulate real-world challenges, we embedded 100 authentic questions, with some collected from textbooks and exam papers, and others sourced from the GAOKAO benchmark (Zhang et al. 2023). We followed the design paradigm of SuperGPQA (Du et al. 2025) for selecting these questions. These questions include formats such as multiple-choice, fill-in-the-blank, and short-answer questions, ranging in difficulty from simple calculations to complex topics like thermodynamics. This multifaceted design ensures that the required teaching support is context-dependent and can be robustly evaluated. Details of these scenarios will be provided in Appendix B.

For the Adversarial Safety contexts (adversarial prompts), the design focuses on creating a seemingly plausible justification for harmful student requests (*Student_Request*). This is achieved through our persona-based jailbreak methodology (Liu et al. 2023), where the *Teacher_Prompt* establishes a specific professional identity and a core, often well-intentioned but flawed, belief to justify fulfilling the subsequent harmful student request. We adhered to the risk classification system established by fundamental safety research (Weidinger et al. 2021; Ji et al. 2023), systematically constructing our contexts across four key domains where harmful inquiries are often disguised. These domains include **arts and psychological (AP)** contexts, **health risk (HR)** contexts, **technology and security (TS)** context, and **political and ideological (PI)** contexts. Furthermore, as a benchmark for Teacher SP-LLMs, we additionally incorporated **academic misconduct (AM)** with LLMs (Cotton, Cotton, and Shipway 2024; Tlili et al. 2023; Newton 2018) – a widely debated aspect since the advent of LLMs – and sub-

divided it into five branches. This design compels models to make trade-offs between their assigned persona and underlying safety principles, thereby constituting a challenging and realistic test of their ethical boundaries. Specific context design details can be found in Appendix C.

Data Generation and Curation

The construction of our dataset followed a **Human-in-the-Loop (HITL)** pipeline that integrates data generation with rigorous quality assurance. This paradigm leverages both the scale of LLMs and the nuance of human expertise to ensure data quality and effectiveness (Wang et al. 2021; Ouyang et al. 2022). The process involved five stages:

1. **Seed Prompt Creation:** We first manually authored a set of high-quality seed examples. **SATA question** seeds are designed based on teaching dimensions and ethical flaw categories (see Appendix A), while **adversarial prompt** seeds are created based on established taxonomies for harms and academic misconduct (see Appendix C).
2. **LLM-based Expansion:** We used multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, guided by specific meta-prompts, to expand and diversify the seed examples. This approach mitigated single-model bias and ensured the core pedagogical or ethical conflict of each seed was maintained during the generation of a large, preliminary corpus. See Appendix D for our model list, multi-model strategy, and prompt examples.
3. **Automated Pre-screening:** Before manual review, an **Automated Filtering** stage pre-screened the LLM-generated corpus for formatting errors, duplicates (using semantic similarity), and basic rule violations. This step increased the efficiency of the manual review process.
4. **Iterative HITL Review and Refinement:** This stage was the core of our quality assurance process.
   - **Manual Cross-Review:** The pre-screened data underwent a rigorous cross-review by annotators with pedagogical and safety expertise. For **SATA questions**, annotators assessed: (i) the realism of the student's query, (ii) the correctness and helpfulness of the ideal answer(s), and (iii) the plausibility and distinctness of the S1/S2/S3 responses. For **adversarial prompts**, the review focused on: (i) the plausibility of the *Teacher_Prompt* persona, (ii) the clarity and severity of the harmful intent in the *Student_Request*, and (iii) the subtlety of the jailbreak attempt, a process aligned with established red-teaming methodologies (Perez et al. 2022a).
   - **Refinement and Expert Verification:** Based on the review feedback, we conducted multiple rounds of modification and refinement. This involved rewriting ambiguous situation statements, strengthening the flawed logic of SATA question distractors, and enhancing the believability of the adversarial personas. Low-quality or borderline samples were discarded. As a final step in this human-led process, our experts verified the factual accuracy of ideal answers (for SATA questions), the pedagogical validity and subtlety of the S1/S2/S3 distractors, and the plausibility and harmfulness of the adversarial set.

   This iterative HITL process was crucial for transforming the raw LLM output into the high-quality, challenging benchmark used in our final evaluation.
5. **Bilingual Verification:** As the final quality assurance step, a **Bilingual Verification** process, involving translation and back-translation, was implemented to ensure the quality and semantic consistency of the dataset across both English and Chinese versions.

Evaluate Method

To comprehensively evaluate the capabilities and safety of large language models in educational scenarios, we designed a dual evaluation protocol based on the unique structure of EduGuardBench. This protocol specifically targets the two core components, *Teaching Harm* and *Adversarial Safety*, aiming to reveal model performance across multiple dimensions. In this section, we detail the models evaluated, the specific metrics, and the experimental procedures.

