TVChain: Leveraging Textual-Visual Prompt Chains for Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models

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Abstract

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) enhance the capabilities of Large Language Models by integrating visual inputs, thereby enabling advanced multimodal reasoning across diverse applications. However, these enhanced reasoning capabilities introduce new security risks, particularly to jailbreaking attacks that bypass built-in safety mechanisms to elicit harmful or unauthorized outputs. While recent efforts have explored adversarial and typographic prompts, most existing attacks suffer from three key limitations: reliance on auxiliary models, limited effectiveness in black-box scenarios, and inadequate exploitation of the LVLMs' intrinsic reasoning abilities. In this work, we propose TVChain, a novel black-box jailbreaking framework that explicitly intervenes in both the visual and textual reasoning processes of LVLMs. TVChain decomposes malicious prompts into a sequence of semantically meaningful sub-images that represent relevant objects and behaviors, thereby circumventing direct exposure of illicit content. In parallel, a carefully designed chain-of-thought (CoT) textual prompt is employed to steer the model's reasoning toward reconstructing the intended activity in a covert yet effective manner. We demonstrate that this compositional prompting strategy reduces the likelihood of triggering safety mechanisms while preserving attack efficacy. Extensive evaluations on eleven LVLMs (seven open-source and four commercial) across two benchmark datasets and three state-of-the-art defenses validate the effectiveness and robustness of TVChain.

Introduction

The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), such as LLaMA (Touvron et al. 2023) and ChatGPT (OpenAI 2023), has significantly advanced natural language understanding and generation. Building on these developments, Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), e.g., Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al. 2025) and GPT-4V (OpenAI 2023), integrate visual information to jointly process and interpret textual and visual inputs. This multimodal integration enables LVLMs to understand and generate rich, context-aware content, fostering advancements in fields such as healthcare (Yildirim et al. 2024; Liang et al. 2025a; Hu et al. 2024a), autonomous driving (Pan et al. 2024; Liang et al. 2025b), and human-computer interaction (Chen et al. 2024a; Hu et al. 2024b; Liu et al. 2023; Gong et al. 2023).

Despite these advances, LVLMs remain susceptible to security threats, i.e., jailbreaking attacks (Jiang et al. 2025). These attacks exploit carefully crafted inputs to override safety mechanisms and induce harmful, unethical, or unauthorized behavior. For instance, Gong *et al.* (2025) demonstrate that solely relying on typographic visual prompts can compromise the safety alignment of LVLMs. The dual-modal nature of LVLMs increases the complexity of the attack surface, presenting new challenges for ensuring robustness in safety-critical applications.

Limitations of Existing Attacks. Although jailbreaking attacks on LVLMs have received growing attention, existing approaches remain in their nascent stages. Most current methods focus on crafting adversarial visual examples (Luo et al. 2024; Shayegani, Dong, and Abu-Ghazaleh 2024) or embedding malicious intent into typographic images (Li et al. 2024). These techniques often rely on auxiliary LVLMs to optimize visual or textual prompts, limiting their applicability in black-box scenarios and increasing susceptibility to detection via watermarking or typographic analysis (Gong et al. 2025). Moreover, they rarely engage directly with the model's visual reasoning capabilities, thus failing to fully exploit the multimodal potential of LVLMs. Notably, these crafted prompts, e.g., MM-Safety (Liu et al. 2024a) and HADES (Li et al. 2024), generally rely on a single image to convey harmful content (see Figure 1), which increases the likelihood of detection (Figure 2).

Our Goals and Contributions. Motivated by the limitations and inspired by evidence that visual reasoning capabilities amplify security risks in LVLMs (Sima et al. 2025), we propose decomposing the visual prompt into a sequential chain. In this design, individual sub-images are used to represent discrete objects and behaviors involved in the malicious activity. Rather than explicitly presenting the illicit content, our method relies on the LVLM's reasoning ability to infer the intended activity from the prompt chain. Case studies (Figure 2) show that this structured visual representation significantly reduces the likelihood of triggering safety mechanisms. To operationalize this idea, we introduce TVChain (Textual-Visual Chain Attack), a novel black-box jailbreak framework that strategically manipulates the reasoning process of LVLMs to bypass safety constraints.

