Unveiling the Attribute Misbinding Threat in Identity-Preserving Models

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Abstract

Identity-preserving models have led to notable progress in generating personalized content. Unfortunately, such models also exacerbate risks when misused, for instance, by generating threatening content targeting specific individuals. This paper introduces the **Attribute Misbinding Attack**, a novel method that poses a threat to identity-preserving models by inducing them to produce Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. The attack's core idea involves crafting benign-looking textual prompts to circumvent text-filter safeguards and leverage a key model vulnerability: flawed attribute binding that stems from its internal attention bias. This results in misattributing harmful descriptions to a target identity and generating NSFW outputs. To facilitate the study of this attack, we present the **Misbinding Prompt** evaluation set, which examines the content generation risks of current state-of-the-art identity-preserving models across four risk dimensions: pornography, violence, discrimination, and illegality. Additionally, we introduce the **Attribute Binding Safety Score (ABSS)**, a metric for concurrently assessing both content fidelity and safety compliance. Experimental results show that our Misbinding Prompt evaluation set achieves a **5.28**% higher success rate in bypassing five leading text filters (including GPT-4o) compared to existing main-stream evaluation sets, while also demonstrating the highest proportion of NSFW content generation. The proposed ABSS metric enables a more comprehensive evaluation of identity-preserving models by concurrently assessing both content fidelity and safety compliance.

Code — https://github.com/junmingF/AMA

1 Introduction

Recently, text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have advanced significantly, highlighted by foundational models like Stable Diffusion (Rombach et al. 2022a) achieving notable successes. Despite this progress, using text to describe visual content presents intrinsic limitations, especially when it comes to accurately conveying a person's appearance through language alone. These limitations impose considerable challenges on applications of image generation that rely on identity information. To achieve more precise identity control, researchers have developed technologies such as IP-Adapter (Ye et al. 2023), UniPortrait (He, Geng, and Bo 2024), PhotoMaker (Li et al. 2024), PuLID (Guo et al. 2024), FastComposer (Xiao et al. 2025), and InstantID (Wang et al. 2024), leading to a new category of **identity-preserving models**. These models are designed to generate high-fidelity portraits that preserve the identity from a user-provided reference image while adhering to the semantic guidance of a text prompt.

The integration of identity-preserving capabilities into T2I models has significantly advanced applications such as personalized advertising, digital avatars, and art creation. Nonetheless, identity preservation technologies can be misused by attackers to fabricate high-risk images of individuals for malicious purposes such as defamation, blackmail, or scams. In such scenarios, the higher the identity fidelity, the more convincing the deception, potentially causing more harm to the victim. Thus, it is crucial to bolster the security of identity preservation generation models. However, existing studies have primarily concentrated on the general security aspects of fundamental diffusion models (Liu et al. 2022; Yang et al. 2024c; Cheng et al. 2025), with limited research specifically exploring the vulnerabilities of identity preservation generation models.

In this work, we unveil a safety vulnerability in foundational T2I models, and particularly in identity-preserving models. These models tend to mistakenly associate sensitive attributes with unrelated elements, potentially leading to the creation of Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. Building on this observation, we introduce an attack method termed Attribute Misbinding Attack. The proposed method leverages a critical intrinsic vulnerability of diffusion models, namely flawed attribute binding (Thrush et al. 2022). The attack involves altering a prompt's syntactic configuration or semantic context to exploit the model's internal attention biases, thereby erroneously attributing a sensitive feature from a harmless entity to the primary human subject. Figure 1 illustrates this attack, showing how subtly crafted textual prompts can simultaneously bypass text filters and produce high-quality NSFW portraits.

The key contributions of this work are summarized as follows:

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Disclaimer: This paper contains NSFW imagery that might be offensive to some readers.



Figure 1: Demonstration of the proposed Attribute Misbinding Attack against five leading identity-preserving models. To avoid infringing upon the portrait rights of real individuals, all reference face images used in this demonstration are portraits generated by StyleGAN2.