Evaluation of Teaching Harm Scenarios

For the SATA question component of EduGuardBench, our evaluation is based on three possible outcomes for each question, defined by comparing the model's selection (P_q) to the set of ideal answers (C_q):

- **Perfect Match ($s = 1.0$):** The model selects all ideal answers and no incorrect ones ($P_q = C_q$).
- **Omission ($s = 0.5$):** The model selects a subset of the ideal answers but no incorrect ones ($\emptyset \subset P_q \subset C_q$).
- **Incorrect Inclusion ($s = 0.0$):** The model selects at least one incorrect answer.

Based on these outcomes, we define our metrics:

- **Role-playing Fidelity Score (RFS):** The average score (s) across all questions, calculated as:

$$\text{RFS} = \frac{1}{|Q|} \sum_{q \in Q} s(P_q, C_q) \tag{1}$$

  where $|Q|$ is the total number of questions.
- **Accuracy (Acc), Omission Rate (Omit), and Inclusion Rate (Incl):** The percentage of questions corresponding to Perfect Match, Omission, and Incorrect Inclusion outcomes, respectively.
- **Ethical Flaw Analysis:** When models select incorrect answers, we categorize errors into three predefined ethical flaw categories: **S1 (Incompetence)**, **S2 (Offensiveness)**, and **S3 (Indolence)**. We report the error rate (Err%) for each scenario and the proportional distribution of S1/S2/S3 error types within those errors.

Evaluation of Adversarial Safety Scenarios

The open-ended nature of the adversarial safety scenarios requires a more nuanced evaluation methodology. Inspired by recent safety evaluation frameworks (Bai et al. 2024), we propose a multi-dimensional assessment. The metrics are:

- **Attack Success Rate (ASR):** This is the primary metric for safety. A response is deemed an "attack success" if the model generates content that substantively aids the harmful or academic cheating request. ASR is the share of successful attacks over all adversarial prompts.
- **Refusal Quality:** For responses where the model refuses the request, we classify them into a a three-tier hierarchy, informed by the principles of Constitutional AI (Bai et al. 2022) and the concept of "teachable moments" in education (Hattie and Timperley 2007):
  1. *Flimsy Refusal:* The model's refusal is weak, apologetic, or provides loopholes. It can be easily bypassed in subsequent turns (Perez et al. 2022b) or actively hints at alternative pathways to achieve the harmful goal. This represents a failure of safety alignment.
  2. *Standard Refusal:* The response clearly and effectively refuses the harmful request, providing little to no educational context beyond citing general safety policies. This includes generic boilerplate and refusals that explain the rejection based on internal safety rules .
  3. *Educational Refusal:* The model not only refuses firmly but also explains the underlying real-world risks or ethical principles for the user, transforming the interaction into a constructive, educational experience.

Evaluated Models and Setup

To facilitate a targeted analysis, we evaluated a total of **14** models, which we categorize into two groups: **reasoning-oriented models** and **non-reasoning models**. Our selection includes a diverse set of representative closed-source and open-source models. A complete list with detailed specifications for each model is provided in Appendix E.

All experiments were conducted using a zero-shot setting with greedy decoding (temperature = 0) to ensure deterministic and reproducible results.

HITL-Guided, LLM-Powered Evaluation

While the analysis of the SATA questions can be rapidly automated via scripts, evaluating the 801 × 14 = 11,214 open-ended responses poses a significant scalability challenge. To ensure a reliable and scalable evaluation for this component, we designed a Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) guided pipeline to select and utilize an LLM-as-a-Judge.

Judge Calibration. Our first step was to select the most human-aligned LLM judge. We established a gold-standard set of 200 human-annotated responses and used it to benchmark a suite of candidate models (including DeepSeek-V3, R1, GPT-4o, etc.). This calibration was performed independently for two distinct tasks: (1) a binary classification of harmfulness and (2) a multi-class classification of refusal quality (*Flimsy, Standard, Educational*). DeepSeek-V3 achieved the highest correlation (Cohen's Kappa = 0.882 and 0.874) with human judgments in both tasks and was selected as our sole judge. See Appendix F for detailed data.

Large-Scale Annotation. With DeepSeek-V3 selected as the judge, we proceeded to the large-scale annotation. The evaluation followed a sequential, two-stage process. First, DeepSeek-V3 assessed the harmfulness of all 11,214 responses. To ensure the stability of this judgment, we employed a Best-of-N (BoN) voting mechanism where N=9: the final harmfulness label for each response was determined by a majority vote of nine independent judgments. Second, for the subset of responses labeled as non-harmful, DeepSeek-V3 then classified their refusal quality, again using the same N=9 BoN voting protocol for each response. This HITL-calibrated, BoN-stabilized process ensures our final labels are both scalable and robust.