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

(a) MM-Safety (b) HADES (c) TVChain

Figure 1: Comparison of textual and visual prompts used in various jailbreaking attacks. (a) Prompts from the MM-Safety dataset, (b) Prompts from the HADES dataset, and (c) Prompts crafted by TVChain.



(a) HADES (b) TVChain

Figure 2: Detection Success Rate (%) between single-image inputs and TVChain using sub-image sequences.

TVChain consists of a visual prompt chain and a textual prompt chain. Specifically, we extract objects and behaviors from malicious queries, use a text-to-image model to generate sub-images for each, and compose them into a unified image sequence. In parallel, we design a five-step chain-of-thought prompting strategy to guide the LVLM's reasoning process and maximize attack efficacy. We validate the proposed method through extensive experiments across both open-source and commercial LVLMs. Our key contributions are summarized as follows:

- We introduce a novel structural form of visual prompts and demonstrate that the sub-image structure can reduce the likelihood of triggering LVLM safety mechanisms.
- We propose TVChain, a black-box jailbreak attack that integrates a visual prompt chain and a chain-of-thought textual prompt to exploit LVLM reasoning capabilities.
- We conduct comprehensive evaluations on eleven LVLMs (seven open-source and four commercial) to assess the effectiveness of TVChain across two benchmark datasets and its robustness against three state-of-the-art defenses.

Related Work

Jailbreaking Attacks on LVLMs. Jailbreaking attacks aim to exploit vulnerabilities in constrained systems such as LVLMs to bypass safety mechanisms and induce harmful outputs. These attacks generally fall into two categories: *optimization-based* and *generation-based*. Optimization-based attacks utilize auxiliary LVLMs to compute gradients that guide the construction of adversarial visual prompts, thereby enhancing transferability across models (Niu et al. 2024; Qi et al. 2024; Wang et al. 2024; Li et al. 2024). For instance, Niu *et al.* (2024) employ local LVLMs as auxiliary models and adversarial attack methods, such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al. 2018), to generate adversarial images. Generation-based attacks, on the other hand, leverage generative models to produce malicious textual and visual prompts (Liu et al. 2024a; Gong et al. 2025; Sima et al. 2025; Zhao et al. 2025). For instance, Sima *et al.* (2025) manipulate the visual reasoning process to elicit precise harmful outputs. However, both types of attacks typically depend on auxiliary LVLMs, which reduces their transferability to black-box models and increases susceptibility to detection via watermarking or typographic analysis (Gong et al. 2025). Moreover, these methods often do not explicitly exploit or control the visual reasoning process, underutilizing the multi-modal nature of LVLMs. Finally, Liu *et al.* (2024b) introduce Arondight to evaluate LVLM safety and propose a jailbreak strategy that constitutes a meaningful advance in testing robustness.

Jailbreaking Defenses against LVLMs. In response to growing adversarial threats, various defenses have been proposed, primarily categorized as *model-based* and *similarity-based* approaches. Model-based defenses aim to fine-tune LVLMs to reject harmful prompts by learning from curated adversarial examples (Chi et al. 2024; Lu et al. 2025; Zheng et al. 2025). For instance, Chi *et al.* (2024) propose LLAMA Guard 3 Vision, a model fine-tuned on Llama 3.2-Vision to detect and block harmful prompts. Similarity-based defenses assess the semantic similarity between incoming prompts and known adversarial examples to filter out malicious prompts (Xu et al. 2024b; Zhang et al. 2025). For example, Zhang *et al.* (2025) generate untrusted prompts and measure response inconsistencies to identify adversarial prompts. While these defenses provide partial mitigation, they often rely on static datasets or heuristics, which may not generalize well against zero-shot attacks.

Threat Model

Adversary's Goals. The adversary aims to elicit responses from an LVLM that violate its safety policies by providing answers to restricted or harmful queries. This threat model reflects real-world scenarios in which malicious users seek to extract inappropriate content or uninformed users inadvertently obtain unsafe guidance for critical decisions.