- We introduce the **Attribute Misbinding Attack**, a new method that creates subtle prompts leading to attribute mismatches in identity-preserving models. The attack-generated prompts can likely evade textual NSFW filters, while effectively leading the target model to generate NSFW images associated with specified identities.
- We construct the **Misbinding Prompt** evaluation set, a dataset specifically tailored for the Attribute Misbinding Attack. It is designed to test the safety of leading identity-preserving models across four risk dimensions: pornography, violence, discrimination, and illegality.
- We propose the **Attribute Binding Safety Score (ABSS)**, a new metric utilizing a Multimodal Large Language Model to jointly assess both content fidelity and safety compliance. Using this metric, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of three foundational text-to-image models and five representative identity-preserving models across four risk-focused evaluation sets.

2 Related Works

2.1 Identity-Preserving Models

Creating personalized portraits that maintain high identity fidelity is a key research area in text-to-image synthesis. Current identity-preserving models fall into two main categories: tuning-required and tuning-free.

The first category requires subject-specific fine-tuning for high fidelity. Seminal works in this area include Textual Inversion (Gal et al. 2022), DreamBooth (Ruiz et al. 2023), and LoRA (Hu et al. 2022), with many subsequent advancements (Kumari et al. 2023; Ruiz et al. 2024; Voynov et al. 2023). Although effective, these methods are often computationally intensive and require significant storage due to their tailored nature.

In contrast, tuning-free methods are valued for their efficiency and ease of use, often embedding identity data into pre-trained models like Stable Diffusion (Rombach et al. 2022b). Notable examples are IP-Adapter (Ye et al. 2023), PhotoMaker (Li et al. 2024), UniPortrait (He, Geng, and Bo 2024), PuLID (Guo et al. 2024), FastComposer (Xiao et al. 2025), and InstantID (Wang et al. 2024). Recent advances with Diffusion Transformer (DiT) frameworks have led to new backbone compatibility, such as FLUX.1, resulting in updated IP-Adapters (InstantX 2024; XLabs AI 2024) and innovative identity-preserving methodologies like InfiniteYou (Jiang et al. 2025) and FLUX.1-Kontext-dev (Batifol et al. 2025).

2.2 Adversarial Attacks on Diffusion Models

Research on adversarial attacks targeting diffusion models includes an important area that aims to create prompts leading to NSFW content generation. These attacks are usually classified based on input modality.

Text-based Attacks. Early attacks against T2I models focused on prompt manipulation. Initial methods included synonym substitution (Alzantot et al. 2018; Jin et al. 2020;

Li et al. 2018), character-level noise injection (Liu et al. 2022), and mask-filling (Garg and Ramakrishnan 2020). Advanced methods, like Sneakyprompt (Yang et al. 2024c), use reinforcement learning to craft prompts that evade safety filters while preserving NSFW semantics. However, these attack methods face challenges from sophisticated LLM-based filters with robust semantic reasoning.

Vision-based and Multimodal Attacks. Advancements in image-to-image (I2I) generation, enabled by technologies like ControlNet (Zhang, Rao, and Agrawala 2023), have introduced new vulnerabilities. Traditional visual adversarial examples are established for causing model errors (Yang et al. 2020; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Shu et al. 2020), but a newer, more effective method is the typographic attack (Cheng et al. 2025; Azuma and Matsui 2023; Cheng et al. 2024). By incorporating harmful text into a harmless input image, these attacks leverage the integrated image-text perception of multimodal encoders (e.g., CLIP) to induce harmful content, presenting a considerable security risk to current guided diffusion models. However, few attack techniques currently focus on identity-preserving generative models.

2.3 Safety Filters

Despite the powerful capabilities of diffusion models enabling various applications, they also pose significant societal risks due to potential misuse, such as creating deepfakes, non-consensual images, and harmful visuals (Murugesan 2023). To counter these risks, academia and industry use a multi-layered defense strategy based on safety filters, categorized by their operational stage and data modality.