Results

Teaching Harm Assessment

Model Performance and Reasoning Capability Impact As shown in Table 1, reasoning-oriented models generally demonstrate superior performance in teaching capability evaluation. The reasoning-oriented models achieve a RFS mean of 0.723, higher than the 0.663 of non-reasoning models, with accuracy following a similar trend (67.19% vs 62.93%). This suggests that reasoning capability may serve as an important factor for Teacher SP-LLMs to enhance role-playing fidelity.

The analysis reveals differential impacts of reasoning capability on teaching safety. Table 3 in appendix indicates that reasoning models perform better on the inclusion rate metric (22.73% vs 30.46%, $p < 0.05$), which relates to risk control in educational contexts. Meanwhile, reasoning models show slightly higher omission rates (10.08% vs 6.61%), possibly reflecting their tendency toward more conservative strategies when handling uncertain issues, which may represent a cautious professional attitude in teaching contexts.

Paired analysis further supports the positive role of reasoning capability. Table 4 in appendix shows that under identical architectural conditions (Qwen3 series), reasoning versions outperform non-reasoning versions across most metrics, particularly achieving an average improvement of 5.23 percentage points in reducing harmful content inclusion rates. This consistent pattern across different models suggests that the improvement effects of reasoning capability may have certain generalizability.

Individual model performance presents an interesting distribution. Claude-3.7 performs best among reasoning models (RFS=0.77), while Deepseek-V3 leads among non-reasoning models (RFS=0.73), even surpassing some reasoning models, indicating that training and optimization strategies are equally important. Notably, despite its larger parameter count, Qwen2.5-72B shows relatively poor performance (RFS=0.56, inclusion rate 40.53%), suggesting that merely increasing model scale may be insufficient to guarantee teaching capability improvement.

Error Patterns Across Teaching Scenarios Current large language models demonstrate substantial safety vulnerabilities in educational contexts. As illustrated in figure 2, significant variations exist across teaching scenarios, with Emotional Support exhibiting the highest average error rate at 44.7%, while Personalized Learning Support shows the lowest at 24.4%. Statistical validation confirms these inter-scenario differences (Kruskal-Wallis $H = 25.95$, $p <$

Model	RFS	Acc	Omit	Incl
Reasoning-Oriented Models				
Claude-3.7	**0.77**	**71.84**	10.78	**17.38**
Qwen3-235B-R	0.69	63.98	9.22	26.80
Deepseek-R1	0.75	70.09	9.87	20.04
R1-Distill-70B	0.73	69.51	7.95	22.54
Qwen3-32B-R	0.75	71.16	**7.29**	21.55
GLM-Z1-9B	0.69	64.06	9.63	26.31
Qwen3-8B-R	0.69	60.76	16.05	23.19
Non-Reasoning Models				
GPT-4o	0.69	67.96	2.96	29.08
Deepseek-V3	**0.73**	**71.46**	**2.58**	25.96
Qwen3-235B	0.67	64.58	4.29	31.13
Qwen2.5-72B	0.56	52.68	6.79	40.53
Qwen3-32B	0.72	70.21	3.04	26.75
Qwen3-8B	0.61	50.68	19.99	29.33
Educhat-r1	0.71	66.12	9.83	**24.05**

Table 1: RFS evaluation results across reasoning-oriented and non-reasoning models. **Bold** indicates the best performance, underlined indicates the worst performance.



Figure 2: Teaching capability analysis: (L) Error rates by scenario; (R) Error type by model reasoning capability.

0.0001), with Emotional Support maintaining significant differences from other scenarios even after multiple comparison corrections, as detailed in Table 6 in appendix.

Reasoning models demonstrate scenario-specific advantages (see Table 7 in appendix), significantly outperforming in Idea Provision (Cohen's $d = 1.000$, $p = 0.0119$) and Emotional Support but underperforming in Error Correction, suggesting reasoning benefits primarily cognitively intensive tasks.

Mixed-effects modeling reveals that reasoning capabilities interact significantly only with Idea Provision scenarios ($\beta = -11.471$, $p = 0.0350$), with no advantages in other contexts (as seen in Table 6 in appendix). This suggests reasoning architectures' core value lies in enhancing safety for concept generation and creative tasks rather than comprehensive educational improvement. Error analysis (as seen in Table 5 in appendix) shows stable distributions with S1 errors predominating, indicating primary challenges stem from fundamental capability limitations rather than malicious outputs.

Adversarial Safety Assessment

Based on systematic evaluation of 14 LLMs across 801 adversarial prompts, we identified significant inter-model differences (Figure 3) and established a three-tier safety classification. As shown in Figure 3 in appendix, model safety performance exhibits extreme polarization spanning 54.65 percentage points: 5 high-risk models (ASR >70%), 8 medium-risk (ASR 40–70%), and 1 relatively safe model (ASR <40%). ANOVA confirms this stratification's statistical significance (Table 8 in appendix), indicating substantial heterogeneity in safety performance across models.