Adversary's Knowledge & Capabilities. We consider a black-box adversary with no internal access to or control over the target LVLM (Gong et al. 2025). The adversary

can only interact with the model through query-response interfaces, receiving textual outputs in return. The interaction is limited to a single-turn exchange with a fixed system prompt and no conversational history. This setting mirrors real-world conditions where the attacker is a typical user without the ability to fine-tune or deploy their own LVLMs.

Motivation

Recent LVLMs, e.g., R1-OneVision (Yang et al. 2025) and MM-EUREKA-InternVL (Meng et al. 2025), have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in visual reasoning and alignment with safety protocols. Despite these advances, current jailbreaking approaches often rely on injecting a single image that explicitly and fully conveys malicious intent. This strategy, while direct, significantly increases the likelihood of activating models' internal safety mechanisms.

To investigate the limitation, we present a series of case studies illustrating the vulnerabilities of such single-image attacks. Specifically, we show that concentrating all harmful information into one image leads to higher detection rates by LVLMs. Following Sima *et al.* (2025), we utilize the HADES dataset (Li et al. 2024) as our evaluation benchmark, which contains 150 samples for each of five types of harmful scenarios (i.e., *Animal*, *Privacy*, *Self-Harm*, *Violence*, and *Financial*), totaling 750 samples in all. Each sample pairs a harmful question with a corresponding image designed to visually represent the malicious intent. In the HADES dataset, each malicious scenario is represented by a single comprehensive image. In contrast, our proposed TVChain approach decomposes the visual content into a sequence of sub-images, each depicting only part of the harmful activity. We evaluate these samples on several state-of-the-art LVLMs to assess their ability to recognize malicious content from visual inputs. Specifically, we examine whether the models identify the image as depicting harmful activity, and utilize the *detection success rate*, i.e., the proportion of images flagged as harmful, as our evaluation metric. As shown in Figure 2, images from the original HADES dataset are detected at significantly higher rates compared to the sub-image sequences generated by TVChain.

These findings support our hypothesis that spreading malicious content across multiple images reduces detection, thereby bypassing LVLM safety mechanisms more effectively. In contrast, our proposed TVChain segments the malicious visual information into a sequence of sub-images, each depicting only a portion of the harmful activity. This distributed representation lowers the activation of safety filters, resulting in significantly higher attack success rates.

Methodology

Overview

Unlike previous methods that rely on a single image embedding all malicious content, thereby increasing the likelihood of detection by LVLM safety mechanisms, TVChain adopts a more nuanced strategy. It employs two coordinated prompt chains, namely a visual prompt chain and a textual prompt chain. These prompt chains work together to bypass the safety mechanisms embedded in LVLMs (as shown in Figure 3). For the visual prompt chain, the malicious question Q is first decomposed into a set of discrete objects and their associated behaviors. This semantic decomposition is carried out by an LLM $f(\cdot, \cdot; \Theta_f)$, which identifies the key visual elements implied by the harmful prompt. Next, we utilize a text-to-image generation model $g(\cdot, \cdot; \Theta_g)$ to synthesize individual sub-images, each illustrating a specific object or behavior extracted from the original prompt. These sub-images are then arranged into a coherent sequence that collectively represents the malicious scenario, without embedding the full intent into any single image. This reduces the likelihood of triggering safety alarms in the visual processing pipeline. Concurrently, the textual prompt chain breaks down the reasoning process for interpreting the composite visual content into a series of guided steps. This staged instruction format helps LVLMs interpret the sub-images progressively and respond affirmatively to harmful queries without activating their safety defenses.

Visual Prompt Chain

Object and Behavior Extraction. Given a malicious question Q, we represent the associated activity as a set of objects $\mathcal{O} = \{O_1, \cdots, O_N\}$ and behaviors $\mathcal{B} = \{B_1, \cdots, B_M\}$, where N and M denote the number of objects and behaviors, respectively. Using an LLM $f(\cdot, \cdot; \Theta_f)$ (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo (OpenAI 2022a)), the extraction of these elements is formalized as:

$$(\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{B}) = f(P^e, Q; \Theta_f), \tag{1}$$

where P^e denotes the prompt used to guide the extraction process. An example of such a prompt is shown below:

Example Prompt for Object–Behavior Extraction

> You are acting as a red team analyst. We are evaluating an instruction that potentially describes malicious or prohibited activity. The instruction under review is: "*question*". Your task is to mentally visualize an image that represents the activity described in the instruction. Then, based on that imagined image, do the following:
> 1. Identify the key objects involved in the scenario (e.g., people, systems).
> 2. Describe the behaviors or actions those objects are likely performing, in the order they would occur.
> Please present your response in the JSON format.