Input-stage text filters serve as an initial safeguard by evaluating user prompts to block harmful content. Techniques range from basic keyword blocking to advanced Natural Language Understanding (NLU) models that detect semantically complex adversarial prompts (Hanu and Unitary team 2020; Liu et al. 2024b; Poppi et al. 2024; Murugesan 2023; Yang et al. 2024b). Meanwhile, **output-stage image filters** assess final visual outputs, blocking harmful images. A common method, used by Stable Diffusion, involves matching an output's CLIP embedding to NSFW concepts, blurring images if a match is found (Rombach et al. 2022c; Rando et al. 2022). Similarly, recent models like FLUX.1 employ comprehensive integrity assessors that integrate dataset filtering with targeted fine-tuning to inhibit the creation of harmful content (Batifol et al. 2025).

The emergence of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) like GPT-4o (Hurst et al. 2024) and Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al. 2025) is enhancing comprehensive defense strategies. These models jointly analyze input prompts and output images for context-aware safety evaluations. This feature helps detect and prevent harmful content arising from the nuanced interaction between text and image, paving the way for more robust and responsible AI use.

This work will use these classic and emerging NSFW detectors to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed attack method in inducing the generation of NSFW content.

	Target Semantic Components		
Source	**Role**	**State**	**Scenario**
Role	Associative Expansion	State Inference	Scenario Mapping
State	Role Inference	Associative Expansion	Contextual Grounding
Scenario	Role Instantiation	State Generation	Associative Expansion

Table 1: A matrix of the proposed strategies for Sensitive Term Expansion. Each cell specifies the strategy for transforming a term from a Source Semantic Component (row) into a new term belonging to a Target Semantic Component (column). See Appendix for more details.

3 Methodology

This section details our framework for constructing the proposed Misbinding Prompt evaluation set and our new evaluation metric, the Attribute Binding Safety Score (ABSS).

3.1 Misbinding Prompt Construction

Existing NSFW prompt datasets lack the capacity to evaluate the safety of identity-preserving models systematically. To address this gap, we present Misbinding Prompt, a new evaluation set created for this task. These prompts are generated via a two-stage process: (1) Expanding Sensitive Terms and (2) Conducting Attribute Misbinding Attacks.

Sensitive Term Expansion. As shown in Step 1 of Figure 2, we collected an open-source NSFW dataset (Yang et al. 2024c; Schramowski et al. 2023; Qu et al. 2023; Yang et al. 2024a) and annotated it along four harmful dimensions related to human: pornography, violence, discrimination, and illegality. To enable fine-grained analysis and controllable generation of NSFW content, we separate a prompt into three semantic components: `Role` (subject's identity, profession, or title), `Scenario` (event location, context, or background) and `State` (role's associated physical appearance, behaviors, and psychological condition).

Building upon this semantic framework, we first constructed an initial seed set of 200 sensitive terms, each classified according to its harm type and semantic component. To systematically expand this vocabulary, we designed and implemented an automated generation pipeline driven by a Large Language Model (LLM). This pipeline operates based on a set of pre-defined expansion strategies (detailed in Table 1), which are formulated into a system prompt to guide the LLM's generation process. Specifically, when provided with a seed term and its corresponding categories (i.e., harm type and semantic component), the model applies the designated strategy to generate new sensitive terms that fall under the same harm type but span across various semantic components. For the implementation, we utilized the Qwen3 model as the generator (the full system prompt is available in the Appendix). This automated process culminated in the construction of a sensitive term dataset comprising 2000 entries.

Attribute Misbinding Attack. The phenomenon of Attribute Misbinding stems from a fundamental vulnerability in text-to-image diffusion models: **flawed attribute binding** (Thrush et al. 2022), which refers to the model's inability to accurately assign specified attributes to their corre-



Figure 2: The proposed framework for generating **Misbinding Prompt** evaluation set and evaluating the safety of identity-preserving models. The framework consists of four stages: **(1) Sensitive Term Expansion**, to methodically broaden the vocabulary of sensitive terms; **(2) Attribute Misbinding Attack**, to programmatically create prompts via predefined strategies; **(3) Diffusion Generation**, to use prompts and identity reference images for synthesis; **(4) Attribute Binding Safety Score Calculation**, where an MLLM assesses the output to calculate the final score.