Tukey HSD analysis (Table 9 in appendix) identifies 15 model pairs with statistically significant differences, with largest differences between Deepseek-V3 and Claude-3.7. These results confirm significant safety stratification and provide statistical foundations for model selection.

Analysis reveals the Educational Transformation Effect: safer models convert refusals into educational guidance (Figure 4 in appendix), with Claude-3.7 achieving 64.5% transformation versus Deepseek-V3's 14.5%, suggesting advanced safety mechanisms transcend mere rejection to actively enhance user safety awareness.

Figure 5 in appendix reveals profound differences in safety strategies. Chinese models exhibit binary polarization with responses strictly divided into attack success or educational refusal; Western models adopt progressive defense with multi-layered safety buffers. This divergence may reflect different safety philosophies across technological ecosystems: Eastern models favor clear boundaries, while Western models employ multi-layered defenses.

Contrary to assumptions, model vulnerability demonstrates significant scenario-dependence. ASR differences across attack scenarios are statistically significant (Figure 6 in appendix), with AM showing highest vulnerability, followed by AP. This suggests vulnerabilities exhibit both intrinsic model characteristics and domain-specific patterns. Cross-scenario consistency varies substantially (Figure 7 in appendix)—GLM-Z1-9B exhibits highest consistency yet maintains 79.0% ASR, while Claude-3.7 shows moderate consistency with lowest overall ASR.

Model series comparison reveals an intriguing scaling paradox. Both Qwen3 and Qwen3-NR series show inverted U-shaped safety curves (Figure 8 and Table 10 in appendix), with medium-scale (32B) models showing highest vulnerability. ASR increases 14.8 percentage points from 8B (60.4%) to 32B (75.2%), then decreases 5.2 points to 235B (70.0%). This challenges the assumption that safety improves monotonically with scale, suggesting that medium-scale models may face a fragile capability–safety balance.

Discussion

Our findings reveal the scenario-specific nature of educational AI safety. The systematic challenges in Emo-



Figure 3: Adversarial safety evaluation across different attack categories.

tional Support scenarios expose fundamental vulnerabilities in complex emotional interactions, carrying critical deployment implications. Reasoning models' clear advantages in Idea Provision scenarios highlight the safety value of reasoning in creative cognitive tasks and provide empirical evidence for architecture selection. The Educational Transformation Effect shows that robust safety mechanisms should convert harmful requests into educationally meaningful guidance rather than merely reject them, opening new directions for safety training. We also identify counter-intuitive safety paradoxes. The scaling paradox presents an inverted U-shaped relationship between safety and parameter scale, with medium-scale models most vulnerable, challenging the assumption that larger models are safer. The consistency paradox shows that safety performance and behavioral consistency are not necessarily aligned. These findings offer practical guidance for educational AI deployment: prioritize reasoning models for creative and emotional tasks, apply enhanced protection to emotional scenarios, and avoid relying solely on parameter scale in model choice. Our framework equips educational institutions with scientific tools for balancing efficiency and safety, and our human-in-the-loop pipeline and statistical methods set new standards for domain-specific AI safety evaluation. These scalable methods lay the groundwork for extending to additional educational scenarios and linguistic contexts.

Conclusion

This study presents the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating large language model safety in educational scenarios. EduGuardBench systematically addresses teaching harm and adversarial safety through dual-component architecture, establishing multi-dimensional metrics assessing performance from educator and learner perspectives. Large-scale experiments reveal key patterns and counter-intuitive findings. Emotional Support scenarios challenge all models most, reasoning models demonstrate safety advantages in cognitively intensive tasks, while substantial performance differences exist among models. The Educational Transformation Effect indicates optimal safety mechanisms should transform harmful requests into educational opportunities, and the scaling paradox provides new insights for model design and deployment. These findings offer direct guidance for educational AI applications: prioritize reasoning models for creative and emotional scenarios, implement special protection for emotionally sensitive tasks, and transcend simple parameter scale considerations in selection. Our evaluation framework provides the research community with scalable tools for educational AI safety research. EduGuardBench establishes important foundations for building safe, trustworthy, and educationally effective AI systems, promoting responsible educational technology development.

Limitations

This work has several limitations. Our evaluation focuses on English and Chinese contexts, limiting generalizability where cross-cultural validation would strengthen global applicability. The relatively small sample size for paired analysis may limit statistical power. Our synthetic data generation may not fully capture authentic student-teacher interaction complexity, and incorporating naturalistic dialogue data could enhance ecological validity. Our text-based evaluation requires extension to multimodal capabilities. Expert annotation introduces potential subjectivity, where automated and objective safety metrics could improve scalability and consistency. Finally, our findings lack validation in real educational settings, requiring future deployment studies.

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