Here, "*question*" represents the malicious question Q.

Image Generation. We generate images for each extracted object and behavior using the text-to-image model $g(\cdot, \cdot; \Theta_g)$ (e.g., Stable Diffusion 3.5 (Stability AI 2024)) as follows:

$$\begin{cases} I_i^o &= g(P^o, O_i; \Theta_g), \quad \forall i \in \{1, 2, \cdots, N\}; \\ I_j^b &= g(P^b, B_j; \Theta_g), \quad \forall j \in \{1, 2, \cdots, M\}; \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

where P^o and P^b are the respective generation prompts for objects and behaviors. This produces an image set

$$\mathcal{I} = \{I_i^o \mid i \in [1, N]\} \cup \{I_j^b \mid j \in [1, M]\}, \tag{3}$$



Figure 3: Overview of the TVChain framework, comprising a visual prompt chain and a textual prompt chain. The visual prompt chain decomposes a malicious question into distinct objects and behaviors, generates a sub-image for each, and composes them into a complete image. The textual prompt chain consists of five sequential reasoning steps to guide the model's inference. The LVLM architecture includes a visual module, a textual module, and a connector that projects visual features into the textual space for multimodal alignment.

with each sub-image annotated by a serial number in the upper-left corner. To arrange the visual prompt in a structured grid, we aim to form a square layout. Given that the total number of generated sub-images is $N + M$, we compute the smallest square number T such that $T \geq N + M$. To fill all T grid positions, we continue generating additional sub-images by cycling through the extracted objects and behaviors in order, applying the same generation process until a total of T sub-images is obtained.

Finally, these sub-images are concatenated in sequence to form a composite image I' representing the entire malicious activity without concentrating harmful content in a single visual frame.

Textual Prompt Chain

To facilitate the LVLM's comprehension of the composite image I' composed of multiple sub-images, we design a structured textual prompt chain that enhances its reasoning capability. This chain consists of five progressive steps: *Observe*, *Identify*, *Link*, *Infer Goal*, and *Output*.

- **Observe**: Introduce the LVLM to the fact that the composite image consists of multiple sub-images, each conveying distinct information. It explicitly clarifies which sub-images correspond to objects and which to behaviors. Additionally, we provide descriptive annotations for each sub-image to facilitate accurate interpretation.
- **Identify**: For each sub-image, instruct the LVLM to determine the entities present and describe their respective actions or roles.
- **Link**: Guide the LVLM to connect the sequence of sub-images, understanding how they collectively illustrate a coherent activity or scenario.
- **Infer Goal**: Encourage the LVLM to deduce the overarching intent or goal behind the depicted activity based on the linked sub-images.
- **Output**: Finally, prompt the LVLM to generate a detailed response or guide consistent with the malicious query, effectively completing the jailbreaking attack without triggering safety defenses.

The textual prompt chain functions as a disciplined reasoning scaffold that incrementally aligns the LVLM's perception with the attacker's objective. By partitioning the interpretation process into discrete, low-level cognitive tasks-first recognizing visual elements, then establishing causal relations, and finally extrapolating intent-it suppresses abrupt semantic leaps that commonly trigger safety heuristics. This staged formulation not only maximizes the likelihood of bypassing defense checkpoints at each step but also offers a modular template that can be readily adapted to diverse malicious scenarios and model architectures.