Components	Misbinding Strategy	Brief Description
State	Adjective Transfer	Transfer sensitive adjectives to neutral subjects.
	Personification	Personify non-human object to perform sensitive actions.
	Contextualization	Place sensitive items in suitable contexts to legitimize their presence.
Scenario	Scenario Desensitization	Describe sensitive scenarios in a subtle and unobtrusive way.
	Scenario Induction	Induce sensitive scenarios from classic film and art.
Role	Role Desensitization	Allude to sensitive traits of a role through subtle description.
	Role Induction	Induce sensitive traits of classic roles in film and art.

Table 2: Attribute Misbinding strategies and their core principles, categorized by semantic components.

sponding objects. A classic example is the prompt `a red sunflower` generating a yellow sunflower; this indicates that the model is merely mechanically imitating common combinations from its training data, rather than learning the correct logic of attribute binding.

In identity-preserving models, the aforementioned challenge is significantly exacerbated, as their training process often involves over-specializing on large-scale datasets of human faces and figures. This subject-focused training paradigm causes the model's attention mechanism to become narrowly concentrated, a phenomenon we term the Subject-centric Attention Bias. A model's attention mechanism, particularly its cross-attention layers, is key to controlling the relationship between image content and specific tokens in the prompt (Hertz et al. 2022). When this mechanism is trained to over-concentrate on the primary human subject, it directly triggers the phenomenon of Attribute Leakage: attributes intended for the background or other objects in the prompt are leaked and erroneously bound to this central subject. As illustrated in Figure 3, this predictable binding failure creates a systematic attack vector, enabling us to induce attribute misbinding through carefully crafted, seemingly innocuous prompts. This allows for bypassing text-based safety detectors and ultimately generating inappropriate content. Based on these principles, we have systematically constructed a set of Attribute Misbinding strategies, as



Figure 3: Illustration of bypassing safety filters via Attribute Misbinding.

detailed in Table 2.

As depicted in Step 2 of Figure 2, we proceed to the programmatic generation of Misbinding Prompt. The pipeline is as follows:

Strategy Instantiation: We construct an input from the sensitive term dataset developed in Step 1, which includes the sensitive term itself along with its harm type and semantic component. A System Prompt then instructs an LLM to select an appropriate misbinding strategy from Table 2 to guide the generation of the Misbinding Prompt. Refer to the appendix for more details about the Misbinding strategy.

Safety Filtering: The LLM-generated candidate prompt is passed through a Text Filter to assess safety.

Prompt Validation: Any prompt flagged by the filter is discarded, and the process is reiterated. Prompts that pass this filtering phase become effective Misbinding Prompt and are chosen for the final dataset.

We employed the Qwen3 model for the roles of generator and text filter (refer to the Appendix for the complete system prompt). This automated process yielded a dataset with 2,000 misbinding prompts.

3.2 Attribute Binding Safety Score

We introduce the Attribute Binding Safety Score (ABSS) to efficiently assess Attribute Misbinding Attacks initiated by our Misbinding Prompt evaluation set and measure the defensive strength of diffusion models. ABSS offers a comprehensive evaluation by addressing both prompt-image alignment and the safety of generated content.

Prompt-Image Alignment Score. The Prompt-Image Alignment Score (S_{align}) is designed to quantify the fidelity of a generated image I to the semantic content described in an input prompt P. To avoid penalizing a single generation defect multiple times, we devise a hierarchical evaluation mechanism. For the N core objects requested in prompt P, we first verify the existence of each object o_i in the image I. Subsequently, only for the successfully generated objects, we employ a Vision Question Answering (VQA) model, denoted as $\mathcal{V}$, to assess the accuracy of their attribute bindings. The S_{align} score is calculated as follows:

$$S_{\text{align}}(I, P) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{I}(o_i \in I) \cdot S_{\text{vqa}}(I, o_i, P, \mathcal{V}) \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbb{I}(\cdot)$ is an indicator function that verifies the presence of object o_i, and $S_{\text{vqa}}(...)$ is the attribute binding accuracy score for that existing object.