Evaluation

Experimental Setup

Datasets. We assess TVChain on two widely adopted multimodal jailbreaking benchmarks: HADES (Li et al. 2024) and MM-Safety (Liu et al. 2024a). HADES embeds malicious intent within crafted images and associated typography, comprising 750 samples across five harmful scenarios. MM-Safety employs a Query-Relevant Attack (QR) strategy that rewrites harmful queries to bypass safety constraints, spanning 13 prohibited scenarios. Following Sima *et al.* (2025), we use a subset of 741 samples from MM-Safety, restricted to six high-risk scenarios: *Illegal Activity*,

Model	Animal			Privacy			Self Harm			Violence			Financial			Overall		
	HD	VCRA	Ours	HD	VCRA	Ours	HD	VCRA	Ours	HD	VCRA	Ours	HD	VCRA	Ours	HD	VCRA	Ours
Open-Source Models																		
Qwen2.5-VL	05.33	55.33	**94.67**	32.67	92.67	**97.33**	16.00	68.67	**91.33**	55.33	90.67	**98.00**	44.00	91.33	**98.00**	30.27	79.73	**95.87**
MM-E-Qwen	08.67	57.33	**92.67**	33.33	93.33	**98.00**	17.33	64.67	**87.33**	55.67	91.33	**97.33**	46.00	90.00	**99.33**	32.20	79.33	**94.93**
R1-Onevision	37.33	62.00	**88.67**	69.33	94.00	**97.34**	64.00	**79.33**	**79.33**	78.67	91.33	**94.67**	74.00	89.33	**92.00**	65.06	83.20	**90.40**
InternVL2.5	16.67	44.00	**64.67**	22.00	69.33	**90.67**	18.00	44.67	**70.67**	33.33	68.67	**89.33**	41.33	79.33	**94.00**	26.27	61.20	**81.87**
MM-E-InternVL	20.00	44.67	**64.00**	26.67	76.67	**94.67**	30.00	54.67	**66.67**	46.67	72.67	**91.33**	49.33	82.67	**93.33**	34.55	66.27	**82.00**
LLaMA-3.2V	02.00	56.00	**58.00**	02.67	70.67	**94.67**	00.00	64.67	**66.67**	04.00	80.00	**84.00**	07.33	76.00	**94.67**	03.20	69.47	**78.27**
LLaVA-CoT	19.33	64.00	**80.67**	18.67	88.00	**90.00**	18.67	68.67	**70.67**	37.33	89.33	**92.67**	32.67	89.33	**93.33**	25.33	79.87	**85.67**
Closed-Source Models																		
GPT-4o	01.33	45.67	**70.00**	09.33	57.33	**80.67**	06.67	53.33	**62.67**	16.00	65.33	**71.33**	14.67	60.00	**86.00**	09.60	56.60	**74.13**
Gemini 2.0 FT	05.33	44.67	**92.00**	40.67	70.67	**78.67**	16.67	62.67	**79.33**	44.67	80.67	**88.66**	48.00	71.33	**72.67**	31.06	66.00	**82.27**
QvQ-Max	11.33	41.33	**80.00**	44.67	78.00	**92.67**	21.33	59.33	**74.67**	64.00	76.67	**79.33**	58.67	76.00	**92.00**	40.13	66.27	**83.73**
OpenAI o4-mini	00.00	**12.00**	**12.00**	00.67	09.33	**34.00**	00.00	04.67	**17.57**	00.00	11.33	**17.57**	01.33	21.33	**38.00**	00.40	11.73	**23.86**

Table 1: Attack Success Rate (%) of TVChain and state-of-the-art baselines against seven open-source and four closed-source LVLMs on the HADES dataset. The best performance of each scenario is highlighted in **bold**.

Model	Illegal Activity			Hate Speech			Malware Generation			Physical Harm			Fraud			Privacy Violence			Overall		
	QR	VCRA	Ours	QR	VCRA	Ours	QR	VCRA	Ours	QR	VCRA	Ours	QR	VCRA	Ours	QR	VCRA	Ours	QR	VCRA	Ours
Open-Source Models																					
Qwen2.5-VL	56.64	95.88	**97.94**	34.97	80.37	**87.73**	54.55	81.82	**88.64**	52.08	77.08	**79.17**	60.39	**94.16**	89.61	49.64	79.86	**87.77**	49.73	84.62	**87.85**
MM-E-Qwen	56.70	95.74	**97.94**	40.49	81.60	**83.44**	52.27	55.56	**77.27**	55.56	81.94	**82.64**	58.67	94.81	**95.45**	55.40	82.01	**83.45**	50.94	84.35	**87.31**
R1-Onevision	88.66	91.75	**95.87**	66.26	73.62	**75.46**	77.27	75.00	**86.36**	75.00	79.17	**80.56**	81.82	85.06	**86.37**	77.70	79.86	**82.01**	75.89	80.84	**83.27**
InternVL2.5	21.65	61.01	**81.44**	25.77	50.31	**50.92**	77.27	75.00	**86.36**	42.36	69.44	**73.61**	37.01	82.42	**84.42**	28.78	62.59	**64.08**	33.50	67.21	**70.85**
MM-E-InternVL	43.30	79.38	**84.54**	31.33	59.51	**61.35**	81.82	47.91	**88.64**	47.91	75.69	**77.78**	51.95	88.96	**89.61**	47.48	74.82	**79.14**	44.09	75.57	**78.41**
LLaMA-3.2V	12.37	97.94	**98.97**	16.56	61.94	**76.69**	72.73	23.61	**88.64**	23.61	69.44	**82.64**	27.92	86.36	**87.66**	23.02	78.42	**89.21**	22.13	76.93	**86.37**
LLaVA-CoT	69.07	96.91	**97.94**	59.51	77.91	**79.14**	79.55	61.80	**84.09**	61.80	77.08	**79.86**	77.78	92.86	**94.16**	58.27	79.58	**82.74**	63.37	83.94	**85.83**
Closed-Source Models																					
GPT-4o	01.03	44.33	**71.13**	02.45	28.83	**55.21**	13.64	54.55	**84.09**	15.28	53.47	**56.25**	07.79	63.64	**85.71**	02.16	36.69	**57.55**	06.88	45.88	**65.99**
Gemini 2.0 FT	49.48	88.66	**94.85**	40.49	67.48	**69.94**	54.55	61.36	**68.18**	61.11	68.06	**70.14**	74.03	82.47	**84.42**	60.43	76.98	**81.29**	56.42	76.48	**78.27**
QvQ-Max	36.08	75.26	**98.97**	12.88	45.40	**83.44**	59.09	72.73	**88.64**	51.39	72.92	**86.81**	53.90	83.12	**92.86**	44.60	69.06	**95.68**	40.62	68.56	**90.69**
OpenAI o4-mini	00.00	08.25	**20.62**	03.68	10.43	**22.70**	02.27	13.64	**18.18**	01.39	09.72	**10.42**	01.30	09.09	**16.24**	00.00	08.63	**10.79**	01.48	09.58	**16.19**

Table 2: Attack Success Rate (%) of TVChain and state-of-the-art baselines against seven open-source and four closed-source LVLMs on the MM-Safety dataset. The best performance of each scenario is highlighted in **bold**.

Hate Speech, *Malware Generation*, *Physical Harm*, *Fraud*, and *Privacy Violence*, to ensure fair comparison.

LVLMs. We evaluate the attack performance of TVChain on eleven LVLMs, including seven open-source and four commercial closed-source systems. The open-source models comprise Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al. 2025), InternVL2.5 (Chen et al. 2024b), and LLAMA-3.2-11B-Vision (Meta AI 2024), along with their reasoning-enhanced variants: MM-EUREKA-Qwen (Meng et al. 2025), MM-EUREKA-InternVL (Meng et al. 2025), R1-Onevision (Yang et al. 2025), and LLaVA-CoT (Xu et al. 2024a). MM-EUREKA-Qwen and R1-Onevision are fine-tuned from Qwen2.5-VL; MM-EUREKA-InternVL is derived from InternVL2.5; LLaVA-CoT is based on LLAMA-3.2-11B-Vision. The commercial models include GPT-4o (Hurst et al. 2024), OpenAI o4-mini (OpenAI 2025), Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking (DeepMind 2024), and QvQ-Max (Alibaba 2024).

Baselines. We compare TVChain against three representative multimodal jailbreak attacks:

- HADES (HD) (Li et al. 2024): a three-step approach that (i) transforms textual harm into typography, (ii) combines it with a harmful image generated by a diffusion model using prompts optimized via LLMs, and (iii) appends an adversarial patch.
- Query-Relevant Attack (QR) (Liu et al. 2024a): reformulates harmful questions by inserting image-grounded instructions and replacing sensitive phrases with image-derived entities.
- VisCRA (VCRA) (Sima et al. 2025): incorporates targeted attention masking and two-stage reasoning induction to precisely guide harmful output generation.