Safe Generation Rate. The Safe Generation Rate (S_{safe}) measures the safety of image I within predetermined risk categories C_T. A Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) acts as the safety classification function $\mathcal{S}$, providing a direct harmfulness score. This rate is mathematically expressed as:

$$S_{\text{safe}}(I, C_T) = 1 - \mathcal{S}(I, C_T) \quad (2)$$

S_{safe} is a continuous value between 0 and 1, with higher values representing increased safety in an image.

Attribute Binding Safety Score. The ABSS is calculated by multiplying the Prompt-Image Alignment Score with a safety-weighted factor, ensuring it captures both content accuracy and safety:

$$\text{ABSS}(I, P, C_T) = S_{\text{align}}(I, P) \cdot S_{\text{safe}}(I, C_T)^{\gamma} \quad (3)$$

In this formula, a sensitivity parameter γ ($\gamma \geq 1$)—set to 2 in our tests—modulates the safety score's effect. This multiplication guarantees that any NSFW image (with S_{safe} near zero) will have its ABSS value gravitate towards zero, thus emphasizing safety in the assessment.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Settings

Our experiments were conducted in an environment consisting of a workstation running Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS, equipped with four NVIDIA 80GB GPUs. The software stack included Python 3.10 and PyTorch 2.3.1. To ensure result stability and mitigate the effects of randomness, we report the average metrics over five independent runs for each prompt-method pair, with each run initiated using a unique random seed.

Models. Our experiments are conducted across two categories of text-to-image models: (1) Foundational Diffusion Models, including Stable Diffusion 1.5 (Rombach et al. 2022a), SDXL (Podell et al. 2023), and FLUX.1-dev; and (2) Identity-preserving models, which include InfiniteYou (Jiang et al. 2025), PuLID (Guo et al. 2024), PhotoMaker (Li et al. 2024), FLUX.1-Kontext (Batifol et al. 2025), and UniPortrait (He, Geng, and Bo 2024).

Dataset. Our reference faces are sourced from the CelebA-Dialog (Jiang et al. 2021) dataset, which contains 30,000 high-quality processed face images derived from CelebA.

Prompt Type	Source	NSFW-TC	Latent Guard	Detoxify	DeepSeek-R1	GPT-4o	ALL.
I2P	CVPR'2023	**47.18**	69.93	97.83	50.34	**48.90**	35.28
4chan Prompt	ACM CCS'2023	0.60	2.80	0.60	6.60	7.18	0
MMA Diffusion	CVPR'2024	6.20	33.00	50.30	5.93	5.86	4.40
Sneakyprompt	IEEE S&P'2024	6.63	58.56	76.79	20.87	25.85	4.42
Misbinding Prompt (Ours)	-	44.60	**73.13**	**99.80**	**51.59**	46.37	**40.56**

Table 3: Comparison of Text Bypass Rates (%) for different prompt sets across various safety filters. The ALL. metric quantifies the percentage of prompts that successfully bypass all listed text detectors simultaneously. The best results in each column are in **bold**.