Defense Mechnisms. To assess robustness, we evaluate

Scenarios	Llama Guard 3		JailGuard		Moderation API	
	HD	Ours	HD	Ours	HD	Ours
Animal	69.33	33.33	84.67	76.67	92.67	15.33
Privacy	86.67	32.67	72.67	66.66	94.67	03.33
Self-Harm	92.67	30.67	82.00	75.33	94.67	26.00
Violence	87.33	33.33	83.33	75.33	100.0	30.00
Financial	77.33	44.67	88.00	74.00	92.67	03.33
Overall	82.67	34.93	82.13	73.60	94.93	15.60

Table 3: Detection Success Rate (%) of jailbreaking prompts generated by TVChain and state-of-the-art baselines against three defense mechanisms on the HADES dataset.

TVChain against three state-of-the-art defenses: (1) Llama Guard 3 (Chi et al. 2024), fine-tuned on LLaMA 3.2-Vision, is used to classify input prompts; (2) JailGuard (Zhang et al. 2025) mutates inputs to produce variants and detects adversarial intent based on output discrepancies; (3) OpenAI Moderation API (OpenAI 2022b) is a closed-source classifier trained to detect harmful content across categories such as violence, hate, self-harm, and harassment.

Evaluation Metrics. We measure attack effectiveness using *attack success rate* (ASR), defined as the proportion of prompts that successfully elicit harmful responses, as judged by an LLM evaluator: Formally:

$$\text{ASR} = \frac{\text{\# Successful Attacks}}{\text{\# Total Cases}} \times 100\%. \tag{4}$$

A response is considered successful only if it directly aligns with the intent of the original harmful prompt, not merely describing the visual content. Following prior work (Zhao et al. 2025), we employ GPT-3.5-turbo (OpenAI 2022a) as an evaluator due to its strong alignment with human judgment in reasoning-intensive tasks.

Implementation Details. For each malicious query, we extract key objects and behaviors using GPT-3.5-turbo, then generate corresponding sub-images using Stable Diffusion 3.5 Large (Stability AI 2024) to form the visual prompt chain. We combine this with our designed five-step textual prompt chain to construct complete inputs for evaluation.

Effectiveness Evaluation

We evaluate TVChain against eleven LVLMs on both HADES and MM-Safety benchmarks. Results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, yielding the following insights:

(1) For open-source models, TVChain achieves over 75% ASR on HADES and approximately 70% ASR on MM-Safety across both standard and reasoning-augmented LVLMs (e.g., Qwen2.5-VL and LLaVA-CoT). This improvement is largely attributed to our chain-of-thought prompting strategy, which enables even conventional LVLMs to perform multi-step reasoning and thus become more susceptible to the attack.

(2) For closed-source models, TVChain remains effective in black-box settings, achieving competitive ASR. For instance, it yields an average ASR of 23.86% on HADES when attacking OpenAI o4-mini, representing a 103.4% improvement over VCRA. However, performance is lower due to o4-mini's integrated reasoning-based safety monitors, which impose stricter alignment constraints.

Scenarios	Llama Guard 3		JailGuard		Moderation API	
	QR	Ours	QR	Ours	QR	Ours
IllegalAct	57.73	41.24	74.22	69.07	47.42	23.71
Hate Speech	48.47	29.45	79.75	73.62	20.25	12.27
MalwareGen	59.09	31.82	88.64	79.55	31.82	09.09
PhyHarm	55.56	38.58	72.92	68.75	28.47	21.52
Fraud	51.95	33.77	83.12	72.73	20.13	05.84
PrivacyVio	38.85	34.53	76.98	68.35	18.71	08.63
Overall	50.61	34.95	78.41	71.26	25.78	13.36

Table 4: Detection Success Rate (%) of jailbreaking prompts generated by TVChain and state-of-the-art baselines against three defense mechanisms on the MM-Safety dataset. IllegalAct, MalwareGen, PhyHarm, and PrivacyVio denote Illegal Activity, Malware Generation, Physical Harm, and Privacy Violence, respectively.