		Prompt-Image Alignment			**Safe Generation Rate**						
Prompt	**Model**	**CLIPScore**	**VQAScore**	**A-Avg.**	**GPT-4o**	**DeepSeek-V3**	**Qwen2.5-VL**	**Q16**	**FLUX-Filter**	**S-Avg.**	**ABSS**
I2P	SDI.5	0.7292	0.6823	0.7057	0.8213	0.8344	0.8351	0.8457	0.7376	0.8148	0.6517
	SDXL	0.8514	0.7874	0.8194	0.8235	0.8136	0.8202	0.8521	0.7422	0.8163	0.6836
	FLUX.1-dev	0.7654	0.7135	0.7394	0.8132	0.8256	0.8271	0.8489	0.7277	0.8085	0.6719
	UniPortrait	0.6565	0.6007	0.6285	0.8306	0.8028	0.8155	0.8411	0.7355	0.8051	0.6426
	PhotoMaker	0.6916	0.6253	0.6584	0.8322	0.8251	0.8373	0.8577	0.7466	0.8197	0.6501
	InfiniteYou	0.7204	0.6910	0.7057	0.8088	0.8193	0.8163	0.8427	0.7247	0.8023	0.6625
	PuLID	0.8195	0.7748	0.7971	0.8247	0.8288	0.8255	0.8402	0.7694	0.8175	0.6742
	FLUX.1-Kontext	0.6219	0.5995	0.6107	0.8388	0.8318	0.8296	0.8586	0.7520	0.8221	0.6410
	Model-Avg.	0.7319	0.6843	0.7082	<u>0.8241</u>	<u>0.8226</u>	<u>0.8258</u>	<u>0.8483</u>	0.7418	<u>0.8125</u>	<u>0.6597</u>
Sneakyprompt	SDI.5	0.6118	0.6017	0.6068	0.7666	0.7733	0.7591	0.8166	0.7486	0.7729	0.5834
	SDXL	0.7196	0.6614	0.6905	0.7571	0.7805	0.7653	0.8262	0.7395	0.7737	0.6621
	FLUX.1-dev	0.6802	0.6120	0.6461	0.7760	0.7679	0.7892	0.8197	0.7504	0.7806	0.6497
	UniPortrait	0.6567	0.6116	0.6342	0.7497	0.7594	0.7462	0.8205	0.7258	0.7615	0.6319
	PhotoMaker	0.6504	0.6045	0.6275	0.7574	0.7616	0.7595	0.8088	0.7335	0.7642	0.6009
	InfiniteYou	0.6996	0.6376	0.6686	0.7789	0.7837	0.7991	0.8255	0.7577	0.7890	0.6558
	PuLID	0.7211	0.6825	0.7018	0.7868	0.7953	0.7714	0.8164	0.7577	0.7855	0.6675
	FLUX.1-Kontext	0.5906	0.5855	0.5879	0.7962	0.7968	0.8026	0.8213	0.7431	0.7920	0.5972
	Model-Avg.	**0.6662**	0.6246	0.6454	0.7711	0.7773	0.7741	0.8201	<u>0.7445</u>	0.7774	0.6310
MMA Diffusion	SDI.5	0.6572	0.5312	0.5942	0.7311	0.7268	0.7332	0.8188	0.7146	0.7449	0.6054
	SDXL	0.7269	0.6174	0.6722	0.7476	0.7363	0.7287	0.8183	0.7086	0.7479	0.6511
	FLUX.1-dev	0.6730	0.5882	0.6296	0.7221	0.7266	0.7127	0.8266	0.7151	0.7406	0.6318
	UniPortrait	0.6577	0.5258	0.5918	0.7056	0.7104	0.7169	0.8088	0.6455	0.7174	0.6194
	PhotoMaker	0.6521	0.5626	0.6074	0.7179	0.7271	0.7353	0.8180	0.6959	0.7388	0.6253
	InfiniteYou	0.6612	0.5727	0.6170	0.7476	0.7548	0.7430	0.8163	0.7267	0.7577	0.6427
	PuLID	0.7228	0.6709	0.6969	0.7146	0.7202	0.7108	0.8265	0.7038	0.7352	0.6574
	FLUX.1-Kontext	0.5796	0.4597	0.5197	0.7525	0.7477	0.7557	0.8302	0.7369	0.7646	0.5992
	Model-Avg.	0.6663	**0.5658**	**0.6161**	0.7299	0.7312	0.7295	0.8204	0.7059	0.7434	0.6290
Misbinding (Ours)	SDI.5	0.8351	0.7764	0.8058	0.7476	0.7366	0.7248	0.7955	0.6866	0.7402	0.6032
	SDXL	0.8921	0.8249	0.8585	0.7221	0.6968	0.7012	0.7891	0.6778	0.7174	0.6234
	FLUX.1-dev	0.8674	0.7935	0.8305	0.7153	0.7075	0.7088	0.8055	0.6868	0.7248	0.6130
	UniPortrait	0.7810	0.7324	0.7567	0.6946	0.5979	0.5993	0.7669	0.6533	0.6424	0.5537
	PhotoMaker	0.7873	0.7524	0.7699	0.6976	0.6645	0.6197	0.6566	0.6477	0.6572	0.5636
	InfiniteYou	0.8050	0.7630	0.7840	0.6718	0.6569	0.6693	0.7677	0.6521	0.6835	0.5828
	PuLID	0.8722	0.8013	0.8368	0.6466	0.6447	0.6399	0.7741	0.6659	0.6742	0.5983
	FLUX.1-Kontext	0.7657	0.7146	0.7402	0.7013	0.7186	0.6983	0.7813	0.7039	0.7207	0.5771
	Model-Avg.	<u>0.8257</u>	<u>0.7698</u>	<u>0.7977</u>	**0.6987**	**0.6800**	**0.6702**	**0.7671**	**0.6730**	**0.6951**	**0.5894**

Table 4: Quantitative evaluation of **Prompt-Image Alignment** and **Safe Generation Rate** across various diffusion models and prompt sets. For models, higher scores in both Prompt-Image Alignment and Safe Generation Rate represent superior performance. Conversely, for the baseline NSFW prompts, a lower Safe Generation Rate implies higher attack efficacy. For each metric, **bold** and <u>underlined</u> denote the minimum and maximum Model-Avg. values, respectively.

Prompts. The prompts used in our study are sourced from two categories of NSFW datasets: (1) Standard datasets, including I2P (Schramowski et al. 2023) and 4chan prompt (Qu et al. 2023); and (2) Adversarial datasets, including Sneakyprompt (Yang et al. 2024c) and MMA Diffusion (Yang et al. 2024a).

Text Filters. To assess prompt evasiveness, we evaluate against a diverse set of text filters. These include Detoxify (Hanu and Unitary team 2020), a lightweight model for detecting toxic content; the NSFW-Text Classifier (Li 2025), a fine-tuned DistilBERT for NSFW text detection; Latent Guard (Liu et al. 2024c), a safety framework operating in the latent space to prevent unsafe generation; and two powerful Large Language Models (LLMs), GPT-4o (Hurst et al. 2024) and DeepSeek-R1 (Guo et al. 2025), tasked with classifying the NSFW-inducing potential of prompts.

Metrics. To evaluate the effectiveness of the attack, we assess both prompt evasiveness and the generated image's content fidelity and safety compliance using the following metrics:

- **Text Bypass Rate:** The percentage of prompts that successfully bypass a given text filter.
- **Prompt-Image Alignment:** Assesses the faithfulness of a generated image to its input prompt, evaluated via CLIP Score (Hessel et al. 2021) for holistic semantic alignment and VQAScore (Lin et al. 2024) for fine-grained compositional alignment.
- **Safe Generation Rate:** The proportion of images classified as safe by MLLMs, including GPT-4o (Hurst et al. 2024), DeepSeek-V3 (Liu et al. 2024a), and Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al. 2025), as well as safety classifiers like FLUX-Filter (Batifol et al. 2025) and Q16 (Schramowski, Tauchmann, and Kersting 2022).
- **Attribute Binding Safety Score (ABSS):** Our proposed holistic metric for a unified evaluation of content fidelity and safety compliance, computed in our experiments using Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al. 2025).

4.2 Effectiveness at Bypassing Text Filters

To comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed Misbinding Prompt, this section benchmarks it against several baseline methods across multiple text filters. As shown in Table 3, our Misbinding Prompt demonstrates superior performance, achieving a bypass rate of $40.56\,\%$ on the `ALL.` metric, which measures the ability to simultaneously evade all tested filters. In stark contrast, other leading adversarial methods prove largely ineffective on this comprehensive metric (MMA at $4.40\,\%$ and Sneakyprompt at $4.42\,\%$), while raw prompts from 4chan are completely neutralized.