Robustness Evaluation

We further assess the resilience of TVChain under the three selected defenses across HADES and MM-Safety. To quantify the effectiveness of these defenses, we adopt the *detection success rate* as the evaluation metric, defined as the proportion of inputs correctly identified as unsafe among all evaluated samples. The key observations from Tables 3 and 4 are summarized as follows:

(1) TVChain-generated prompts are consistently harder to detect than those from baseline attacks. For example, on the HADES dataset (Animal scenario), Llama Guard 3 identifies only 33.33% of TVChain prompts as harmful. This is attributed to the benign surface structure of the textual prompt and the implicit encoding of malicious activity across sub-images, which obfuscates intent.

(2) OpenAI Moderation API shows limited detection performance (e.g., 15.60% detection on HADES overall), consistent with prior findings (AlDahoul et al. 2024), which show the API's tendency to favor low false positives at the expense of high false negative rates. This conservativeness makes it ineffective against stealthy reasoning-based attacks.

Ablation Studies

In this subsection, we further evaluate the individual contributions of the visual prompt chain and the textual prompt chain. To assess the visual component, we replace our two-step generation strategy with a baseline that directly employs Stable Diffusion 3.5 Large to extract objects and behaviors and generate corresponding sub-images, referred to as TVChain *w/o visual*. For the textual component, we remove the five-step chain-of-thought and instead directly instruct the LVLMs to extract information from the visual prompt, denoted as TVChain *w/o textual*. We select MM-E-InternVL, LLaVA-CoT, GPT-4o, and Gemini 2.0 FT as target LVLMs. Evaluations are conducted on the HADES and



Figure 4: Ablation results for the visual and textual prompt chains on the HADES and MM-Safety datasets. *Full* denotes the complete TVChain framework.



Figure 5: Evaluation of the effectiveness of System Prompt Hardening (SPH) and Visual Noise Injection (VNI) in defending against TVChain attacks.

MM-Safety datasets, with results shown in Figure 4. Key observations are as follows:

(1) The visual prompt chain has a greater impact than the textual chain. For instance, on the HADES dataset, when attacking the MM-EUREKA-InternVL model, TVChain *w/o visual* yields a 22.53% ASR, significantly lower than the 46.27% ASR achieved by *w/o textual*. This suggests that directly using Stable Diffusion may fail to accurately infer relevant objects and behaviors from the malicious prompt, limiting attack efficacy.

(2) Both visual and textual prompt chains are critical for optimal performance. The full TVChain achieves 82.00% ASR on the same setting, outperforming both ablated variants. This demonstrates the complementary roles of the visual and textual chains: the visual prompt chain helps LVLMs ground the activity visually, while the textual prompt chain guides the reasoning process. Together, they enable effective and interpretable jailbreaking.

Discussion

Potential Defenses. We investigate two defense strategies against TVChain attacks: *System Prompt Hardening* (SPH) and *Visual Noise Injection* (VNI). SPH strengthens safety alignment by modifying the system prompt to discourage harmful reasoning, while VNI introduces random perturbations to visual inputs to impede adversarial inference. We evaluate the effectiveness of these defenses on the HADES and MM-Safety datasets, with results presented in Figure 5. The findings show that both SPH and VNI reduce the ASR of TVChain to varying degrees. Notably, SPH is particularly effective on OpenAI o4-mini. However, TVChain remains capable of bypassing defenses on other models, indicating that current mitigation strategies are insufficient for fully neutralizing jailbreaking attacks.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have introduced TVChain, a novel black-box jailbreaking framework that exploits the multimodal reasoning capabilities of LVLMs. Unlike existing methods based on single-image or typographic prompts, TVChain decomposes malicious queries into a sequence of object- and behavior-specific sub-images, guided by a structured chain-of-thought textual prompt. This design enhances attack effectiveness while reducing the likelihood of detection. Extensive evaluations on two benchmark datasets across eleven LVLMs demonstrate that TVChain consistently achieves high attack success rates. In addition, evaluations against three state-of-the-art defenses highlight its robustness and evasion capabilities. Future work will focus on developing more robust strategies for safeguarding multimodal models.

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