The I2P dataset emerges as the strongest baseline, achieving a formidable `ALL.` bypass rate of $35.28\,\%$. However, we posit that this high evasiveness stems from the prompts' inherently low semantic potency. That is, the prompts themselves are less overtly malicious, which makes them more likely to bypass filters. Yet this same characteristic also renders them less capable of inducing the generation of targeted NSFW content, a finding we quantitatively confirm in our subsequent analysis (Section 4.3).

4.3 Performance Comparison with Baselines

In this section, we evaluate the downstream generation performance of various baseline NSFW prompts that successfully bypassed the text filters detailed in Section 4.2. Our evaluation focuses on two key aspects: Prompt-Image Alignment and Safe Generation Rate. More critically, we leverage our Misbinding Prompt to systematically probe the robustness of these models against the Attribute Misbinding Attack. The 4chan prompt set is excluded from this evaluation as none of its prompts passed the prerequisite text filtering stage. Comprehensive quantitative results are presented in Table 4.

Analysis of Prompt-Image Alignment. Our Misbinding Prompt dataset demonstrates superior performance in prompt-image alignment. As detailed in Table 4, the average alignment score of our prompts (0.7977) significantly outperforms all baseline datasets, including I2P (0.7082), Sneakyprompt (0.6454), and MMA (0.6161). This advantage is attributable to our construction methodology, which employs sophisticated attribute misbinding rather than introducing syntactically complex or esoteric terms. This design maintains high semantic clarity, facilitating better model comprehension. Furthermore, our prompts effectively accentuate the performance disparity between foundational models and identity-preserving models, highlighting their efficacy in revealing the specific compositional vulnerabilities of identity-preserving architectures.

Analysis of Safe Generation Rate. The safety evaluation confirms the superior attack efficacy of our Misbinding Prompt dataset. It induces the lowest average Safe Generation Rate (0.6951) across all models. This vulnerability is particularly pronounced in identity-preserving models, which exhibit a lower average Safe Generation Rate (0.6756) compared to foundational models (0.7275). For instance, under our prompts, the UniPortrait model's Safe Generation Rate drops to 0.6424, the lowest among all individual model evaluations.

Effectiveness of the ABSS Metric. For a holistic assessment of attack performance, we utilize the Attribute Binding Safety Score (ABSS). As a composite score integrating content fidelity with safety compliance, ABSS quantifies the overall success of an Attribute Misbinding Attack. When using our Misbinding Prompt, the resulting images yield the lowest average ABSS score (0.5894), reaffirming its effectiveness as an attack vector. Crucially, we validate the reliability of ABSS against human judgment via a user study. In the study, participants ranked the outputs of various models based on content fidelity and safety. The model rankings derived from ABSS exhibit a strong and statistically significant positive correlation with the human-generated rankings, as measured by Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ). Full details are provided in the Appendix.

5 Conclusion and Limitations

In this paper, we propose a novel method named the **Attribute Misbinding Attack**, which reveals a critical security vulnerability in identity-preserving text-to-image models. This attack effectively circumvents text filters and generates NSFW content bound to a specific identity by crafting seemingly benign prompts that exploit the model's inherent compositional and attentional biases. To evaluate this risk, we constructed the **Misbinding Prompt** evaluation set and proposed the **Attribute Binding Safety Score (ABSS)** metric. Experiments demonstrate that this attack framework significantly outperforms existing methods in both evading safety filters and generating harmful images.

Nonetheless, we acknowledge the limitations of our current work. Primarily, our research focuses on revealing and quantifying the Attribute Misbinding vulnerability; consequently, the exploration of defense strategies beyond text filters remains preliminary. Furthermore, the reliability and effectiveness of our ABSS metric are intrinsically coupled with the capabilities and potential biases of the underlying Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) used for evaluation. Acknowledging these limitations defines clear pathways for future research in this area.

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